Philosophical Thought
eISSN : 0000-0000
10.5
citescore
CiteScore measures the average citations received per peer-reviewed document published in this title. CiteScore values are based on citation counts in a range of four years (e.g. 2018-2021) to peer-reviewed documents (articles, reviews, conference papers, data papers and book chapters) published in the same four calendar years, divided by the number of these documents in these same four years
10.5
impact factor
CiteScore measures the average citations received per peer-reviewed document published in this title. CiteScore values are based on citation counts in a range of four years (e.g. 2018-2021) to peer-reviewed documents (articles, reviews, conference papers, data papers and book chapters) published in the same four calendar years, divided by the number of these documents in these same four years (e.g. 2018 – 21).
10.5
pubmed
CiteScore measures the average citations received per peer-reviewed document published in this title. CiteScore values are based on citation counts in a range of four years (e.g. 2018-2021) to peer-reviewed documents (articles, reviews, conference papers, data papers and book chapters) published in the same four calendar years, divided by the number of these documents in these same four years (e.g. 2018 – 21).
10.5
Embase
Biosis Preview
About GMJ Medicine
GMJ Medicine is an open-access, online, peer-reviewed journal that has been published by the Afarand Scholarly Publishing Institute in Germany since 2017. The new series of the journal started publishing in January 2021. The publication frequency of GMJ Medicine is Quarterly (4 issues per year).
All research articles submitted to GMJ Medicine should be original in nature, never previously published in any journal or undergoing such process across the globe. All the submissions will be peer-reviewed by the panel of experts associated with a particular field.
All research articles submitted to GMJ Medicine should be original in nature, never previously published in any journal or undergoing such process across the globe. All the submissions will be peer-reviewed by the panel of experts associated with a particular field.
28.3 days
Average Time to First Review
65 days
Average Time to Accept
24.2 days
Average Time to Publish
100 %
Acceptance Rate
Editor-in-chief
Articles
Alethic Pluralism and the Problem of Mixed Discourse
H. Alaeinejad
Alethic pluralism maintains that truth is realized by different truth-conferring properties in different domains of discourse. A challenge for this view arises from mixed discourse: propositions and inferences that combine content from distinct domains. This paper examines the problem at three levels: mixed atomic propositions, mixed compound propositions, and mixed inferences. Its central claim is that these forms of mixed discourse are not equally problematic. Moderate versions of alethic pluralism, especially Lynch’s functionalist account, can explain mixed compounds and mixed inferences by appealing to a higher-order property of truth shared across domains. Mixed atomic propositions, however, remain resistant to such treatment because they involve cross-domain interaction at the most fundamental semantic level. The paper concludes that the ultimate viability of alethic pluralism depends on its ability to provide a convincing account of mixed atomic propositions.
View Abstract
Pre-Beingness; Reconsidering the Problem of Ground in the Horizon of Meta-Ontology, Knowledge, and Manifestation
M.A. Montazeri
The notions of priority, foundation, and condition of possibility have been among the most pervasive themes in the history of philosophy. Yet philosophical traditions have largely focused on identifying particular foundations rather than examining the structure of priority itself. This paper introduces the concept of “Pre-beingness” as an independent philosophical problem and investigates whether it is merely an epistemic presupposition or a more fundamental structure underlying being, cognition, and manifestation. Using reexamining ontological, epistemological, and phenomenological traditions, the study argues that structures of priority, grounding, referentiality, and conditionality recur throughout the history of thought. The findings suggest that pre-beingness is neither an entity, nor a mode of being, nor merely an epistemological category; rather, it is a meta-ontological structure that makes grounding, explanation, understanding, manifestation, and directedness possible. Accordingly, pre-beingness may be understood as the universal condition of priority relations and the common horizon within which philosophical foundations become intelligible.
View Abstract
“Immortality as a Project” of Bostrom and Kurzweil versus “Mortality as a Condition” of Heidegger
M. Anjomrooz , M. Khezri
This article compares two radical formulations of the human condition: “immortality as project” in the transhumanism of Bostrom and Kurzweil, versus “mortality as condition” in Heideggerian ontology. The central question concerns the ontological and ethical implications of transforming death from a structural condition of Dasein into a technical problem. Through a comparative conceptual analysis, it is shown that in Being and Time, death as an insurmountable possibility constitutes the structure of temporality, authentic identity, and resoluteness. In contrast, by relying on radical life extension and mind uploading, transhumanism views death as a removable risk and the human as an optimizable information pattern. This shift reduces temporality to endless duration, embodiment to interchangeable hardware, and identity to informational continuity. Finally, this paper argues for a technology that serves the richness of human meaning within finitude, rather than seeking to eliminate death.
