Philosophical Thought
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Volume 5, Issue 4 (2025)
J Clin Care Skill 2025, 5(4): 689-702 |
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History
Received: 2025/06/22 | Accepted: 2025/07/27 | Published: 2025/10/12
Received: 2025/06/22 | Accepted: 2025/07/27 | Published: 2025/10/12
How to cite this article
Mahdavi Sula A. From the Will to Truth to Liberation from it; André van der Braak’s Comparative Reading of Nietzsche and Nāgārjuna. J Clin Care Skill 2025; 5 (4) :689-702
URL: http://jpt.modares.ac.ir/article-6-81638-en.html
URL: http://jpt.modares.ac.ir/article-6-81638-en.html
Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Literature and Humanities, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran
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The dominant history of philosophy has long been marked by an enduring metaphysical orientation toward an ultimate truth—one that either transcends the human, sensible world or is conceived as a rational, holistic structure that grounds being and knowledge from within the world. Plato’s allegories of the Cave and the Line exemplify this, positing a split between the phenomenal world and a higher realm of fixed truth, shaping the philosopher’s quest beyond ordinary life toward truer reality [Plato, 1997]. This dualism pervades Western philosophy—from medieval scholasticism linking the finite and transcendent via divine reason [Pasnau, 2009], through modern rationalism’s suspicion of sensory experience in favor of pure reason [Everitt & Fisher, 1994], to German idealism’s distinction between the phenomenal and foundational domains enabling experience [Pätzold, 2005]. Within this framework, values like beauty, justice, and freedom are grounded in metaphysical truth. Yet, the validity and desirability of the will to such truth remain insufficiently questioned. Nietzsche’s genealogical critique reframes this will not as pure desire for knowledge but as an ascetic, life-denying ideal inherited from earlier religious asceticism, privileging otherworldly absolutes over lived experience [Foucault, 1978; Clark, 2022; Ardebili, 2021]. He considers this desire an obstacle to authentic and elevated living.
Likewise, Buddhist traditions—especially Nāgārjuna’s Madhyamaka—stand against classical Indian metaphysical systems like Vedānta and Nyāya, which uphold doctrines of essential realities such as Ātman and ultimate truth [Kaisar, 2024; Kumar, 2022; Panda, 2025], rejecting fixed essences and promoting emptiness as liberatory insight [Patil, 2009; Aich, 2013; van der Braak, 2011]. Thus, dogmatic will to truth may hinder enlightenment, a key insight shared by Nietzsche and Nāgārjuna.
André van der Braak’s comparative study offers a lens to explore how these traditions interrogate and transcend the metaphysical will to truth, opening paths toward existential authenticity and freedom. This article uses a descriptive-analytical approach to trace these critiques and assess van der Braak’s interpretive nuances and limitations.
Nietzsche’s examination of truth goes beyond theory to genealogical, psychological, and ethical dimensions of the human drive to know [Nietzsche, 2013]. He challenges the self-evident “will to truth,” probing its historical origins, motivations, and ethical consequences. Van der Braak explains that Nietzsche begins with epistemological skepticism—doubting the possibility of representing reality as it is—but moves toward questioning the value of truth itself [van der Braak, 2011: 33]. Early works like “On Truth and Lies in an Extramoral Sense” accept the possibility of a “world in itself” but portray it as inaccessible, mediated entirely by linguistic metaphors and concepts. This skepticism evolves into ontological skepticism, questioning the independent existence of reality [van der Braak, 2011: 33; Hinman, 1982]. Nietzsche rejects the metaphysical separation of “apparent” and “real” worlds, proposing perspectivism—truth as interpretive and value-laden. His genealogy reveals the will to truth rooted not in love of knowledge but in ascetic denial of life’s vitality, inheriting an ideal that devalues the sensory world [Mitcheson, 2013; van der Braak, 2011: 34]. Even science rests on metaphysical faith in objective reality [van der Braak, 2011: 34]. Nietzsche questions whether truth should always be preferred over falsehood, suggesting illusions sometimes better promote life than truth [Nietzsche, 1924:164]. Van der Braak highlights Nietzsche’s concept of “self-overcoming” the will to truth—not by abandoning truth to relativism, but through embracing life-affirming, existential “truthfulness” free from absolutes [Girard, 2016; van der Braak, 2011: 42]. Nietzsche’s skepticism thus enables a creative philosophy transcending nihilism toward courageous affirmation and honest self-expression.
