This article raises a claim different from the common attitude toward the relationship between the absurdity of life and suicide. In the common attitude, one believes that one commits suicide if and only if his life becomes absurd. This can be objected to in two ways: a priori and posterior. In the first path, to analyze this proposition, we should obtain a proper notion about the concepts of absurdity of life and suicide. After this clarification, we can reflect on the relation between these two concepts. In the second path, we should find two kinds of cases: (1) mentioning suicides that are committed by ones with meaningful lives, (2) considering some absurd lives which did not end up committing suicide. Thus, rejecting the aforementioned proposition a priori and posterior, we can mention new relations between life's absurdity and suicide. This article aims to first scrutinize accounts around death and second justifying lives worth living different from common attitudes around the meaningfulness of lives. In this article, we will only evaluate this contradiction by referring to western-christen thinkers, and we will show that unlike the common attitudes, suicide is not necessarily based on deep thoughts about life.