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Volume 6, Issue 2 (2026)                   3 2026, 6(2): 1001-1011 | Back to browse issues page
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Habib Mamkarimmi, Mehri Mortazavi. Does the Theory-Ladenness of Observation Necessarily Entail Constructivism?. 3 2026; 6 (2) :1001-1011
URL: http://jpt.daneshafarand.org/article-6-85698-en.html
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Abstract   (51 Views)
The thesis of the theory-ladenness of observation claims that neutral, unbiased observation is impossible. Based on this thesis, some philosophers have inferred that facts—or more precisely, reality independent of mental influences—do not exist, and that human knowledge of the world is a social construct. The aim of this paper is to assess whether the theory-ladenness of observation necessarily entails a constructivist view, or whether it still allows us to speak about reality. To this end, the concepts of "theory-ladenness of observation" and "constructivism" will be clarified. It will then be argued that although the theory-ladenness of observation is acceptable, we are not compelled to adopt constructivism; rather, this thesis can provide an attractive framework for realist theses. Finally, some implications of this view for evaluating epistemological proposals will be indicated.