Early Buddhist traditions, especially Abhidharma schools, systematized consciousness into impermanent, insubstantial elements called dharmas—considered the only real entities. Nāgārjuna’s emptiness doctrine (śūnyatā) challenges even these, diagnosing them as covert essentialism [van der Braak, 2011:36; Huntington & Wangchen, 1989]. He presents emptiness as radical epistemological and ontological skepticism, liberating thought from foundationalist commitments. Van der Braak notes that dharmas reflect a metaphysical desire—a “will to possess a final, clear form of the world,” a cognitive thirst (tanhā) that perpetuates suffering [van der Braak, 2011:36]. Nāgārjuna’s emptiness negates intrinsic essences and rejects claims to absolute truth independent of dependent origination [van der Braak, 2011:36]. Using the tetralemma (catuṣkoṭi), he deconstructs dualities like existence/non-existence, exposing metaphysical contradictions [Priest, 2010; van der Braak, 2011:37]. Unlike Plato’s hierarchical dualism of truth and reality, Nāgārjuna initially distinguishes between conventional truth (saṁvṛti-satya) and ultimate truth (paramārtha-satya); yet, through the radical application of śūnyatā śūnyatā—the emptiness of emptiness—he ultimately dissolves this very dualism. In this view, the ultimate truth does not transcend or negate conventional truth but rather coincides with it, revealing that there is no realm of truth beyond lived and conditioned reality [van der Braak, 2011: 40; Jones, 2020]. For Nāgārjuna, truth is a provisional, pragmatic tool (upāya) that eases suffering and enables freer living [Schroeder, 2000]. Van der Braak reads this as an internal critique of the will to truth that preserves sensitivity to suffering while avoiding conceptual traps. Like Nietzsche, Nāgārjuna’s skepticism undermines dualisms and foundationalisms not by negation or acceptance but by opening a flexible, impermanent, and open existential space, promoting lived wisdom beyond dogma.
Nietzsche and Nāgārjuna, from distinct traditions, converge critically in their rejection and transcendence of the metaphysical “will to truth” anchored in fixity and absoluteness. Van der Braak emphasizes that their shared endeavor is not a mere rejection of dogmas but a structural critique of the craving for immutable truth. Both enact internal ruptures, genealogically and existentially questioning the will’s value, psychological role, and implications for freedom. Nietzsche destabilizes epistemology by rejecting knowledge’s representational model and the “world in itself,” favoring a genealogical psychology that views the will to truth as an ascetic ideal—a life-denying impulse that shadows lived experience [van der Braak, 2011; Mitcheson, 2013]. Simultaneously, Nāgārjuna dismantles Abhidharma’s conceptual fixity, revealing it as cognitive craving (tanhā) perpetuating suffering. His emptiness deconstructs essentialism and teleology, employing tetralemma to dissolve dualities and show conceptual contingency [van der Braak, 2011; Priest, 2010]. Both reject the truth/falsehood binary not through nihilism or passive negation, but through radical conceptual revision, allowing skepticism to be self-transcendent. This transcendence dissolves the need for absolute foundations, shifting from Nietzsche’s “existential truthfulness,” rooted in life affirmation and creativity, to Nāgārjuna’s prajñā—liberating insight that frees existence from conceptual bondage. Each proposes a philosophical áskēsis cultivating new relations to self and world. Van der Braak sees Nāgārjuna’s method illuminating Nietzsche’s non-essentialist project and his hermeneutic of upāya as key to understanding Nietzsche’s skepticism as philosophy’s radical revaluation of values [van der Braak, 2011]. Fundamentally, both anchor philosophy in lived practice, where truth is a dynamic tool for self-overcoming and liberation.
