Philosophical Thought
eISSN : 0000-0000
10.5
citescore
CiteScore measures the average citations received per peer-reviewed document published in this title. CiteScore values are based on citation counts in a range of four years (e.g. 2018-2021) to peer-reviewed documents (articles, reviews, conference papers, data papers and book chapters) published in the same four calendar years, divided by the number of these documents in these same four years
10.5
impact factor
CiteScore measures the average citations received per peer-reviewed document published in this title. CiteScore values are based on citation counts in a range of four years (e.g. 2018-2021) to peer-reviewed documents (articles, reviews, conference papers, data papers and book chapters) published in the same four calendar years, divided by the number of these documents in these same four years (e.g. 2018 – 21).
10.5
pubmed
CiteScore measures the average citations received per peer-reviewed document published in this title. CiteScore values are based on citation counts in a range of four years (e.g. 2018-2021) to peer-reviewed documents (articles, reviews, conference papers, data papers and book chapters) published in the same four calendar years, divided by the number of these documents in these same four years (e.g. 2018 – 21).
10.5
Embase
Biosis Preview
Volume 5, Issue 4 (2025)
J Clin Care Skill 2025, 5(4): 703-714 |
Back to browse issues page
History
Received: 2025/06/26 | Accepted: 2025/08/6 | Published: 2025/10/13
Received: 2025/06/26 | Accepted: 2025/08/6 | Published: 2025/10/13
How to cite this article
Karimi M. Consistency of the Individuation Criterion in the Thoughts of Avicenna, Suhrawardi, and Mulla Sadra. J Clin Care Skill 2025; 5 (4) :703-714
URL: http://jpt.modares.ac.ir/article-6-81804-en.html
URL: http://jpt.modares.ac.ir/article-6-81804-en.html
Department of Philosophy and Islamic Theology, Farabi College, University of Tehran, Qom, Iran
Keywords:
| Abstract (HTML) (1049 Views)
Full-Text: (19 Views)
Introduction
The problem of individuation and its criterion is one of the most intricate metaphysical issues that has been extensively discussed by Islamic philosophers such as Avicenna, Suhrawardi, and Mulla Sadra. While Aristotle [Aristotle, 1987] and Porphyry briefly touched upon this issue, Boethius addressed it with theological motivations [Ilkhani, 1996]. Al-Farabi also considered individuation to be identical with existence [Mulla Sadra, 1981; Farabi, 1992]. The significance of this problem lies in its foundational impact on various other philosophical inquiries, such as the problem of universals, the unity and multiplicity of beings, and the metaphysical understanding of existence itself. By investigating how individuation has been conceptualized historically, we can better grasp the ontological commitments of each philosophical school.
Position of Individuation in Islamic Philosophy
Individuation refers to the impossibility of a thing being predicated on anything other than itself. Mirza Mahdi Ashtiani emphasizes that individuation is an essential attribute of being qua being and is identical with existence itself [Ashtiani, 1988]. This issue is discussed within general metaphysics and also in relation to universal quiddities. The debate over whether individuation is an accidental or essential property of beings has led to divergent perspectives in Islamic thought, with some considering it derivative of existence itself and others seeking its source in external factors. The placement of this discussion in ilahiyyat bi-ma‘na al-a‘amm indicates its foundational nature in metaphysics.
Relationship between Individuation and Determination
Although individuation and determination both create distinction, they are fundamentally different. Fakhr al-Din al-Razi and Taftazani equated individuation with determination [Fakhr al-Din al-Razi, 1966; Taftazani, 1988], whereas Lahiji and Allamah Hilli distinguished between them [Lahiji, 1927; Allamah Hilli, 1986]. The relationship between them is that of generality and particularity. Determination (ta‘yin) refers to comparative relational distinctions that arise in the context of multiple beings. At the same time, individuation (tashakhkhuṣ) pertains to the intrinsic self-identity of a being, independent of its relation to others. The confusion of these two levels of analysis has historically led to philosophical ambiguities, particularly within the Peripatetic tradition.
Peripatetic View on Individuation
In the Peripatetic tradition, Avicenna attributes individuation to contingent accidents such as position, time, and place [Avicenna, 1992; Bahmanyar, 1996]. This view leads to a conflation of mental and external realities [Yazdanpanah, 2010]. Avicenna's approach starts from the logical category of type (naw‘) and attempts to trace how a universal concept becomes actualized in particular instances. However, by relying on accidents as the principle of individuation, his framework remains vulnerable to critiques that accuse it of epistemological circularity. The Peripatetic school did not fully separate logical analysis from ontological grounding, which created inherent tensions in their theory of individuation.
