Philosophical Thought
eISSN : 0000-0000
10.5
citescore
CiteScore measures the average citations received per peer-reviewed document published in this title. CiteScore values are based on citation counts in a range of four years (e.g. 2018-2021) to peer-reviewed documents (articles, reviews, conference papers, data papers and book chapters) published in the same four calendar years, divided by the number of these documents in these same four years
10.5
impact factor
CiteScore measures the average citations received per peer-reviewed document published in this title. CiteScore values are based on citation counts in a range of four years (e.g. 2018-2021) to peer-reviewed documents (articles, reviews, conference papers, data papers and book chapters) published in the same four calendar years, divided by the number of these documents in these same four years (e.g. 2018 – 21).
10.5
pubmed
CiteScore measures the average citations received per peer-reviewed document published in this title. CiteScore values are based on citation counts in a range of four years (e.g. 2018-2021) to peer-reviewed documents (articles, reviews, conference papers, data papers and book chapters) published in the same four calendar years, divided by the number of these documents in these same four years (e.g. 2018 – 21).
10.5
Embase
Biosis Preview
Volume 5, Issue 2 (2025)
Geo Res 2025, 5(2): 191-206 |
Back to browse issues page
History
Received: 2025/04/21 | Accepted: 2025/05/22 | Published: 2025/05/31
Received: 2025/04/21 | Accepted: 2025/05/22 | Published: 2025/05/31
How to cite this article
Yaghoubpoor H, Monfared M, Alahbedashti A. Alteration and Motion in the Philosophy of Avicenna and Later Wittgenstein; A Comparative Study. Geo Res 2025; 5 (2) :191-206
URL: http://jpt.modares.ac.ir/article-6-80453-en.html
URL: http://jpt.modares.ac.ir/article-6-80453-en.html
1- Department of Philosophy and Theology, Faculty of Theology and Islamic Studies, Comparative Philosophy, Qom University, Qom, Iran
2- Department of Philosophy and Theology, Faculty of Theology and Islamic Studies, University of Qom, Qom, Iran
2- Department of Philosophy and Theology, Faculty of Theology and Islamic Studies, University of Qom, Qom, Iran
Keywords:
| Abstract (HTML) (1062 Views)
Full-Text: (57 Views)
Introduction
The concept of “change and motion” is central to philosophical contemplation. Avicenna, influenced by Greek thought, offers a systematic, ontological explanation of motion as an objective, gradual transition from potency to act, crucial for time’s actualization, revealing the dynamism of “being.” Conversely, the later Wittgenstein, in the context of analytic philosophy, shifts from ontology to linguistic and conceptual analysis. While not directly addressing metaphysical motion, his discussions on linguistic dynamism, rule-following, “aspect-seeing” (perceptual/conceptual change), and the river-bed analogy relate to “change” in “understanding” and “meaning-making”.
This research, acknowledging foundational differences (Avicenna’s metaphysics versus Wittgenstein’s linguistic and conceptual analysis), comparatively reviews these perspectives. It's a question: what are the analytical commonalities and divergences in their explanations of change/motion (or related ideas), and what are the philosophical implications? The aim is to establish an analytical bridge, seeking new insights into “change” and the capacities of comparative philosophy. The article analyzes each philosopher, then conducts a comparative analysis, presenting conclusions.
Determining the Problem of Change and Motion
In comparative philosophy, conceptual precision is vital. Motion is an object’s positional change relative to its environment over time [Tyson et al., 2000: 20-21], a relative phenomenon. Science understands existence via time; philosophy understands time via existence [Ismailpour & Alavi, 2022: 66]. Avicenna deems “nature” (tabī’ah) the internal principle of motion/rest; motion is gradual emergence from potency to act in categories (quantity, quality, where, position), and a condition for time’s actualization. The later Wittgenstein's views change conceptually-logically: it arises from a new perspective on a constant subject (“descriptive method”), necessitating propositional transitions. His analysis links to logic’s a priori characteristics; understanding motion occurs through describing logical symbols, not through the senses.
