Philosophical Thought
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Volume 4, Issue 2 (2024)
J Clin Care Skill 2024, 4(2): 123-139 |
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History
Received: 2024/07/2 | Accepted: 2024/08/31 | Published: 2024/09/20
Received: 2024/07/2 | Accepted: 2024/08/31 | Published: 2024/09/20
How to cite this article
Salari Khoram S. Agency and the Existence of Material Beings in Ilāhīyyāt VI. J Clin Care Skill 2024; 4 (2) :123-139
URL: http://jpt.modares.ac.ir/article-6-75913-en.html
URL: http://jpt.modares.ac.ir/article-6-75913-en.html
Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Humanities, Tarbiat Modares University, Tehran, Iran
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Introduction
Ibn Sina’s doctrine of efficient causality is typically formulated as follows: “The essence does not have a preference with respect to existence or non-existence. That is, its existence is neither necessary nor impossible. Consequently, the realization of an essence in the external world necessitates the removal of this lack of preference with regard to existence, and therefore, the occurrence of existence upon it per accidens. That is, this occurrence of existence is not inherent to the essence itself; rather, it occurs due to some other factor. Thus, while an essence may be possible in itself and by its own nature, its existence becomes necessary due to a separate cause—the true efficient cause—that brings it into being. The necessity of existence for an essence does not mean that the cause itself must exist while the essence does not; rather, Ibn Sina interprets this relationship in terms of the co-existing connection between cause and effect.”
This formulation of efficient causality, as attributed to Ibn Sina, has been evaluated in [Richardson, 2012]. Additionally, regarding its reception in both the Islamic world and the Latin West [Wisnovsky, 2013: 199-203; Omar Zamboni, 2023; Richardson, 2014b], respectively. However, in this article, I aim to address three ambiguities that challenge our interpretation of this doctrine and lead to conflicts.
Firstly, this formulation of efficient causality by Ibn Sina, along with his emphasis on an active cause (the active intellect), suggests that he fundamentally denies the natural causal explanation and inclines toward a kind of occasionalism. In other words, the existence and essence are not inherently related; rather, the occurrence of existence upon essence is contingent upon the will of an efficient cause. I refer to this idea as a “volitional understanding of efficient causality.” Consequently, this interpretation of Ibn Sina’s formulation of efficient causality has faced criticism both within contemporary theological circles [Misbah, 2016: 96] and in the Western philosophical tradition (specifically by Thomas Aquinas and Ibn Rushd) [Richardson, 2012a]. Secondly, the standard interpretation of efficient causality seems to imply that existence is a particular property alongside other properties of material objects—a shared property that pertains to all existing things, in a way that this property is bestowed upon entities by a transcendent cause. Thirdly, Ibn Sina does not sharply distinguish between a real efficient cause and a complete cause. In other words, it appears that a real efficient cause suffices for the existence of an object, much like a complete cause [Richardson, 2014a].
Form, Matter, and an Unknown Cause
Ibn Sina argues that the fact that each component of a material compound possesses a specific essence and actuality (let’s call it a proper existence), and that the so-and-so collection of essences possesses this specific actuality, and also, sustains its continuity and persistence through this actuality, is grounded in the activity of a separate cause, although he does not explicitly define the nature of this activity in this context. What is clear, though, is that the form and activity of each component within a material compound, along with their respective powers, depend on an extrinsic activity that is separate from them. This extrinsic efficient cause, which Ibn Sina introduces at the beginning of Ilāhīyyāt VI.1, is distinct from the effect (the material compound) and possesses its own essence [Lizzini, 2004].
Therefore, in explaining the existence of material objects, we encounter a longitudinal relation concerning efficient causality. The form is the cause of the material compound, and the extrinsic, separate cause is the cause of the form. On one hand, form is the cause of the material compound, for the necessitation of the proper existence that a material compound has is dependent on the form (for instance, the potential building materials could exist without being an actual building, but what makes them a building is the specific architectural form). On the other hand, the cause of the form is the separate cause—one that actualizes a particular form, ensuring its persistence and continuity through the activity it possesses. Thus, within the existence of a material thing, three causes are transitively at play: matter, form, and the separate cause. Form and matter are not separate from the material compound, whereas the separate cause exists independently of the material compound. In other words, what inherently necessitates the existence of a material thing involves these three intertwined factors, and therefore, they are essential to co-exist with the material compound.