Individuation Definition
The Peripatetics believe that the property that prevents a thing from being shared with others constitutes individuation. Avicenna states that individuation pertains to a unique attribute of a thing that has no partner in existence [Avicenna, 1992]. According to them, an entity becomes individuated when it possesses an attribute that renders it non-shareable with others in its existence. However, this non-shareable attribute was often considered an external accident, which, in itself, is contingent and mutable. This perspective underestimates the intrinsic dimensions of individuation that are independent of external contingencies.
Source of Individuation in Material Entities
The Peripatetics rejected quiddity and its concomitants as sources of individuation and instead attributed individuation of material entities to contingent accidents, particularly position combined with temporal unity [Avicenna, 1992; Yazdanpanah, 2010]. They argued that since quiddity is common among individuals, it cannot provide a sufficient basis for individuation. Instead, they posited that external accidents, such as spatial location and temporal occurrence, endow entities with distinctness. However, since these accidents are themselves subject to change, the Peripatetic account encounters the problem of explaining stable individuation within a dynamic framework.
Source of Individuation Regarding Immaterial Beings and the Necessary Existent
Regarding immaterial intellects, Peripatetics argue that their individuation stems from their essential properties. For the Necessary Existent, individuation is inherent in its very essence, which is pure existence [Avicenna, 2002]. However, this view faces philosophical problems such as circular reasoning [Lukari, 1994]. The Peripatetics assert that the Necessary Existent is individuated by its pure actuality and absence of quiddity. Nevertheless, when applied to immaterial intellects, their explanation seems insufficient, as it relies on essential properties that are themselves conceptual abstractions. This has led to further questions about whether the individuation of intelligibles can be adequately explained without reference to an external grounding principle.
Problems with the Peripatetic View
Fundamental objections to the Peripatetic view include the incapacity of matter, as pure potentiality, to serve as the principle of individuation, and the dependency of accidents on their substrate [Yazdanpanah, 2010]. Additionally, the conflation of mental and external realities is identified as a critical epistemological flaw. The inability to distinguish between logical constructs and ontological realities renders their account susceptible to circular explanations, in which individuation is explained by entities that themselves require individuation.
Suhrawardi’s Perspective on Individuation
Suhrawardi critiques the Peripatetic conflation of mental concepts with external realities and, on the basis of the principle of intuitive knowledge (knowledge by presence), attributes individuation to the external identity of things [Suhrawardi, 1976]. He emphasizes that, by their very nature, concepts are universal and cannot account for the unique selfhood of particular beings. Instead, he introduces the notion of immediate self-awareness as the foundation for individuation. This approach shifts the focus from external accidents to the entity's intrinsic presence, marking a significant departure from Peripatetic ontology.
Individuation of Mental Existents
Suhrawardi regards mental existents as inherently universal, yet considers them to possess accidental individuation due to their specific actualization within a particular mind and their relational distinction from other mental forms [Suhrawardi, 1976]. He posits that although mental forms are universal in their conceptual content, they acquire a kind of relative individuation through their unique occurrence in a given mental subject. This relational individuation, however, is considered secondary and derivative, underscoring Suhrawardi’s insistence on the primacy of external, concrete identity as the true source of individuation.
Principle of Individuation
Contrary to the Peripatetics, Suhrawardi rejects accidents as principles of individuation because they are universal. Instead, he identifies the external identity and particularized quiddities of things as the true sources of individuation [Suhrawardi, 1976]. His ontological framework asserts that only concrete external realities possess the necessary distinctness to serve as individuating principles. Suhrawardi's epistemological distinction between knowledge by presence and knowledge by acquisition further reinforces his argument that conceptual universals are epistemically incapable of accounting for the metaphysical reality of individuation.
Mulla Sadra's Influence from Suhrawardi on Individuation
Mulla Sadra, influenced by Suhrawardi, redefines individuation in terms of the primacy of existence. He argues that individuation stems from existence itself, not from quiddity. Accidents, in his view, merely indicate an already individuated reality [Mulla Sadra, 1981; Mulla Sadra, 1923]. In al-Shawahid al-Rububiyya, he explicitly affirms that the unity and individuation of existents are intrinsic to their existential identity [Mulla Sadra, 1981]. His doctrine of substantial motion also plays a crucial role in explaining the dynamic nature of individuation. For Mulla Sadra, individuation is not a static property but a continuous ontological process in which beings unfold their existential actuality progressively through their unique modes of being. His philosophical system resolves the problem of individuation by positing existence as the singular reality from which all individuated phenomena emerge.