View Abstract
The Mind–Body Problem 3.0 and the Reduction of the Proper Task of Philosophy of Mind; a Critique of Jacob Nathan's View
R. Dargahifar
Jacob Nathan argues that the mind–body problem has historically worn three different faces, and that, in light of its most recent face, the proper task of philosophy of mind in the present era is restricted to investigating how the mind can be empirically studied within the neuroscientific age, thus requiring that ontological investigations be set aside. This paper offers a reconstruction and critical evaluation of Nathan's position. An instance of the articulation of the proper task of philosophy within contemporary mind studies can be observed in the 'critical neuroscience' approach as expounded by David Låg Tomasi. Tomasi conceives of philosophy not as a peripheral discipline, but as a "Philosophy as basic approach toward neuroscience." On this account, philosophy, in its relation to neuroscience, is charged with analyzing theoretical presuppositions, interpreting empirical data, integrating various levels of explanation, and appraising the existential, ethical, and social consequences of neuroscientific research—without relinquishing its own ongoing inquiries into its characteristic problems.
View Abstract
Three Modes of the Problem of Evil
S.M. Eslami
Much has been written about the various forms of the problem of evil, such as the distinction between the logical and evidential versions. However, it is also worthy to attend to the different modes of the problem of evil. Here, I illustrate how we can distinguish three modes of the problem of evil: curiosity, decision, and challenge. In other words, we can understand the relationship between God and the evils of the world in three ways: as a curiosity question, a decision question, and a challenge question. After introducing these three modes, I use several examples to show that attending to them is useful and illuminating for understanding and evaluating positions on the problem of evil. By considering these modes, we can better understand familiar distinctions, articulate differences among responses to the problem of evil more clearly, and evaluate arguments more comprehensively.
View Abstract
Three Philosophical Ideas About Education
This article adopts a philosophical-critical approach to reconsider the concept of education and the idea of the school in the contemporary world. By tracing the historical development of education from the Greek concept of paideia to the modern school, the author argues that the aim of education has shifted from cultivating virtue and citizenship to serving economic functions and producing human resources. Influenced by instrumental rationality and neoliberal logic, the modern school has become more a mechanism of discipline and standardization than a space for nurturing free and creative individuals. In response, the article proposes three fundamental ideas: reviving the notion of the teacher-philosopher, moving education beyond the exclusive framework of the school institution, and strengthening critical thinking among educational leaders, teachers, and policymakers. The study concludes that future education should focus on forming responsible, free, creative, and participatory human beings.
View Abstract
The Development of the Concept of “Eternal Necessity” in Islamic Logic
“Eternal necessity” is a key concept in Islamic modal logic, and determining its nature and distinction from “absolute necessity” has long been a subject of debate among Avicennian logicians. This study, employing an analytical-historical method, examines the views of thinkers such as Avicenna, Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, al-Abharī, and others to explore the relationship between these two forms of necessity and the criteria of eternality.
The findings reveal that disagreements among logicians stem less from fundamental conflicts than from divergent interpretations of Avicenna’s expressions—particularly regarding the relationship between “perpetuity,” “necessity,” and “eternality.” This study identifies two major approaches within the Avicennian tradition: one that grounds eternality in the essence of the subject, and another that attributes it to the perpetuity of the subject-predicate relationship. This distinction serves as the core of the conceptual evolution of eternal necessity in Islamic logic.
View Abstract
The findings reveal that disagreements among logicians stem less from fundamental conflicts than from divergent interpretations of Avicenna’s expressions—particularly regarding the relationship between “perpetuity,” “necessity,” and “eternality.” This study identifies two major approaches within the Avicennian tradition: one that grounds eternality in the essence of the subject, and another that attributes it to the perpetuity of the subject-predicate relationship. This distinction serves as the core of the conceptual evolution of eternal necessity in Islamic logic.
