CiteScore measures the average citations received per peer-reviewed document published in this title. CiteScore values are based on citation counts in a range of four years (e.g. 2018-2021) to peer-reviewed documents (articles, reviews, conference papers, data papers and book chapters) published in the same four calendar years, divided by the number of these documents in these same four years
10.5
impact factor
CiteScore measures the average citations received per peer-reviewed document published in this title. CiteScore values are based on citation counts in a range of four years (e.g. 2018-2021) to peer-reviewed documents (articles, reviews, conference papers, data papers and book chapters) published in the same four calendar years, divided by the number of these documents in these same four years (e.g. 2018 – 21).
10.5
pubmed
CiteScore measures the average citations received per peer-reviewed document published in this title. CiteScore values are based on citation counts in a range of four years (e.g. 2018-2021) to peer-reviewed documents (articles, reviews, conference papers, data papers and book chapters) published in the same four calendar years, divided by the number of these documents in these same four years (e.g. 2018 – 21).
Institute for the History of Science, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran
* Corresponding Author Address: Institute for the History of Science, University of Tehran, Enghlab Street, Tehran, Iran. Postal Code: 1417964116 jalaljalal13721372@gmail.com)
Abstract (2168 Views)
In the traditional debate between epistemic absolutists and relativists, the main issue is whether there are neutral and absolute criteria for selecting epistemic systems or whether such criteria are dependent on socio-cultural contexts. Absolutists consider empirical evidence as a neutral and absolute criterion, while relativists, emphasizing the theory-ladenness of observation and underdetermination, argue that theoretical presuppositions and thus non-absolute always influence observation. Recently, David Stump, by proposing a pragmatic stance as a third position, rejects both relativism and absolutism. He uses observation as an objective but non-absolute criterion to refute relativism. However, Shahram Shahriari demonstrates that Stump's third position cannot exist. We, by examining the debate between Stump and Shahriari, show that observation, as Stump envisions it, cannot provide sufficient grounds to refute relativism.