The Concept of Potency and Act
The distinction between potency (the possibility of change) and act (objective realization) is fundamental to Avicennian and Aristotelian explanations of motion; this division is relative [Mesbah Yazdi, 2003: 2/296-301]. Avicenna sees potency as the “principle of transformation,” and in bodies, as “inclination” (mayl); potency and act are relational concepts [Mesbah Yazdi, 2005: 133]. In Aristotle’s hylomorphism, prime matter (hayūlā) is pure potency [Copleston, 2008: 1/352]. A potential being is an existential mode [Asgari, 2014: 106-109]. In Western thought, actuality (Entelecheia/Energeia) realizes potency; Aquinas defines motion as “the actuality of that which is potential, insofar as it is potential” [Coope, 2009: 277]
The Place of Time
Avicenna considers time an objective reality, motion’s “measure,” dependent on it, perceived via the “now” (ān), and in “contingents” (mumkināt), eternal [Reyhani, 2017: 66]. Linking motion and time continuity, he refutes discrete instant theories [Ibn Sina, 2021: 291-292]. Wittgenstein critiques the linguistic use of time, distinguishing between “memory-time” and “information-time” [Tomashpolskaia, 2023: 18]. For him, knowing the essence of time is through the “representation of grammar” and its use; time is necessary for world intelligibility, constructed from perceptual changes in language games.
Becoming (Sayrūrah)
Becoming signifies a transition from potency to act and reality’s dynamic nature. The later Wittgenstein sees human identity as “becoming,” reality as interconnected processes; understanding mental processes is problematic due to commitment to a specific perspective [Wittgenstein, 2020: 192].
The Method of Knowing Change and Motion
The “descriptive method” emphasizes “becoming” with “being” [Nail, 2019: 27-29]. If existence is flux, its description requires a process that shows continuous flows [Nail, 2019: 84-86]. The early Wittgenstein linked a “symbol’s” value to inter-symbol change [Wittgenstein, 2021: 83]. For the later Wittgenstein, motion’s possibility (a priori principle) uniquely relates to its concept; motion is a “symbol’s” actualization [Wittgenstein, 2020: 150-153].
The Problem of Motion and Change in Avicenna’s Philosophy
In Avicenna’s philosophy, motion is an objective reality, key to explaining the material world and becoming (ṣayrūrah), founded on potency and act. His definition (“Motion is a gradual change in the stable state of a body, which is directed towards an end and desires to reach it, whether the end is potential or actual” [Ibn Sina, 2000: 203]) emphasizes change in a stable substrate, graduality, and teleology.
Avicenna distinguishes harakah qat’iyyah (continuous mental process) from harakah tawassutiyyah (“the state of being intermediate between the beginning and the end” - al-tawassut bayn al-mabda’ wa al-muntahā) [Motahhari, 2008: 6/764]. Accepting Aristotle’s definition of motion as “the first perfection of that which is in potency,” he states that only harakah tawassutiyyah exists externally [Ibn Sina, 1984: 83]. This “intermediacy” (tawassut), the mobile’s intermediate state, is the “first perfection”; perfection post-motion is “second perfection” [Ibn Sina, 1982: 106-108]. This relates to “first perfection” (stable essential form) [Ibn Sina, 1983: 33] and “second perfection” (acquired accidents). Motion is acquiring “second perfection”; time’s continuity reflects motions. Avicenna presents motion as objective, real, gradual, continuous, and teleological, occurring in a stable substance and its accidents, thereby grounding time.
The Problem of Motion and Change in the Philosophy of the Later Wittgenstein
The later Wittgenstein examines change and motion through language analysis, “language-games,” and “forms of life.” Understanding concepts means grasping use-rules in these contexts, not objective correspondence. Meaning is dynamic and use-dependent; different forms of life yield different understandings of change. Objectivity is “agreement in judgments” in a linguistic community, implying conceptual “relativism,” though forms of life as “the given” are more fundamental [Hanfling, 2018; 199-200].
In “On Certainty,” Wittgenstein introduces “hinge propositions” or the “world-picture” framing other beliefs. These are also “changeable” [Paya & Mohammadi, 2022: 246]; “language-games change with time” [Wittgenstein, 2023: 12]. The “river-bed” analogy likens empirical propositions to flowing water, hinge propositions to the riverbed itself, which is changeable [Wittgenstein, 2023: 18]. Their boundary is fluid, with a dynamic, interactive relationship [Burwood, 2023: 8-10].
Other interpretations encompass epistemological and psychological change, logical and semantic change (referring to the Tractatus), and the connection between change and causality and possibility. Wittgenstein’s view of change is linguistic, conceptual, and epistemological, focusing on the dynamism of language and its cognitive frameworks.
Attaining Perfection through Change and Motion
For Avicenna, change/motion is a contingent’s transition from potency to act, the “first perfection of the potential thing,” actualizing in time [Ibn Sina, 2004: 4-6]. The moving object is imperfect; motion removes imperfection to reach “second perfection” (actuality, rest). Motion is existential, internal, goal-directed (ghāyah). Avicenna distinguishes “form” (essential first perfection) from “quality” (accidental second perfection capable of intensification); motion arises from quality’s intensification, akin to Aristotle’s capacity/execution distinction [Saadat Mostafavi, 2012: 43].