Internalism and Normative Authority: A Critique of Bernard Williams and Stephen Finlay
Internalism about normative reasons grounds moral normativity in our psychological states by positing a necessary connection between such reasons and an agent’s motivational set. Externalists reject this constraint. A central locus of this dispute concerns the interpretation and evaluation of Bernard Williams’s seminal argument for internalism.
Drawing on the work of Stephen Finlay, this article first isolates four standard readings of Williams’s argument, introduces Finlay’s own distinct interpretation, and subsequently subjects these accounts to critical scrutiny. The discussion then turns to Finlay’s broader theoretical framework. By employing contextualism and an end-relational analysis of moral concepts, Finlay attempts to decouple the "existence" of reasons from their "significance"—seeking to preserve the spirit of internalism within an externalist framework. Ultimately, the paper argues that Finlay’s account falls prey to the very same fundamental objection that plagues Williams’s view: it fails to provide an adequate account of morality's normative authority.
View Abstract
Drawing on the work of Stephen Finlay, this article first isolates four standard readings of Williams’s argument, introduces Finlay’s own distinct interpretation, and subsequently subjects these accounts to critical scrutiny. The discussion then turns to Finlay’s broader theoretical framework. By employing contextualism and an end-relational analysis of moral concepts, Finlay attempts to decouple the "existence" of reasons from their "significance"—seeking to preserve the spirit of internalism within an externalist framework. Ultimately, the paper argues that Finlay’s account falls prey to the very same fundamental objection that plagues Williams’s view: it fails to provide an adequate account of morality's normative authority.
A Critique of Adopting Category Theory as a Framework for Ontological Structuralism
Ontological structuralism aims to eliminate fundamental objects from ontology and elevate the status of relations. On the other hand, category theory offers a framework for representing a metaphysical view according to which (possible) worlds lack inner structure, including a domain of fundamental objects. To demonstrate this, we first rule out a naïve approach to category-theoretic structuralism, then examine the preferred approach at two levels of complexity (with respect to sets and relational structures). We establish that category-theoretic structuralism is committed to possible-world realism and, being limited to the resources of category theory, cannot distinguish the actual world in a non-indexical way. Moreover, since the world is emptied of fundamental inner structure and relations are removed from this metaphysical picture along with objects, the resulting view aligns more closely with monism than structuralism. Apparently, structuralists have not fully considered these metaphysical consequences of adopting the category-theoretic framework.
View Abstract
The absurdity of Life and Suicide
M.M. Fallah
This article raises a claim different from the common attitude toward the relationship between the absurdity of life and suicide. In the common attitude, one believes that one commits suicide if and only if his life becomes absurd. This can be objected to in two ways: a priori and posterior. In the first path, to analyze this proposition, we should obtain a proper notion about the concepts of absurdity of life and suicide. After this clarification, we can reflect on the relation between these two concepts. In the second path, we should find two kinds of cases: (1) mentioning suicides that are committed by ones with meaningful lives, (2) considering some absurd lives which did not end up committing suicide. Thus, rejecting the aforementioned proposition a priori and posterior, we can mention new relations between life's absurdity and suicide. This article aims to first scrutinize accounts around death and second justifying lives worth living different from common attitudes around the meaningfulness of lives. In this article, we will only evaluate this contradiction by referring to western-christen thinkers, and we will show that unlike the common attitudes, suicide is not necessarily based on deep thoughts about life.
Graham Priest on Reconstruction of Hegel’s Logic and Metaphysics in Modern Logic
K. Farsian, S.M.A. Hodjati
In this paper, we will try to reconstruct Hegel’s logic and metaphysics through modern logic. Graham Priest has claimed that we can read Hegel’s logic with the paraconsistent approach to logic, specially Dialetheism; he calls Hegel a Dialetheist. At first, we report Priest’s account of Hegel’s dialectic and his notion of dialectical contradiction; also, we try to analyze Priest’s argument for calling Hegel a Dialetheist. To achieve the proper comparison between Hegel’s logic and Dialetic one, we explain, non-technically, the simple semantics of a Dialetic logic. Furthermore, finally, we establish a criticism of Priest’s account to reopen the question about Hegel’s being Dialetheist.