In this context, the threefold causes are all the complete causes, and necessarily co-exist with the material object. However, the transitive relation between them allows us to identify the true efficient cause of the existence of a material thing as precisely that separate cause—an efficient cause that is genuinely separate from the material existence. Among the moving causes that bring together the components of material objects, all are preparatory causes, and their causality with respect to the existence of the material thing is per accidens, not essential. Indeed, there is no inherent necessity for the assembly of the natures of material things solely due to a specific moving cause (as demonstrated, for instance, by spontaneous generation, which shows that reproduction is not necessary for an individual of the human species to come into being [Ibn Sina, 1965: 76-79; Ibn Sina, ND; Anvari, 2023; Bertolacci, 2012]). Nevertheless, the efficient cause does not grant anything to matter beyond its form. More precisely, the “bringing into existence” of a material thing by the separate cause is nothing other than the dependence of the form of the material thing on the activity of the extrinsic cause. Ibn Sina, at this point in the discussion, merely refers to this relationship between form and matter as “emanation” but does not fully elucidate this causal connection [Ibn Sina, 1960: 259].
Contingency, Necessity, and Existence
As for the issue of the volitional understanding of efficient causality, specifically, it relates to whether existence and essence inherently lack any connection and whether existence is contingent upon the will of the efficient cause. Regardless of the correct interpretation of efficient causality according to Ibn Sina, it is worthy of note that it is precisely what made him stand against the Mutikallimun’s conception of temporal creation, and generally, causality, in a way that in Ilāhīyyāt VI, he engages in refuting this volitional understanding (even though his dialectical arguments in these sections might complicate the intended meaning). However, causal sufficiency and the necessitation of the existence of a material being lie within a reciprocal relationship between the efficient cause and the potentiality inherent in matter. The realization of agency occurs only when both conditions are met: the power to receive a specific form within matter (from one side) and the power of efficiency (the issuance of that form, from the other side). As for the separate efficient cause, its power for issuing form is always its sufficient extend, because, based on its separateness from any potentiality, it lacks any inherent potential aspect that would be actualized in terms of any circumstance and situation (the obligation that accompanies the assumption of volitional causality; for will arises due to specific conditions, and from this perspective, the separate cause—a non-material agent—becomes involved in matter by having a potential aspect). Rather, the non-realization of a material thing is contingent upon the inadequacy of the receiving capacity within matter. In other words, a specific material substrate that is not sufficient to accommodate a particular form has not actualized the material thing. Therefore, causality with respect to the existence of a material thing is not volitional but rather dependent, and indeed limited, by the possibility of providing matter capable of receiving that form through the act of some moving, and also natural, cause.
Ibn Sina’s doctrine of efficient causality is typically formulated as follows: “The essence does not have a preference with respect to existence or non-existence. That is, its existence is neither necessary nor impossible. Consequently, the realization of an essence in the external world necessitates the removal of this lack of preference with regard to existence, and therefore, the occurrence of existence upon it per accidens. That is, this occurrence of existence is not inherent to the essence itself; rather, it occurs due to some other factor. Thus, while an essence may be possible in itself and by its own nature, its existence becomes necessary due to a separate cause—the true efficient cause—that brings it into being. The necessity of existence for an essence does not mean that the cause itself must exist while the essence does not; rather, Ibn Sina interprets this relationship in terms of the co-existing connection between cause and effect.”
This formulation of efficient causality, as attributed to Ibn Sina, has been evaluated in [Richardson, 2012]. Additionally, regarding its reception in both the Islamic world and the Latin West [Wisnovsky, 2013: 199-203; Omar Zamboni, 2023; Richardson, 2014b], respectively. However, in this article, I aim to address three ambiguities that challenge our interpretation of this doctrine and lead to conflicts.
Firstly, this formulation of efficient causality by Ibn Sina, along with his emphasis on an active cause (the active intellect), suggests that he fundamentally denies the natural causal explanation and inclines toward a kind of occasionalism. In other words, the existence and essence are not inherently related; rather, the occurrence of existence upon essence is contingent upon the will of an efficient cause. I refer to this idea as a “volitional understanding of efficient causality.” Consequently, this interpretation of Ibn Sina’s formulation of efficient causality has faced criticism both within contemporary theological circles [Misbah, 2016: 96] and in the Western philosophical tradition (specifically by Thomas Aquinas and Ibn Rushd) [Richardson, 2012a]. Secondly, the standard interpretation of efficient causality seems to imply that existence is a particular property alongside other properties of material objects—a shared property that pertains to all existing things, in a way that this property is bestowed upon entities by a transcendent cause. Thirdly, Ibn Sina does not sharply distinguish between a real efficient cause and a complete cause. In other words, it appears that a real efficient cause suffices for the existence of an object, much like a complete cause [Richardson, 2014a].
