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Volume 4, Issue 1 (2024)
Geo Res 2024, 4(1): 41-59 |
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History
Received: 2024/03/24 | Accepted: 2024/06/1 | Published: 2024/06/9
Received: 2024/03/24 | Accepted: 2024/06/1 | Published: 2024/06/9
How to cite this article
Ebrahimzadeh A, Jamshidpour A, Valeh H. Description and Evaluation of Nicholas Rescher's Critique of Extreme Specialization in Philosophy. Geo Res 2024; 4 (1) :41-59
URL: http://jpt.modares.ac.ir/article-6-74438-en.html
URL: http://jpt.modares.ac.ir/article-6-74438-en.html
1- Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Letters and Human sciences, Shahid Beheshti University, Tehran, Iran
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Introduction
The practice of specialization and abstaining from macro systematizations in philosophy can be regarded as a relatively common practice among analytic philosophers and the boundaries of this philosophical tradition [Russell, 1945: 834; Rescher, 2005: 40; Soames, 2003: xv], which is in opposition to the common approach of continental philosophers [Glock, 2008: 165].
In this article, the term 'systematization' refers to the attempt to construct a macro system in philosophical domains, especially one that transcends the limitations of the minor fields of philosophy. Hence, it does not imply other definitions [Dummett, 1978: 455; McGinn, 1993: 153; Malekian, 1993: 39-41].
Certainly, within the analytic tradition, there were philosophers who showed interest in constructing systems [Glock, 2008: 166-167; Stroll, 2000: 188; 251]; however, they were a minority and their systems were often not as extensive as those of system-building philosophers in history. It is worth noting that, for different reasons, opposition to systematization can also be observed among figures such as Nietzsche [Nietzsche, 1998: I 26] and existentialists [Macquarrie, 1973: 1-2].
Opposition to systematization has been explained in various ways. Some view it as hindering the progress of philosophy [Soames, 2003: xv], while others see it as a dismissal of common sense [Preston, 2017: 154].
However, the contemporary philosopher Nicholas Rescher, who is clearly classified within the analytic tradition [Rescher, 1996: 191-192], is one exception. He believes that the current specialization in philosophy is methodologically detrimental [Ibna, 2021]. It is important to recognize that Rescher's methodology is influenced by non-analytic philosophies, consistent with his specific philosophical foundations- such as Kant's transcendental idealism [Rescher, 1973a: 139-141] and neo-Hegelianism.
His viewpoint can be elucidated by explaining three key stages- which is based on the assumption of certain relationships between epistemology, methodology and method [Schwandt, 2007: 88; 190-193; Kaplan, 1998: 18; Carter & Little, 2007]: a) the foundations underpinning his perspective; b) the methodological idea derived from these foundations; and c) the specific methods and procedures employed in his philosophical works, stemming from the methodology he adopts.
The foundations
The systems
Systems and their detailed study were initially observed in Bogdanov's works [Midgley, 2000: 45], but they were formally introduced with von Bertalanffy's systems theory. Its central tenet posits that understanding the components of a system is best achieved by examining their interrelationships with one another and with other related systems. Hence, von Bertalanffy opposed reductionism and sought to revive the notion of the unity of science [Heylighen & Joslyn, 2015: 1045]. Furthermore, systems analysis, developed independently of systems theory, aims to systematically assess the costs, efficiency, and risks associated with alternative policies and strategies [Jackson, 1991: 75].
Due to the wide application of systems literature, Rescher has also applied its concepts and ideas to the methodology of philosophy in his works. He has grounded this literature in his version of coherentism [Rescher, 1979: xi]. Indeed, he describes his coherentism as representing the systems-analysis approach to the criteriology of truth [Rescher, 2003: 135]. Within this context, elements of the system, including wholeness, completeness, cohesiveness, consonance, and functional unity [Rescher, 2014: 104-105; 21-22], become the criteria for the validation or refutation of beliefs in Rescher's epistemology [Rescher, 2014: 105].
coherentism
Rescher's epistemological coherentism, which is one of the most important elements of his philosophical system [Sosa, 2015: 928], is of a holistic [Audi, 2010: 217-218] and pure type [Fumerton, 2006: 44], in which, instead of basic beliefs, we are faced with a large collection of data [Rescher, 2017b: 34; Rescher, 2014: 17] that only has the potential to be valid and can be accepted unless there is a reason to the contrary [Rescher, 2017b: 35; Rescher, 2014: 23; Rescher, 1973b: 56].