Analysis of Rorty's Point of View Regarding the Separation of the Private Sphere from the Public Sphere
N. Soleimani, A. Fath Taheri, Sh. Peyk Herfeh
Challenging the entire western philosophical tradition, which in his opinion has caused useless theoretical dualisms throughout the history of philosophy, Rorty wants to attempt to deconstruct and eliminate these dualisms in the context of redemptive literary culture. By creating a dividing line between the private and public spheres, Rorty wants to specify the contribution and involvement of philosophers in presenting theoretical and philosophical views and to say that the political sphere does not need to acquire foundations from the individual criteria of the private sphere. It is as if Rorty wants to prevent the philosopher's ambitions and interference with theorizing by reducing philosophy to literature. In fact, he believes in the distinction between private and public spheres or politics, the philosopher's tool is imagination and his intellectual sphere is literary culture and his place is the private sphere. Assuming the acceptance of pragmatic criteria, doesn't this division of a person in two completely different areas make him a dual personality? Can this intellectual stance be reasonable and acceptable?
View Abstract
The Gabriel Marcel on Inauthenticity; a Critical Study
Z. Malakoutikhah, M.J. Safian
The notion of the characteristics of an ignoble human being in Gabriel Marcel's thought revolves around components such as establishing an I - s/he relationship with others, unpreparedness and unopenness in relations with others, and presence in the realm of having. To that end, it will become clear that by establishing an I-you relationship, being present to other human beings in the realm of being becomes noble, but by examining Marcel's ideas it became clear that the dominance of science and technology over human beings paved the way for the formation of a mass society and further, it intensifies the functional view of human, and as a result all these factors, increases the intensity and speed of ignobility of contemporary mankind. In this study, which aimed to explain the factors of nobelity and ignobility from Gabriel Marcel's point of view, it became clear that he believes to emerge from unoriginality. a human being should be able to freely choose, to accept responsibility, to communicate with the secret and to have characteristics such as love, loyalty, faith and hope.
View Abstract
Could it be that the Burden of Proof is not on Theist?
H. Ghadiri, S.K. Vahabi
In his classic paper on the philosophy of religion entitled ‘The Presumption of Atheism’, Antony Flew, relying on a traditional legal rule, extracts a methodological rule according to which the burden of proof in the problem of God’s existence is non-restrictedly on the Theist. Here we argue that from another legal rule in Islamic jurisprudence, we can extract another methodological rule that, in contrast to Flew’s rule, is context-dependent; so, applying this new rule, we can imagine that in some situations, the burden of proof would be on atheist. Since there are some historical evidence for the relationship or even identification of that traditional rule and this Islamic rule, it could be concluded that Flew’s rules, too, should be context-dependence. Hence, his non-restricted claim about the burden of proof in the problem of God’s existence will be rejected.
The Requirement of Voluntary Act in Criminal Law and Attempts at Its Moral Justification
H. Mahboobi Arani
For a crime to be realized, the defendant is judged as a criminal with moral and legal liability, deserving to be punished properly; Anglo-American legal theory appeals to the Requirement of Voluntary Act (RVA), a necessary and comprehensive requisite. According to this requisite, the criminal act has consisted of Mens rea and Actus reus, with voluntary acts as the Actus reus in its restricted conception. Moral and legal philosophers have attempted to provide various moral explanations for the RVA, particularly utilizing theories of action philosophy. In this paper, I introduce the RVA as it is articulated in Anglo-American legal theory (in first two parts) and then illustrate and review five different possible moral rationales that could be deduced. Finally, I will conclude my paper with some hints about my preferable view and set forth questions concerning the very validity of such attempts at philosophically moral justification.
A critique on the belief of Wonder: the beginning of philosophy and arguing for Surprise: the origin of abductive inference
M. Zaker
The article’s main aim is to investigate the relationship between wonder and philosophical thoughts and between surprise and abductive thoughts. We critique the Platonic belief that philosophy begins from wonder and argue that the explanatory and normalizing function of knowledge in societies and naturalistic ontology neutralizes the astonishment and makes ineffective its impact on philosophical thoughts. In contrast, we argue that the genesis of philosophical thought is due to deep speculation and introspective temperament of the mind and skeptical exploration of the existing knowledge and beliefs. Abduction has been the recent research subject of various disciplines. Next, the paper is devoted to a new investigation of abductive inference, subjective abduction, and its relationship with the emotion of surprise and dramatic events. We explain this amazing mental ability regarding subjective estimation of probability and intuitive expectation. At last, some fallacies arising from abductive reasoning are discussed.