Form, Matter, and an Unknown Cause
Ibn Sina argues that the fact that each component of a material compound possesses a specific essence and actuality (let’s call it a proper existence), and that the so-and-so collection of essences possesses this specific actuality, and also, sustains its continuity and persistence through this actuality, is grounded in the activity of a separate cause, although he does not explicitly define the nature of this activity in this context. What is clear, though, is that the form and activity of each component within a material compound, along with their respective powers, depend on an extrinsic activity that is separate from them. This extrinsic efficient cause, which Ibn Sina introduces at the beginning of Ilāhīyyāt VI.1, is distinct from the effect (the material compound) and possesses its own essence [Lizzini, 2004].
Therefore, in explaining the existence of material objects, we encounter a longitudinal relation concerning efficient causality. The form is the cause of the material compound, and the extrinsic, separate cause is the cause of the form. On one hand, form is the cause of the material compound, for the necessitation of the proper existence that a material compound has is dependent on the form (for instance, the potential building materials could exist without being an actual building, but what makes them a building is the specific architectural form). On the other hand, the cause of the form is the separate cause—one that actualizes a particular form, ensuring its persistence and continuity through the activity it possesses. Thus, within the existence of a material thing, three causes are transitively at play: matter, form, and the separate cause. Form and matter are not separate from the material compound, whereas the separate cause exists independently of the material compound. In other words, what inherently necessitates the existence of a material thing involves these three intertwined factors, and therefore, they are essential to co-exist with the material compound.
In this context, the threefold causes are all the complete causes, and necessarily co-exist with the material object. However, the transitive relation between them allows us to identify the true efficient cause of the existence of a material thing as precisely that separate cause—an efficient cause that is genuinely separate from the material existence. Among the moving causes that bring together the components of material objects, all are preparatory causes, and their causality with respect to the existence of the material thing is per accidens, not essential. Indeed, there is no inherent necessity for the assembly of the natures of material things solely due to a specific moving cause (as demonstrated, for instance, by spontaneous generation, which shows that reproduction is not necessary for an individual of the human species to come into being [Ibn Sina, 1965: 76-79; Ibn Sina, ND; Anvari, 2023; Bertolacci, 2012]). Nevertheless, the efficient cause does not grant anything to matter beyond its form. More precisely, the “bringing into existence” of a material thing by the separate cause is nothing other than the dependence of the form of the material thing on the activity of the extrinsic cause. Ibn Sina, at this point in the discussion, merely refers to this relationship between form and matter as “emanation” but does not fully elucidate this causal connection [Ibn Sina, 1960: 259].
Contingency, Necessity, and Existence
As for the issue of the volitional understanding of efficient causality, specifically, it relates to whether existence and essence inherently lack any connection and whether existence is contingent upon the will of the efficient cause. Regardless of the correct interpretation of efficient causality according to Ibn Sina, it is worthy of note that it is precisely what made him stand against the Mutikallimun’s conception of temporal creation, and generally, causality, in a way that in Ilāhīyyāt VI, he engages in refuting this volitional understanding (even though his dialectical arguments in these sections might complicate the intended meaning). However, causal sufficiency and the necessitation of the existence of a material being lie within a reciprocal relationship between the efficient cause and the potentiality inherent in matter. The realization of agency occurs only when both conditions are met: the power to receive a specific form within matter (from one side) and the power of efficiency (the issuance of that form, from the other side). As for the separate efficient cause, its power for issuing form is always its sufficient extend, because, based on its separateness from any potentiality, it lacks any inherent potential aspect that would be actualized in terms of any circumstance and situation (the obligation that accompanies the assumption of volitional causality; for will arises due to specific conditions, and from this perspective, the separate cause—a non-material agent—becomes involved in matter by having a potential aspect). Rather, the non-realization of a material thing is contingent upon the inadequacy of the receiving capacity within matter. In other words, a specific material substrate that is not sufficient to accommodate a particular form has not actualized the material thing. Therefore, causality with respect to the existence of a material thing is not volitional but rather dependent, and indeed limited, by the possibility of providing matter capable of receiving that form through the act of some moving, and also natural, cause.