André van der Braak’s comparative reading in Nietzsche and Zen presents a nuanced study of the will to truth in Eastern and Western thought, avoiding superficial comparisons by focusing on truth’s foundational, motivational structure. Skepticism plays a central role: Nietzsche deconstructs knowledge’s representational model, revealing the will to truth’s psychological genealogy; Nāgārjuna undermines conceptual fixity through emptiness and tetralemma logic. Van der Braak links Nietzsche’s critique of metaphysical “truth” with Nāgārjuna’s conventional truth, showing their shared rejection of absolute truth beyond experience, and their replacement by transformative openness through philosophical áskēsis and existential engagement.
However, ambiguities remain. Van der Braak somewhat conflates Nietzsche’s genealogical method—probing ethical and psychological motives—with Nāgārjuna’s ontological and soteriological use of śūnyatā, functioning within a metaphysical and meditative rather than purely analytical framework. While both start with skepticism, Nietzsche frames it as a value-critical inquiry; Nāgārjuna’s skepticism is more linguistic and conceptual. Their post-negation “affirmation” differs sharply: Nietzsche’s is radical life-affirming creativity and will; Nāgārjuna’s stresses renunciation, non-attachment, and liberation from concepts without necessarily positing creativity. Van der Braak’s reading would benefit from exploring critical dialogues on emptiness, will to power, selfhood, and time—differences deepening intercultural philosophical reflection.
In conclusion, this article suggests that a key pathway for rethinking the relation between philosophy and life lies in critically examining the will to truth—not as an absolute imperative, but as a historically, ethically, and psychologically conditioned phenomenon. Drawing on van der Braak’s analysis in chapter four of Nietzsche and Zen, it showed how Nietzsche and Nāgārjuna each pursue self-overcoming that disrupts metaphysical foundations of truth, challenging essentialist, dualistic, and representational assumptions. Nietzsche links the will to truth to a transformed ascetic ideal—life-rejection for immutable abstractions—while Nāgārjuna exposes attachment to essences or dharmas as cognitive craving (tanhā) that hinders liberation.
From this emerges skepticism that reconfigures thinking-living relations. Nietzsche’s “existential truthfulness” and active nihilism parallel Nāgārjuna’s emptiness, tetralemma, and “emptiness of emptiness.” Truth ceases to be an ultimate goal, becoming a provisional tool unsettling habitual cognition. Self-overcoming the will to truth moves beyond metaphysical certainty toward wisdom rooted in impermanence, openness, and readiness for transformation. Philosophy becomes a form of áskēsis—a transformative practice living without fixed grounds or final truths, marked by courage, freedom, and awareness of the limits of cognition and language.
While van der Braak’s framework is methodologically valuable in highlighting the dialogical affinities between Nietzsche and Nāgārjuna, his interpretation warrants further reflection in several areas: the ambiguity between genealogy and śūnyatā, the unclear status of negation after affirmation, and the potential for opening up a space of mutual critique between the two traditions.
Likewise, Buddhist traditions—especially Nāgārjuna’s Madhyamaka—stand against classical Indian metaphysical systems like Vedānta and Nyāya, which uphold doctrines of essential realities such as Ātman and ultimate truth [Kaisar, 2024; Kumar, 2022; Panda, 2025], rejecting fixed essences and promoting emptiness as liberatory insight [Patil, 2009; Aich, 2013; van der Braak, 2011]. Thus, dogmatic will to truth may hinder enlightenment, a key insight shared by Nietzsche and Nāgārjuna.
André van der Braak’s comparative study offers a lens to explore how these traditions interrogate and transcend the metaphysical will to truth, opening paths toward existential authenticity and freedom. This article uses a descriptive-analytical approach to trace these critiques and assess van der Braak’s interpretive nuances and limitations.