Cryptic Cosmology in the Mystical Stories of Sheikh Eshraq
A. Elyasi, M. Akhlaghi
Even today, Sheikh Eshraq's cryptic stories can be a great guide to us. In the sense that they can make human beings and show us the world around them. Because Sheikh in these stories regularly seek to represent the hierarchy of the universe and the position of the human in his proof that the human soul was the abstract light that originated in the set of existence. But the material body that belongs from the sacred universe has fallen to the darkness of the material universe, and it has been captured there. Then happiness comes back to its original itself. So, to identify more the main place soul of human speech in these cryptic stories, he has arranged the quadruple hierarchy of the universe based on the problem of the sulk and love between lights in the form of secret and the form of detailed that consist of universe wisdom, universe egos, objects, and purgatory universe and example universe among these factors Sheikh Eshraq emphasized the universe or imagination. It is the storytelling scene of his cryptic.
Application of Rumi and Gabriel Marcel's Views in Hope Therapy
N. Nazarnejad, F. Golshan Roghani, M. Shoaakazemi
The present study is interdisciplinary in applying philosophy through its collaboration with psychology and literature. This article examines hope according to the two great thinkers; Rumi, a Muslim mystic and writer, and Gabriel Marcel, a Christian existentialist philosopher. The purpose of this study is to provide a basis for the work of philosophical counselors and psychotherapists. For this reason, the views of Richard Snyder, the theorist and founder of hope therapy in contemporary psychology, are also introduced in the present study to bring Rumi and Marcel's views on hope closer to the topics of hope therapy, and the similarities are derived from being used by philosophical advisors. According to the findings of this research, the hope that Rumi speaks of is a clear and guiding hope that, if used properly, can become a positive moral trait in human beings; The hope that arises from man's need for God and will always be the way to man's spiritual progress. Marcel also considers hoping a tool for faith and closeness to the higher being, which causes a person to be spiritually ready to serve other human beings. This spiritual preparation frees man from the snare of the shattered world of which Marcel speaks. By comparing Snyder's theory of hope and Rumi's view of hope, we find similarities between the views of these two philosophers in the components of hope. The examination of Snyder's theory of hope and Marcel's view of hope also reveals the intellectual similarity of the two thinkers on the vital role of hope in life. Athir al-Dīn al-Abharī and some contemporaries on Conditional Logic
A. Fallahi
Athir al-Dīn al-Abharī was the only Avicennan logician who denied the validity of conditional syllogism. He was also the first who doubted in the validity of conversion and contraposition of conditionals and dispensed with them. In the contemporary era, after 1968, some logical consequence systems have evolved under the title ‘Conditional Logic’, which rejected the validity of the same rules. A similarity between al-Abharī’s system and these contemporary’s is in their commitment to Modus Ponens and Modus Tollens. Analyzing the reasons that the two groups provided for denying conditional syllogism reveals that their rejections were rooted in their novel interpretations of ‘strict conditional’. On al-Abjarī’s view, the strict conditional ‘whenever A then B’ means that ‘A implies B in all assumptions in which the implication between A and B is possible’. On the contemporary conditional logicians’ view, the conditional proposition ‘if A then B’ in natural languages means that ‘other things being equal, A implies B’. The two interpretations are common in the fact that in addition to the assumption of antecedent, they both assume matters which are somehow related to the antecedent, and this is the common root for both groups to deny the validity of conditional syllogism.
Murphy’s Holistic Physicalism on Mind Problem
S. Abdollahi, M. Nasiri
Based on the interaction between science and religion, Nancy Murphy turns to a special version of non-transitive physicalism that uses empirical science, physicalism, and the Bible to formulate her holistic physicalism; A middle position between essential dualism and illusionism that defines humans as spiritual beings and hides the problem of the mind within it. Murphy brings the soul into holistic physicalism with his theological assumptions and not with scientific evidence and philosophical arguments. The distinguishing feature of non-transmission physicalism from transmission physicalism is the attention to the explanatory gap in the issue of supervenience. Holistic physicalism has not filled this gap and has only changed the form of the problem from explaining the relationship between human parts to explaining the relationship between human dimensions. Therefore, combining the universal and weak perceptions of supervenience, along with the positive and negative teachings of holistic physicalism, that is, the use of pure holistic physicalism and avoiding introducing theological presuppositions in a philosophical theory, can be used to solve the problem.