The later Wittgenstein, focusing on language's “function” in “language-games” and “forms of life,” sees philosophy’s aim as “clarification” via “description,” not theorizing. Clarification arises from “rule-following,” with its goal being “awareness” through the description of ordinary language functions [Zandiyeh, 2018: 98]. Analyzing “description” vs. “naming,” he shows proposition meaning isn’t necessarily dependent on referents’ objective existence, but on structure/use; behind words must be a “real name” or “description” [Wittgenstein, 2020: 57-58]. Wittgenstein notes “change of aspect in cognition,” where mental apprehension changes are attributed to object changes [Wittgenstein, 2020: 348, 356-357]; the river-bed analogy shows fluid boundaries. “Description” in linguistic analysis is second perfection/pure actuality; “copulative verbs” (first perfection) express the name’s (subject) movement towards the predicate (description) for awareness.
The Centrality of the Problem of Change and Motion
Despite fundamental differences (Avicenna’s ontology vs. Wittgenstein’s linguistic/epistemology; Avicenna’s metaphysical/correspondence basis vs. Wittgenstein’s use-based/conventional basis), structural/functional commonalities exist.
Fundamental Divergences
Domain/Nature
Avicenna: existential/physical change in substance/accidents.
Wittgenstein: linguistic, conceptual, perceptual, epistemological change.
Analysis Basis/Truth Criterion
Avicenna: metaphysical foundations, external reality correspondence.
Wittgenstein: language use, judgment agreement.
Analytical Commonalities
Stable Element in Transformation
“Substance” (Avicenna); “world-picture”/“hinge propositions” (Wittgenstein).
Teleology/Directedness
Avicennian motion: towards second perfection.
Wittgenstein: functional/epistemological directedness to clarity, agreement, awareness.
Tripartite Structure (“Origin – Intermediary – Terminus”)
Avicenna: Potency → Motion (First Perfection) → Actuality (Second Perfection).
Wittgenstein (interpretive): Proposition Subject (Substance/First Perfection) → Copula (Intermediary/Motion) → Predicate (Potency) = Awareness (Second Perfection). Wittgenstein (Tractatus: semantic transition; Investigations: change/causality/possibility, “machine” as possibility symbol) offers analyses in logic/language.
Comparative Analysis
In “Arash is literate,” “Arash” (subject) ~ stable substance (first perfection), “literate” (predicate) ~ potency, “is” (copula) ~ motion bringing subject to actuality (understanding “Arash is literate” = second perfection). This is a logical/linguistic process.
Avicenna sees change as objective, existential for potential actualization; Wittgenstein seeks transformation in language/concept/cognitive framework dynamism, showing philosophy’s diverse engagement capacities.
Conclusion
This research comparatively investigates change/motion in Avicenna and later Wittgenstein. Avicenna views motion as existential, objective, teleological in the external world (potency to act for second perfection) on a stable substance. Wittgenstein sees dynamism in language, concepts, epistemological frameworks (language-game/“world-picture” evolution), use/agreement dependent.
Despite substantive differences (ontological vs. linguistic/epistemological), structural similarities (stable element, directedness, origin-intermediary-terminus structure) are traceable. Both philosophers, clarifying objective (Avicenna) and linguistic/epistemological (Wittgenstein) dimensions of “becoming,” aid its multifaceted understanding. This comparison shows metaphysical tradition’s and linguistic analysis’s capacities in confronting this problem.
The concept of “change and motion” is central to philosophical contemplation. Avicenna, influenced by Greek thought, offers a systematic, ontological explanation of motion as an objective, gradual transition from potency to act, crucial for time’s actualization, revealing the dynamism of “being.” Conversely, the later Wittgenstein, in the context of analytic philosophy, shifts from ontology to linguistic and conceptual analysis. While not directly addressing metaphysical motion, his discussions on linguistic dynamism, rule-following, “aspect-seeing” (perceptual/conceptual change), and the river-bed analogy relate to “change” in “understanding” and “meaning-making”.
This research, acknowledging foundational differences (Avicenna’s metaphysics versus Wittgenstein’s linguistic and conceptual analysis), comparatively reviews these perspectives. It's a question: what are the analytical commonalities and divergences in their explanations of change/motion (or related ideas), and what are the philosophical implications? The aim is to establish an analytical bridge, seeking new insights into “change” and the capacities of comparative philosophy. The article analyzes each philosopher, then conducts a comparative analysis, presenting conclusions.
