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Volume 2, Issue 2 (2022)                   J Clin Care Skill 2022, 2(2): 105-119 | Back to browse issues page

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Alaeinejad H. Evaluating Wright and Noonan's Externalist Arguments against Skepticism. J Clin Care Skill 2022; 2 (2) :105-119
URL: http://jpt.modares.ac.ir/article-6-62294-en.html
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Authors H. Alaeinejad *
Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Literature and Humanities, University of Isfahan, Isfahan, Iran
* Corresponding Author Address: Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Literature and Humanities, University of Isfahan, Azadi Square, Isfahan, Iran. Postal Code: 8174673441 (hamid.alaeinejad@gmail.com)
Abstract   (3562 Views)
Putnam argues that accepting semantic externalism would require refuting the brains-in-a-vat skeptical hypothesis, and as a result, the skeptic will not succeed in proving her claim. Putnam's argument, however, is epistemically circular and inconclusive. The present article is devoted to evaluating Wright and Noonan's attempt to provide a plausible version of Putnam's argument. Based on the evaluation of these arguments, it was determined that (1) Wright and Noonan's arguments can at best only show that I am not a brain in a vat, but without the use of any auxiliary premises, they can not prove that we are not brains in a vat; (2) Contrary to Wright's claim, this premise of his argument that In BIVese, “brain-in-a-vat” does not refer to brains-in-a-vat, and its result, that is, that my language is not BIVese, lead his argument to be epistemically circular; and (3) Noonan's attempt to avoid epistemic circularity has not led to the desired result, and his argument, like Wright's, is epistemically circular.
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