View Abstract
Source of the Contradiction in the Kripke Puzzle
M.A. Yousefi Poor
One of the most important issues in the reference section of the philosophy of language is the sense of the proper names. Two main figures in this discussion are Friedrich Ludwig Gottlob Frege and John Stuart Mill. Frege has posed several puzzles against Mill's view. One of the puzzles is the puzzle of the belief context. the puzzle of the belief context implies that Mill's view of proper names is incorrect because it entails an account of the Substitution Principle (S) which is the origin of contradiction in the belief context. (S) is accounted in two ways. Frege shows in his puzzle that S1 is responsible for contradiction in belief context. Since Mill’s view entails S1, it is responsible for contradiction. But if Frege’s view of proper names is accepted, since the referent of proper names in belief context is identical with the sense of proper name in ordinal context, S2 which is more intuitive than S1 is not violated in any context. Kripke, a prominent advocate of Millie's view, shows the puzzle of the belief context can be reproduced even if Frege's view of the sense of the proper names is accepted. He designs his first puzzle by two intuitionally true principles (Disquotation and Translation), and designs his second puzzle by only Disquotation Principle. David Sosa, a proponent of Frege's view, claims that He has been able to revive Frege's puzzle against Mill, which Kripke believes he was able to neutralize with two similar puzzles. On his opinion, intuitionally true Hermeneutic principle is violated in the context of belief only if Millian view is accepted. In this paper, after explaining Sosa's proposal, a concern have been proposed about it. The concern is related to the analytical nature of line 7 of Frege’s puzzle, line of 8 of Kripke’s first puzzle, and line of 7 of Kripke’s second puzzle. Sosa believes that these lines are analytic. Nevertheless, according to the scenario of puzzles, being analytic of these lines is not clear. Because of this unclarity, Steinberg claims that these lines are responsible for contradiction.
Phronesis and its Relationship with Theoretical Wisdom According to Aristotle
H. Roshani Rad
In Nicomachean ethics, Aristotle divides the soul into two fundamental parts, the knowing part and the calculating part, the virtue of the first part is theoretical wisdom (Sophia) and the virtue of the second part is practical wisdom (Phronesis). This distinction is based on the ontological distinction between becoming and stability because the subject of practical wisdom is the realm of changeable affairs and the subject of theoretical wisdom is eternal affairs. In this research, we will first show that the intuitive intellect or Nous is the connecting factor of these two realms: Nous receives the ultimate principles from both sides, in the framework of theoretical knowledge, Nous knows the most general concepts of eternity and in the framework of Practical wisdom receives the partial individual. We will also argue that practical wisdom is the agent of realization of theoretical wisdom: Phronesis is the power of receiving the highest good, that is, the life according to the Sophia. The interpretation of the relationship between Phronesis and Sophia as a “necessary – end” suggests a way out of two conflicting interpretations of Aristotle’s ethics- the rationalist and holistic interpretation of happiness – which we will address.
View Abstract
Some Remarks on Teaching Logic in Higher Education Institutions
M.M. Haeri
In different branches of science, the word 'logic' can denote different scientific activities. Logic courses taught in humanities departments and the ones taught in engineering departments only share similar course titles, several preliminary definitions, and examples. This raises the question about the nature of logic and the purpose for teaching it to students of different academic majors in higher education institutions. Normally, the answer would be that logic, similar to other courses, equips students with tools or skills they will need in their studies. But what are these tools and skills, and what is the best method for teaching them to students of different academic majors? This article aims to answer this question by examining the three major options: Aristotelian logic, first-order predicate classical logic, and informal logic. I try to demonstrate philosophical and psychological reasons in favor of teaching informal logic as the main material in introductory courses in logic, specifically introductory courses aimed at students who do not major in logic.