Conclusion
Despite the foundational differences among the Peripatetics, Suhrawardi, and Mulla Sadra, a harmonized framework emerges when distinguishing between factors of determination and principles of individuation. This framework posits that the true criterion of individuation lies in the external, concrete identity of entities. Such a perspective resolves the Peripatetic conflation of mental and external realities and offers a more precise ontological explanation of individuation. By integrating Suhrawardi’s emphasis on external identity with Mulla Sadra’s existential ontology, the problem of individuation is rearticulated in a manner that overcomes the epistemological and ontological shortcomings of earlier Peripatetic models.
The problem of individuation and its criterion is one of the most intricate metaphysical issues that has been extensively discussed by Islamic philosophers such as Avicenna, Suhrawardi, and Mulla Sadra. While Aristotle [Aristotle, 1987] and Porphyry briefly touched upon this issue, Boethius addressed it with theological motivations [Ilkhani, 1996]. Al-Farabi also considered individuation to be identical with existence [Mulla Sadra, 1981; Farabi, 1992]. The significance of this problem lies in its foundational impact on various other philosophical inquiries, such as the problem of universals, the unity and multiplicity of beings, and the metaphysical understanding of existence itself. By investigating how individuation has been conceptualized historically, we can better grasp the ontological commitments of each philosophical school.
Position of Individuation in Islamic Philosophy
Individuation refers to the impossibility of a thing being predicated on anything other than itself. Mirza Mahdi Ashtiani emphasizes that individuation is an essential attribute of being qua being and is identical with existence itself [Ashtiani, 1988]. This issue is discussed within general metaphysics and also in relation to universal quiddities. The debate over whether individuation is an accidental or essential property of beings has led to divergent perspectives in Islamic thought, with some considering it derivative of existence itself and others seeking its source in external factors. The placement of this discussion in ilahiyyat bi-ma‘na al-a‘amm indicates its foundational nature in metaphysics.
Relationship between Individuation and Determination
Although individuation and determination both create distinction, they are fundamentally different. Fakhr al-Din al-Razi and Taftazani equated individuation with determination [Fakhr al-Din al-Razi, 1966; Taftazani, 1988], whereas Lahiji and Allamah Hilli distinguished between them [Lahiji, 1927; Allamah Hilli, 1986]. The relationship between them is that of generality and particularity. Determination (ta‘yin) refers to comparative relational distinctions that arise in the context of multiple beings. At the same time, individuation (tashakhkhuṣ) pertains to the intrinsic self-identity of a being, independent of its relation to others. The confusion of these two levels of analysis has historically led to philosophical ambiguities, particularly within the Peripatetic tradition.
Peripatetic View on Individuation
In the Peripatetic tradition, Avicenna attributes individuation to contingent accidents such as position, time, and place [Avicenna, 1992; Bahmanyar, 1996]. This view leads to a conflation of mental and external realities [Yazdanpanah, 2010]. Avicenna's approach starts from the logical category of type (naw‘) and attempts to trace how a universal concept becomes actualized in particular instances. However, by relying on accidents as the principle of individuation, his framework remains vulnerable to critiques that accuse it of epistemological circularity. The Peripatetic school did not fully separate logical analysis from ontological grounding, which created inherent tensions in their theory of individuation.
Individuation Definition
The Peripatetics believe that the property that prevents a thing from being shared with others constitutes individuation. Avicenna states that individuation pertains to a unique attribute of a thing that has no partner in existence [Avicenna, 1992]. According to them, an entity becomes individuated when it possesses an attribute that renders it non-shareable with others in its existence. However, this non-shareable attribute was often considered an external accident, which, in itself, is contingent and mutable. This perspective underestimates the intrinsic dimensions of individuation that are independent of external contingencies.
