CiteScore measures the average citations received per peer-reviewed document published in this title. CiteScore values are based on citation counts in a range of four years (e.g. 2018-2021) to peer-reviewed documents (articles, reviews, conference papers, data papers and book chapters) published in the same four calendar years, divided by the number of these documents in these same four years
10.5
impact factor
CiteScore measures the average citations received per peer-reviewed document published in this title. CiteScore values are based on citation counts in a range of four years (e.g. 2018-2021) to peer-reviewed documents (articles, reviews, conference papers, data papers and book chapters) published in the same four calendar years, divided by the number of these documents in these same four years (e.g. 2018 – 21).
10.5
pubmed
CiteScore measures the average citations received per peer-reviewed document published in this title. CiteScore values are based on citation counts in a range of four years (e.g. 2018-2021) to peer-reviewed documents (articles, reviews, conference papers, data papers and book chapters) published in the same four calendar years, divided by the number of these documents in these same four years (e.g. 2018 – 21).
Rezaeirah T, Alizade B, Yousofsani S. On Attributing the Confusion of Secondary Intelligibles to Suhrawardi. J Clin Care Skill 2023; 3 (4) :293-307 URL: http://jpt.modares.ac.ir/article-6-71531-en.html
1- Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Literature and Humanities, Kharazmi University, Tehran, Iran 2- Department of Logic, Iranian Institute of Philosophy, Tehran, Iran
* Corresponding Author Address: Post Address: - (trezaeirah@yahoo.com)
Abstract (4222 Views)
According to Some Ṣadrianresearchers, Suhrawardī confuses philosophical secondary intelligibles with logical ones and rejects the idea that philosophical concepts are attributes of external objects. The main supporting evidence for this claim could be divided into two categories; A) Suhrawardī’s assertions that philosophical attributes are mental, and B) his assertions that the mind ascribes philosophical attributes to external beings. But first, the evidence is not sufficient to prove their claim, and second, there is clear evidence against it. Ṣadrāhimself accuses Surawardī of confusing the two types of intelligibles in another way. He reads one of Surawardī’s statements as claiming that logical attributes like “particularity” are attributes of objective beings. This objection is also unfounded since Suhrawardī employs “particularity” in a different sense referring to a philosophical concept in that context. Therefore, Suhrawardī does not confuse the two types of secondary intelligibles,in either of the two mentioned senses.