Due to the limitations of data [Rescher, 2017b: 36; Rescher, 2014: 18] and the contradictions that exist between them that make them not acceptable collectively [Rescher, 2017b: 35-36; Rescher, 2017a: 24], they need a speculative conjecture supplementing them [Rescher, 2014: 18]. In an inconsistent set of data, this conjecture should bring them compatibility with minimal damage to their collections [Rescher, 2017b: 37]. To achieve this important goal, conjectures should be used systematically and with a maximalist approach, not a local one [Rescher, 2017b: 36, 40; Rescher, 2014: 24-25].
Rescher's methodology: maximalist systematization
Based on his epistemological perspective, Rescher also supports the maximalism of the philosophical system in the methodology of philosophy. It is obvious that this methodology leads to a criticism of common specialization. He believes that philosophy needs to be approached systematically and its problems solved holistically, considering the whole field of philosophy. This is a requirement of rationality [Rescher, 1988: 15]. But specialization is a minimalist approach that focuses on problems locally, which may pose challenges for other related issues. This can cause an inconsistency in the bigger picture [Rescher, 2017b: 40].
Methods based on Rescher's methodology
According to Rescher, this methodology has always been important to him [Hobbs, 2004: 21; Rescher, 2002: 54]. Therefore, we can find methods in his philosophizing, as he himself has mentioned some appropriate methods and procedures. Some of these are: 1) prolific writing [University of Pittsburgh, 2024; Rescher, 1996: 114]; 2) diversity of works [Rescher, 1996: 203, 242, 256-257, 263, 265; University of Pittsburgh, 2024]; 3) pursuing the previous researches by recognizing the limitations, removing the defects, and reflecting on their implicit ideas; 4) tracing the details of the results of previous researches in subsequent researches related to other philosophical fields; 5) cyclic structure model in research and revision of initial ideas [Rescher, 1996: 206]; 6) comprehensive systematization of research findings; 7) a holistic view of the philosophy in general; and 8) extra-philosophical comprehensiveness and attention to the achievements of other sciences [Rescher, 2002: 54]- which is in some ways similar to Williamson's idea [Williamson, 2007: 285].
In any case, the set of methods resulting from Rescher's ideal methodology is clearly incompatible with the current specialization.
The disadvantages of the philosophers' lack of expertise and competent management
The benefits of specialization and the harms of its absence are obvious, but Rescher is aware of the limitations of his methodology, considers them inevitable to some extent, and prefers it overall [Rescher, 1996: 135].
Nevertheless, he himself asserts that he has always tried to establish a reasonable balance between superficiality- the disadvantage of lack of expertise- and narrow-mindedness- the disadvantage of expertise- in his works [Rescher, 1996: 206].
Conclusion
- Rescher's philosophical systematization is exempt from some criticisms of some great systematizing philosophers, who were noted in Berlin's article: The Hedgehog and the Fox [Berlin, 1953: 1-2]. In fact, it should be considered a type of systemic specialization that, while paying attention to the necessary specialized details in each field, also recognizes the need for a holistic approach to coordinating and ensuring compatibility.
- Although Rescher's version of coherentism, which supports his methodology, may have been successful with respect to some criticisms of coherentism [Bonjour, 1979: 169], it seems that it's still subject to some other criticisms [Ebrahimzadeh et al., 2024: 28-29]. But it is possible to base the methodology mentioned on some versions of foundationalism [Van Cleve, 2011: 337-338] and obtain the same results with other epistemological bases as well.
- Although Rescher has mentioned a kind of balanced management between specialization and comprehensiveness, he has left its characteristics vague and has not thought of providing a theory for its mechanism. Also, he has not defined the boundaries of a maximalist systematization.
- But it's possible to solve these problems by focusing on the issue of conflicts of doxastic norms in the ethics of belief [Chignell, 2018]. Because Rescher's point of view ultimately ends with a norm governing the practices of belief-formation, namely maximalism in systematization, and this norm seems to conflict with another prudential norm, namely our numerous limitations in complying with belief-formation standards.