Nietzsche’s examination of truth goes beyond theory to genealogical, psychological, and ethical dimensions of the human drive to know [Nietzsche, 2013]. He challenges the self-evident “will to truth,” probing its historical origins, motivations, and ethical consequences. Van der Braak explains that Nietzsche begins with epistemological skepticism—doubting the possibility of representing reality as it is—but moves toward questioning the value of truth itself [van der Braak, 2011: 33]. Early works like “On Truth and Lies in an Extramoral Sense” accept the possibility of a “world in itself” but portray it as inaccessible, mediated entirely by linguistic metaphors and concepts. This skepticism evolves into ontological skepticism, questioning the independent existence of reality [van der Braak, 2011: 33; Hinman, 1982]. Nietzsche rejects the metaphysical separation of “apparent” and “real” worlds, proposing perspectivism—truth as interpretive and value-laden. His genealogy reveals the will to truth rooted not in love of knowledge but in ascetic denial of life’s vitality, inheriting an ideal that devalues the sensory world [Mitcheson, 2013; van der Braak, 2011: 34]. Even science rests on metaphysical faith in objective reality [van der Braak, 2011: 34]. Nietzsche questions whether truth should always be preferred over falsehood, suggesting illusions sometimes better promote life than truth [Nietzsche, 1924:164]. Van der Braak highlights Nietzsche’s concept of “self-overcoming” the will to truth—not by abandoning truth to relativism, but through embracing life-affirming, existential “truthfulness” free from absolutes [Girard, 2016; van der Braak, 2011: 42]. Nietzsche’s skepticism thus enables a creative philosophy transcending nihilism toward courageous affirmation and honest self-expression.
Early Buddhist traditions, especially Abhidharma schools, systematized consciousness into impermanent, insubstantial elements called dharmas—considered the only real entities. Nāgārjuna’s emptiness doctrine (śūnyatā) challenges even these, diagnosing them as covert essentialism [van der Braak, 2011:36; Huntington & Wangchen, 1989]. He presents emptiness as radical epistemological and ontological skepticism, liberating thought from foundationalist commitments. Van der Braak notes that dharmas reflect a metaphysical desire—a “will to possess a final, clear form of the world,” a cognitive thirst (tanhā) that perpetuates suffering [van der Braak, 2011:36]. Nāgārjuna’s emptiness negates intrinsic essences and rejects claims to absolute truth independent of dependent origination [van der Braak, 2011:36]. Using the tetralemma (catuṣkoṭi), he deconstructs dualities like existence/non-existence, exposing metaphysical contradictions [Priest, 2010; van der Braak, 2011:37]. Unlike Plato’s hierarchical dualism of truth and reality, Nāgārjuna initially distinguishes between conventional truth (saṁvṛti-satya) and ultimate truth (paramārtha-satya); yet, through the radical application of śūnyatā śūnyatā—the emptiness of emptiness—he ultimately dissolves this very dualism. In this view, the ultimate truth does not transcend or negate conventional truth but rather coincides with it, revealing that there is no realm of truth beyond lived and conditioned reality [van der Braak, 2011: 40; Jones, 2020]. For Nāgārjuna, truth is a provisional, pragmatic tool (upāya) that eases suffering and enables freer living [Schroeder, 2000]. Van der Braak reads this as an internal critique of the will to truth that preserves sensitivity to suffering while avoiding conceptual traps. Like Nietzsche, Nāgārjuna’s skepticism undermines dualisms and foundationalisms not by negation or acceptance but by opening a flexible, impermanent, and open existential space, promoting lived wisdom beyond dogma.