The Problem of Emanation in Farabi; From Aristotelian- to Independent Works
H. Ahmadizade
Surveying the problem of emanation in Farabi's view, has some difficulties like that does for Farabi this problem is a fundamental problem in metaphysics or a secondary one? In this issue we are confronted with two main difficulties: one is that some scholars doubted to two Farabi's works that he discussed there the problem of emanation, mean Fosus Al-hekam and Ouoon Al-masael. They cannot say that these two books certainly are Farabi's books. But the more difficult problem is that Farabi's views on the problem of emanation are different in his works. It seem that some of Farabi's books are basically written in the Aristotelian context and some of his books are from his personally views. In addition, there is another difficulty: Farabi discussed the problem of emanation in some of his books that are not basically metaphysical but are psychological. In the present article, we try to survey these difficulties in Farabi's works.
View Abstract
Intelligible Forms, Inherence and the Materiality of the Soul
A. Zadyousefi
According to Avicenna's theory of knowledge, intellectual knowledge in human beings is explained via the inherence of intelligible forms in the soul. In this paper, I will show that the inherence of intelligible forms in the soul is at odds with the soul's immateriality.
A Critical Look on Polkinghorne's Point of View; Insufficiency of Uncertainty Principles in Physics to Explain Divine Agency
F. Barzegar Tabrizi, S.M.A. Dibaji
In the philosophy of religion, Divine Agency has been related to how God does his action in the human world and the physical world. Polkinghorne has presented a particular method to answer this question. His theological approach has been a combination of Classical Theology and Process Theology. On the one hand, he has said that the God defined in Classical Theology is too unavailable, and on the other hand, he has criticized the Process approach to God. Polkinghorne has established that Epistemology is equal to Ontology, and based on this fact, he has explained his Critical Realism. In his view, the guaranty of reality is not to understand it but is its objectivity. Uncertain situations in Modern Physics presented in Einsteinian Relativity, Quantum Theory, and Chaos Theory is the main areas Polkinghorne has constructed his specific theory about Divine Agency on them.
Explaining the Ontological Differences between Islamic Transcendent Philosophy and Emergentism on the Soul-Body Problem
M. Toossi Saeidi, S.H. Hosseini
Emergentism bears similarities to the Islamic Transcendent Philosophy about the relationship between the soul and the body. At the same time, despite these similarities, there seem to be fundamental differences in the ontological picture of these two. The main issue of this paper is to identify these differences. The result of this effort can be summarized as saying that the ontological foundations of Emergentism are consistent with scientific findings, while this is not the case with Transcendent Philosophy, and that there are fundamental differences between the ontological picture of Transcendent Philosophy and Emergentism in relation to the soul and the body relation; Differences rooted in the contradiction between the classical or Aristotelian image of the world and the new scientific image of the that.
Argument of Matter and Form on the Unity of the Reasoner and Reasonable and the Analysis of the Suspicion of Allegory and Confiscation
M.R. Ershadinia
One of Hakim Sabzevari's arguments on the reasoner and reasonable :union: of matter and form is the argument, in which he considers the ontological principles of matter, form, and soul on the one hand, and on the other hand, he has put the view of Sadra's psychology as the basis for the completion of this argument. In order to distort all the arguments of Hakim Sabzevari, a published article accusing Hakim of gross confusion in recognizing the basic contents of philosophy. In this regard, in refuting the argument of matter and form, that article has turned to two major accusations. On the one hand, Hakim has been accused of using allegorical syllogism instead of argumentative syllogism, and on the other hand, it has condemned Hakim for the objection of confiscation. The analysis shows that this argument is based on total unity and that article has been distorted both in terms of reporting and in judgment, it has deviated to adopt illogical positions.
View Abstract
Analytic Thomism; History, Challenges, and Lessons
S.M. Eslami
Thomism has had a continuous history from the 13th century, and some think it is unique in this regard. Each time, it experienced different forms and took different approaches, as in the twentieth century, there are also transcendental Thomists and existentialist Thomists. However, it took longer for analytic philosophy and Thomism to have interaction, and it did not happen until the attempts by Peter Geach, Elizabeth Anscombe, and Anthony Kenny. Then, in the 1990s, John Haldane, drawing on these works, coined the term Analytic Thomism. Here I explore this movement by focusing on some of its aspects. First, we will see the historical phases of Thomism. Then, we review the roots of analytic Thomism as we know it now. After looking at some examples of the works done in this tradition, some challenges for analytic Thomism are presented and discussed. By way of conclusion, a few remarks about “Analytic Islamic philosophy” are discussed.
Indexing and Abstracting