Furthermore, as one of the primitive solutions to the aforementioned conflict, it is feasible to employ some ideas presented in the field of principles of religious jurisprudence -in a similar problem [Akhond Khorasani, 1988: 227; Khomeini, 1997: 372-373; Ansari, 2007: 447; Sadr, 2009: 357-364; Naini, 1997: 539] on the basis of which some have reached several results in other subjects as well [Amoli, 2009: 103-104; Rohani, 2013: 22]. We can partially answer some of the questions by introducing two other important teachings from this discipline into Rescher's philosophical methodology: a) determining the ability, possibilities, and limitations of solving a problem; and b) determining the probability of connection of other areas with the problem in question.
The practice of specialization and abstaining from macro systematizations in philosophy can be regarded as a relatively common practice among analytic philosophers and the boundaries of this philosophical tradition [Russell, 1945: 834; Rescher, 2005: 40; Soames, 2003: xv], which is in opposition to the common approach of continental philosophers [Glock, 2008: 165].
In this article, the term 'systematization' refers to the attempt to construct a macro system in philosophical domains, especially one that transcends the limitations of the minor fields of philosophy. Hence, it does not imply other definitions [Dummett, 1978: 455; McGinn, 1993: 153; Malekian, 1993: 39-41].
Certainly, within the analytic tradition, there were philosophers who showed interest in constructing systems [Glock, 2008: 166-167; Stroll, 2000: 188; 251]; however, they were a minority and their systems were often not as extensive as those of system-building philosophers in history. It is worth noting that, for different reasons, opposition to systematization can also be observed among figures such as Nietzsche [Nietzsche, 1998: I 26] and existentialists [Macquarrie, 1973: 1-2].
Opposition to systematization has been explained in various ways. Some view it as hindering the progress of philosophy [Soames, 2003: xv], while others see it as a dismissal of common sense [Preston, 2017: 154].
However, the contemporary philosopher Nicholas Rescher, who is clearly classified within the analytic tradition [Rescher, 1996: 191-192], is one exception. He believes that the current specialization in philosophy is methodologically detrimental [Ibna, 2021]. It is important to recognize that Rescher's methodology is influenced by non-analytic philosophies, consistent with his specific philosophical foundations- such as Kant's transcendental idealism [Rescher, 1973a: 139-141] and neo-Hegelianism.
His viewpoint can be elucidated by explaining three key stages- which is based on the assumption of certain relationships between epistemology, methodology and method [Schwandt, 2007: 88; 190-193; Kaplan, 1998: 18; Carter & Little, 2007]: a) the foundations underpinning his perspective; b) the methodological idea derived from these foundations; and c) the specific methods and procedures employed in his philosophical works, stemming from the methodology he adopts.
The foundations
The systems
Systems and their detailed study were initially observed in Bogdanov's works [Midgley, 2000: 45], but they were formally introduced with von Bertalanffy's systems theory. Its central tenet posits that understanding the components of a system is best achieved by examining their interrelationships with one another and with other related systems. Hence, von Bertalanffy opposed reductionism and sought to revive the notion of the unity of science [Heylighen & Joslyn, 2015: 1045]. Furthermore, systems analysis, developed independently of systems theory, aims to systematically assess the costs, efficiency, and risks associated with alternative policies and strategies [Jackson, 1991: 75].
Due to the wide application of systems literature, Rescher has also applied its concepts and ideas to the methodology of philosophy in his works. He has grounded this literature in his version of coherentism [Rescher, 1979: xi]. Indeed, he describes his coherentism as representing the systems-analysis approach to the criteriology of truth [Rescher, 2003: 135]. Within this context, elements of the system, including wholeness, completeness, cohesiveness, consonance, and functional unity [Rescher, 2014: 104-105; 21-22], become the criteria for the validation or refutation of beliefs in Rescher's epistemology [Rescher, 2014: 105].
coherentism
Rescher's epistemological coherentism, which is one of the most important elements of his philosophical system [Sosa, 2015: 928], is of a holistic [Audi, 2010: 217-218] and pure type [Fumerton, 2006: 44], in which, instead of basic beliefs, we are faced with a large collection of data [Rescher, 2017b: 34; Rescher, 2014: 17] that only has the potential to be valid and can be accepted unless there is a reason to the contrary [Rescher, 2017b: 35; Rescher, 2014: 23; Rescher, 1973b: 56].
Due to the limitations of data [Rescher, 2017b: 36; Rescher, 2014: 18] and the contradictions that exist between them that make them not acceptable collectively [Rescher, 2017b: 35-36; Rescher, 2017a: 24], they need a speculative conjecture supplementing them [Rescher, 2014: 18]. In an inconsistent set of data, this conjecture should bring them compatibility with minimal damage to their collections [Rescher, 2017b: 37]. To achieve this important goal, conjectures should be used systematically and with a maximalist approach, not a local one [Rescher, 2017b: 36, 40; Rescher, 2014: 24-25].