Nietzsche and Nāgārjuna, from distinct traditions, converge critically in their rejection and transcendence of the metaphysical “will to truth” anchored in fixity and absoluteness. Van der Braak emphasizes that their shared endeavor is not a mere rejection of dogmas but a structural critique of the craving for immutable truth. Both enact internal ruptures, genealogically and existentially questioning the will’s value, psychological role, and implications for freedom. Nietzsche destabilizes epistemology by rejecting knowledge’s representational model and the “world in itself,” favoring a genealogical psychology that views the will to truth as an ascetic ideal—a life-denying impulse that shadows lived experience [van der Braak, 2011; Mitcheson, 2013]. Simultaneously, Nāgārjuna dismantles Abhidharma’s conceptual fixity, revealing it as cognitive craving (tanhā) perpetuating suffering. His emptiness deconstructs essentialism and teleology, employing tetralemma to dissolve dualities and show conceptual contingency [van der Braak, 2011; Priest, 2010]. Both reject the truth/falsehood binary not through nihilism or passive negation, but through radical conceptual revision, allowing skepticism to be self-transcendent. This transcendence dissolves the need for absolute foundations, shifting from Nietzsche’s “existential truthfulness,” rooted in life affirmation and creativity, to Nāgārjuna’s prajñā—liberating insight that frees existence from conceptual bondage. Each proposes a philosophical áskēsis cultivating new relations to self and world. Van der Braak sees Nāgārjuna’s method illuminating Nietzsche’s non-essentialist project and his hermeneutic of upāya as key to understanding Nietzsche’s skepticism as philosophy’s radical revaluation of values [van der Braak, 2011]. Fundamentally, both anchor philosophy in lived practice, where truth is a dynamic tool for self-overcoming and liberation.
André van der Braak’s comparative reading in Nietzsche and Zen presents a nuanced study of the will to truth in Eastern and Western thought, avoiding superficial comparisons by focusing on truth’s foundational, motivational structure. Skepticism plays a central role: Nietzsche deconstructs knowledge’s representational model, revealing the will to truth’s psychological genealogy; Nāgārjuna undermines conceptual fixity through emptiness and tetralemma logic. Van der Braak links Nietzsche’s critique of metaphysical “truth” with Nāgārjuna’s conventional truth, showing their shared rejection of absolute truth beyond experience, and their replacement by transformative openness through philosophical áskēsis and existential engagement.
However, ambiguities remain. Van der Braak somewhat conflates Nietzsche’s genealogical method—probing ethical and psychological motives—with Nāgārjuna’s ontological and soteriological use of śūnyatā, functioning within a metaphysical and meditative rather than purely analytical framework. While both start with skepticism, Nietzsche frames it as a value-critical inquiry; Nāgārjuna’s skepticism is more linguistic and conceptual. Their post-negation “affirmation” differs sharply: Nietzsche’s is radical life-affirming creativity and will; Nāgārjuna’s stresses renunciation, non-attachment, and liberation from concepts without necessarily positing creativity. Van der Braak’s reading would benefit from exploring critical dialogues on emptiness, will to power, selfhood, and time—differences deepening intercultural philosophical reflection.
In conclusion, this article suggests that a key pathway for rethinking the relation between philosophy and life lies in critically examining the will to truth—not as an absolute imperative, but as a historically, ethically, and psychologically conditioned phenomenon. Drawing on van der Braak’s analysis in chapter four of Nietzsche and Zen, it showed how Nietzsche and Nāgārjuna each pursue self-overcoming that disrupts metaphysical foundations of truth, challenging essentialist, dualistic, and representational assumptions. Nietzsche links the will to truth to a transformed ascetic ideal—life-rejection for immutable abstractions—while Nāgārjuna exposes attachment to essences or dharmas as cognitive craving (tanhā) that hinders liberation.
From this emerges skepticism that reconfigures thinking-living relations. Nietzsche’s “existential truthfulness” and active nihilism parallel Nāgārjuna’s emptiness, tetralemma, and “emptiness of emptiness.” Truth ceases to be an ultimate goal, becoming a provisional tool unsettling habitual cognition. Self-overcoming the will to truth moves beyond metaphysical certainty toward wisdom rooted in impermanence, openness, and readiness for transformation. Philosophy becomes a form of áskēsis—a transformative practice living without fixed grounds or final truths, marked by courage, freedom, and awareness of the limits of cognition and language.
While van der Braak’s framework is methodologically valuable in highlighting the dialogical affinities between Nietzsche and Nāgārjuna, his interpretation warrants further reflection in several areas: the ambiguity between genealogy and śūnyatā, the unclear status of negation after affirmation, and the potential for opening up a space of mutual critique between the two traditions.