Determining the Problem of Change and Motion
In comparative philosophy, conceptual precision is vital. Motion is an object’s positional change relative to its environment over time [Tyson et al., 2000: 20-21], a relative phenomenon. Science understands existence via time; philosophy understands time via existence [Ismailpour & Alavi, 2022: 66]. Avicenna deems “nature” (tabī’ah) the internal principle of motion/rest; motion is gradual emergence from potency to act in categories (quantity, quality, where, position), and a condition for time’s actualization. The later Wittgenstein's views change conceptually-logically: it arises from a new perspective on a constant subject (“descriptive method”), necessitating propositional transitions. His analysis links to logic’s a priori characteristics; understanding motion occurs through describing logical symbols, not through the senses.
The Concept of Potency and Act
The distinction between potency (the possibility of change) and act (objective realization) is fundamental to Avicennian and Aristotelian explanations of motion; this division is relative [Mesbah Yazdi, 2003: 2/296-301]. Avicenna sees potency as the “principle of transformation,” and in bodies, as “inclination” (mayl); potency and act are relational concepts [Mesbah Yazdi, 2005: 133]. In Aristotle’s hylomorphism, prime matter (hayūlā) is pure potency [Copleston, 2008: 1/352]. A potential being is an existential mode [Asgari, 2014: 106-109]. In Western thought, actuality (Entelecheia/Energeia) realizes potency; Aquinas defines motion as “the actuality of that which is potential, insofar as it is potential” [Coope, 2009: 277]
The Place of Time
Avicenna considers time an objective reality, motion’s “measure,” dependent on it, perceived via the “now” (ān), and in “contingents” (mumkināt), eternal [Reyhani, 2017: 66]. Linking motion and time continuity, he refutes discrete instant theories [Ibn Sina, 2021: 291-292]. Wittgenstein critiques the linguistic use of time, distinguishing between “memory-time” and “information-time” [Tomashpolskaia, 2023: 18]. For him, knowing the essence of time is through the “representation of grammar” and its use; time is necessary for world intelligibility, constructed from perceptual changes in language games.
Becoming (Sayrūrah)
Becoming signifies a transition from potency to act and reality’s dynamic nature. The later Wittgenstein sees human identity as “becoming,” reality as interconnected processes; understanding mental processes is problematic due to commitment to a specific perspective [Wittgenstein, 2020: 192].
The Method of Knowing Change and Motion
The “descriptive method” emphasizes “becoming” with “being” [Nail, 2019: 27-29]. If existence is flux, its description requires a process that shows continuous flows [Nail, 2019: 84-86]. The early Wittgenstein linked a “symbol’s” value to inter-symbol change [Wittgenstein, 2021: 83]. For the later Wittgenstein, motion’s possibility (a priori principle) uniquely relates to its concept; motion is a “symbol’s” actualization [Wittgenstein, 2020: 150-153].
The Problem of Motion and Change in Avicenna’s Philosophy
In Avicenna’s philosophy, motion is an objective reality, key to explaining the material world and becoming (ṣayrūrah), founded on potency and act. His definition (“Motion is a gradual change in the stable state of a body, which is directed towards an end and desires to reach it, whether the end is potential or actual” [Ibn Sina, 2000: 203]) emphasizes change in a stable substrate, graduality, and teleology.
Avicenna distinguishes harakah qat’iyyah (continuous mental process) from harakah tawassutiyyah (“the state of being intermediate between the beginning and the end” - al-tawassut bayn al-mabda’ wa al-muntahā) [Motahhari, 2008: 6/764]. Accepting Aristotle’s definition of motion as “the first perfection of that which is in potency,” he states that only harakah tawassutiyyah exists externally [Ibn Sina, 1984: 83]. This “intermediacy” (tawassut), the mobile’s intermediate state, is the “first perfection”; perfection post-motion is “second perfection” [Ibn Sina, 1982: 106-108]. This relates to “first perfection” (stable essential form) [Ibn Sina, 1983: 33] and “second perfection” (acquired accidents). Motion is acquiring “second perfection”; time’s continuity reflects motions. Avicenna presents motion as objective, real, gradual, continuous, and teleological, occurring in a stable substance and its accidents, thereby grounding time.
The Problem of Motion and Change in the Philosophy of the Later Wittgenstein
The later Wittgenstein examines change and motion through language analysis, “language-games,” and “forms of life.” Understanding concepts means grasping use-rules in these contexts, not objective correspondence. Meaning is dynamic and use-dependent; different forms of life yield different understandings of change. Objectivity is “agreement in judgments” in a linguistic community, implying conceptual “relativism,” though forms of life as “the given” are more fundamental [Hanfling, 2018; 199-200].