Source of Individuation in Material Entities
The Peripatetics rejected quiddity and its concomitants as sources of individuation and instead attributed individuation of material entities to contingent accidents, particularly position combined with temporal unity [Avicenna, 1992; Yazdanpanah, 2010]. They argued that since quiddity is common among individuals, it cannot provide a sufficient basis for individuation. Instead, they posited that external accidents, such as spatial location and temporal occurrence, endow entities with distinctness. However, since these accidents are themselves subject to change, the Peripatetic account encounters the problem of explaining stable individuation within a dynamic framework.
Source of Individuation Regarding Immaterial Beings and the Necessary Existent
Regarding immaterial intellects, Peripatetics argue that their individuation stems from their essential properties. For the Necessary Existent, individuation is inherent in its very essence, which is pure existence [Avicenna, 2002]. However, this view faces philosophical problems such as circular reasoning [Lukari, 1994]. The Peripatetics assert that the Necessary Existent is individuated by its pure actuality and absence of quiddity. Nevertheless, when applied to immaterial intellects, their explanation seems insufficient, as it relies on essential properties that are themselves conceptual abstractions. This has led to further questions about whether the individuation of intelligibles can be adequately explained without reference to an external grounding principle.
Problems with the Peripatetic View
Fundamental objections to the Peripatetic view include the incapacity of matter, as pure potentiality, to serve as the principle of individuation, and the dependency of accidents on their substrate [Yazdanpanah, 2010]. Additionally, the conflation of mental and external realities is identified as a critical epistemological flaw. The inability to distinguish between logical constructs and ontological realities renders their account susceptible to circular explanations, in which individuation is explained by entities that themselves require individuation.
Suhrawardi’s Perspective on Individuation
Suhrawardi critiques the Peripatetic conflation of mental concepts with external realities and, on the basis of the principle of intuitive knowledge (knowledge by presence), attributes individuation to the external identity of things [Suhrawardi, 1976]. He emphasizes that, by their very nature, concepts are universal and cannot account for the unique selfhood of particular beings. Instead, he introduces the notion of immediate self-awareness as the foundation for individuation. This approach shifts the focus from external accidents to the entity's intrinsic presence, marking a significant departure from Peripatetic ontology.
Individuation of Mental Existents
Suhrawardi regards mental existents as inherently universal, yet considers them to possess accidental individuation due to their specific actualization within a particular mind and their relational distinction from other mental forms [Suhrawardi, 1976]. He posits that although mental forms are universal in their conceptual content, they acquire a kind of relative individuation through their unique occurrence in a given mental subject. This relational individuation, however, is considered secondary and derivative, underscoring Suhrawardi’s insistence on the primacy of external, concrete identity as the true source of individuation.
Principle of Individuation
Contrary to the Peripatetics, Suhrawardi rejects accidents as principles of individuation because they are universal. Instead, he identifies the external identity and particularized quiddities of things as the true sources of individuation [Suhrawardi, 1976]. His ontological framework asserts that only concrete external realities possess the necessary distinctness to serve as individuating principles. Suhrawardi's epistemological distinction between knowledge by presence and knowledge by acquisition further reinforces his argument that conceptual universals are epistemically incapable of accounting for the metaphysical reality of individuation.
Mulla Sadra's Influence from Suhrawardi on Individuation
Mulla Sadra, influenced by Suhrawardi, redefines individuation in terms of the primacy of existence. He argues that individuation stems from existence itself, not from quiddity. Accidents, in his view, merely indicate an already individuated reality [Mulla Sadra, 1981; Mulla Sadra, 1923]. In al-Shawahid al-Rububiyya, he explicitly affirms that the unity and individuation of existents are intrinsic to their existential identity [Mulla Sadra, 1981]. His doctrine of substantial motion also plays a crucial role in explaining the dynamic nature of individuation. For Mulla Sadra, individuation is not a static property but a continuous ontological process in which beings unfold their existential actuality progressively through their unique modes of being. His philosophical system resolves the problem of individuation by positing existence as the singular reality from which all individuated phenomena emerge.
Conclusion
Despite the foundational differences among the Peripatetics, Suhrawardi, and Mulla Sadra, a harmonized framework emerges when distinguishing between factors of determination and principles of individuation. This framework posits that the true criterion of individuation lies in the external, concrete identity of entities. Such a perspective resolves the Peripatetic conflation of mental and external realities and offers a more precise ontological explanation of individuation. By integrating Suhrawardi’s emphasis on external identity with Mulla Sadra’s existential ontology, the problem of individuation is rearticulated in a manner that overcomes the epistemological and ontological shortcomings of earlier Peripatetic models.