Rescher's methodology: maximalist systematization
Based on his epistemological perspective, Rescher also supports the maximalism of the philosophical system in the methodology of philosophy. It is obvious that this methodology leads to a criticism of common specialization. He believes that philosophy needs to be approached systematically and its problems solved holistically, considering the whole field of philosophy. This is a requirement of rationality [Rescher, 1988: 15]. But specialization is a minimalist approach that focuses on problems locally, which may pose challenges for other related issues. This can cause an inconsistency in the bigger picture [Rescher, 2017b: 40].
Methods based on Rescher's methodology
According to Rescher, this methodology has always been important to him [Hobbs, 2004: 21; Rescher, 2002: 54]. Therefore, we can find methods in his philosophizing, as he himself has mentioned some appropriate methods and procedures. Some of these are: 1) prolific writing [University of Pittsburgh, 2024; Rescher, 1996: 114]; 2) diversity of works [Rescher, 1996: 203, 242, 256-257, 263, 265; University of Pittsburgh, 2024]; 3) pursuing the previous researches by recognizing the limitations, removing the defects, and reflecting on their implicit ideas; 4) tracing the details of the results of previous researches in subsequent researches related to other philosophical fields; 5) cyclic structure model in research and revision of initial ideas [Rescher, 1996: 206]; 6) comprehensive systematization of research findings; 7) a holistic view of the philosophy in general; and 8) extra-philosophical comprehensiveness and attention to the achievements of other sciences [Rescher, 2002: 54]- which is in some ways similar to Williamson's idea [Williamson, 2007: 285].
In any case, the set of methods resulting from Rescher's ideal methodology is clearly incompatible with the current specialization.
The disadvantages of the philosophers' lack of expertise and competent management
The benefits of specialization and the harms of its absence are obvious, but Rescher is aware of the limitations of his methodology, considers them inevitable to some extent, and prefers it overall [Rescher, 1996: 135].
Nevertheless, he himself asserts that he has always tried to establish a reasonable balance between superficiality- the disadvantage of lack of expertise- and narrow-mindedness- the disadvantage of expertise- in his works [Rescher, 1996: 206].
Conclusion
- Rescher's philosophical systematization is exempt from some criticisms of some great systematizing philosophers, who were noted in Berlin's article: The Hedgehog and the Fox [Berlin, 1953: 1-2]. In fact, it should be considered a type of systemic specialization that, while paying attention to the necessary specialized details in each field, also recognizes the need for a holistic approach to coordinating and ensuring compatibility.
- Although Rescher's version of coherentism, which supports his methodology, may have been successful with respect to some criticisms of coherentism [Bonjour, 1979: 169], it seems that it's still subject to some other criticisms [Ebrahimzadeh et al., 2024: 28-29]. But it is possible to base the methodology mentioned on some versions of foundationalism [Van Cleve, 2011: 337-338] and obtain the same results with other epistemological bases as well.
- Although Rescher has mentioned a kind of balanced management between specialization and comprehensiveness, he has left its characteristics vague and has not thought of providing a theory for its mechanism. Also, he has not defined the boundaries of a maximalist systematization.
- But it's possible to solve these problems by focusing on the issue of conflicts of doxastic norms in the ethics of belief [Chignell, 2018]. Because Rescher's point of view ultimately ends with a norm governing the practices of belief-formation, namely maximalism in systematization, and this norm seems to conflict with another prudential norm, namely our numerous limitations in complying with belief-formation standards.
Furthermore, as one of the primitive solutions to the aforementioned conflict, it is feasible to employ some ideas presented in the field of principles of religious jurisprudence -in a similar problem [Akhond Khorasani, 1988: 227; Khomeini, 1997: 372-373; Ansari, 2007: 447; Sadr, 2009: 357-364; Naini, 1997: 539] on the basis of which some have reached several results in other subjects as well [Amoli, 2009: 103-104; Rohani, 2013: 22]. We can partially answer some of the questions by introducing two other important teachings from this discipline into Rescher's philosophical methodology: a) determining the ability, possibilities, and limitations of solving a problem; and b) determining the probability of connection of other areas with the problem in question.