In “On Certainty,” Wittgenstein introduces “hinge propositions” or the “world-picture” framing other beliefs. These are also “changeable” [Paya & Mohammadi, 2022: 246]; “language-games change with time” [Wittgenstein, 2023: 12]. The “river-bed” analogy likens empirical propositions to flowing water, hinge propositions to the riverbed itself, which is changeable [Wittgenstein, 2023: 18]. Their boundary is fluid, with a dynamic, interactive relationship [Burwood, 2023: 8-10].
Other interpretations encompass epistemological and psychological change, logical and semantic change (referring to the Tractatus), and the connection between change and causality and possibility. Wittgenstein’s view of change is linguistic, conceptual, and epistemological, focusing on the dynamism of language and its cognitive frameworks.
Attaining Perfection through Change and Motion
For Avicenna, change/motion is a contingent’s transition from potency to act, the “first perfection of the potential thing,” actualizing in time [Ibn Sina, 2004: 4-6]. The moving object is imperfect; motion removes imperfection to reach “second perfection” (actuality, rest). Motion is existential, internal, goal-directed (ghāyah). Avicenna distinguishes “form” (essential first perfection) from “quality” (accidental second perfection capable of intensification); motion arises from quality’s intensification, akin to Aristotle’s capacity/execution distinction [Saadat Mostafavi, 2012: 43].
The later Wittgenstein, focusing on language's “function” in “language-games” and “forms of life,” sees philosophy’s aim as “clarification” via “description,” not theorizing. Clarification arises from “rule-following,” with its goal being “awareness” through the description of ordinary language functions [Zandiyeh, 2018: 98]. Analyzing “description” vs. “naming,” he shows proposition meaning isn’t necessarily dependent on referents’ objective existence, but on structure/use; behind words must be a “real name” or “description” [Wittgenstein, 2020: 57-58]. Wittgenstein notes “change of aspect in cognition,” where mental apprehension changes are attributed to object changes [Wittgenstein, 2020: 348, 356-357]; the river-bed analogy shows fluid boundaries. “Description” in linguistic analysis is second perfection/pure actuality; “copulative verbs” (first perfection) express the name’s (subject) movement towards the predicate (description) for awareness.
The Centrality of the Problem of Change and Motion
Despite fundamental differences (Avicenna’s ontology vs. Wittgenstein’s linguistic/epistemology; Avicenna’s metaphysical/correspondence basis vs. Wittgenstein’s use-based/conventional basis), structural/functional commonalities exist.
Fundamental Divergences
Domain/Nature
Avicenna: existential/physical change in substance/accidents.
Wittgenstein: linguistic, conceptual, perceptual, epistemological change.
Analysis Basis/Truth Criterion
Avicenna: metaphysical foundations, external reality correspondence.
Wittgenstein: language use, judgment agreement.
Analytical Commonalities
Stable Element in Transformation
“Substance” (Avicenna); “world-picture”/“hinge propositions” (Wittgenstein).
Teleology/Directedness
Avicennian motion: towards second perfection.
Wittgenstein: functional/epistemological directedness to clarity, agreement, awareness.
Tripartite Structure (“Origin – Intermediary – Terminus”)
Avicenna: Potency → Motion (First Perfection) → Actuality (Second Perfection).
Wittgenstein (interpretive): Proposition Subject (Substance/First Perfection) → Copula (Intermediary/Motion) → Predicate (Potency) = Awareness (Second Perfection). Wittgenstein (Tractatus: semantic transition; Investigations: change/causality/possibility, “machine” as possibility symbol) offers analyses in logic/language.
Comparative Analysis
In “Arash is literate,” “Arash” (subject) ~ stable substance (first perfection), “literate” (predicate) ~ potency, “is” (copula) ~ motion bringing subject to actuality (understanding “Arash is literate” = second perfection). This is a logical/linguistic process.
Avicenna sees change as objective, existential for potential actualization; Wittgenstein seeks transformation in language/concept/cognitive framework dynamism, showing philosophy’s diverse engagement capacities.
Conclusion
This research comparatively investigates change/motion in Avicenna and later Wittgenstein. Avicenna views motion as existential, objective, teleological in the external world (potency to act for second perfection) on a stable substance. Wittgenstein sees dynamism in language, concepts, epistemological frameworks (language-game/“world-picture” evolution), use/agreement dependent.
Despite substantive differences (ontological vs. linguistic/epistemological), structural similarities (stable element, directedness, origin-intermediary-terminus structure) are traceable. Both philosophers, clarifying objective (Avicenna) and linguistic/epistemological (Wittgenstein) dimensions of “becoming,” aid its multifaceted understanding. This comparison shows metaphysical tradition’s and linguistic analysis’s capacities in confronting this problem.