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Volume 2, Issue 3 (2022)                   Geo Res 2022, 2(3): 269-282 | Back to browse issues page

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Farsian K. Inconsistency in Science; an Argument for the Possibility of the Paraconsistent Philosophy of Science. Geo Res 2022; 2 (3) :269-282
URL: http://jpt.modares.ac.ir/article-6-64565-en.html
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Authors K. Farsian *
Deptartment of Philosophy and Logic, Faculty of Humanities, Tarbiat Modares University, Tehran, Iran
* Corresponding Author Address: Faculty of Humanities, Tarbiat Modares University, Jalal Al-Ahmad and Chamran Highway Junction, Tehran, Iran. Postal Code: 1344786594 (kasrafarsian@gmail.com)
Abstract   (4202 Views)
According to some important philosophers of science, such as Popper, Hempel and Tarski, consistency is a necessary condition of establishing any scientific theory. They hold that all inconsistent scientific theories are uninformative, meaningless or deficient. In this paper I will first argue against their clams, then I consider some inconsistencies which happened at the heart of some well-accepted scientific theories (Empirical or Non-Empirical), and by this I will try to open the door for the possibility of the paraconsistent philosophy of science.
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