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Volume 4, Issue 3 (2024)
J Clin Care Skill 2024, 4(3): 253-264 |
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History
Received: 2024/07/30 | Accepted: 2024/10/20 | Published: 2024/10/31
Received: 2024/07/30 | Accepted: 2024/10/20 | Published: 2024/10/31
How to cite this article
Seifollahifard E. Embodied Cognition in Avicenna's Viewpoint. J Clin Care Skill 2024; 4 (3) :253-264
URL: http://jpt.modares.ac.ir/article-6-76328-en.html
URL: http://jpt.modares.ac.ir/article-6-76328-en.html
Department of Islamic Philosophy and Theology, Faculty of Humanities, Tarbiat Modares University, Tehran, Iran
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Introduction
This paper seeks to investigate the possibility and manner in which the body influences cognition, contrary to the prevailing philosophical trend that views perception as a spiritual phenomenon detached from the body. Among Muslim philosophers, except for Ibn al-Haytham's views on sensory perception, especially vision, Ibn Sina is the first philosopher to explain both the metaphysical and physiological aspects of perception. Therefore, the central question of this paper can be expressed in the following question: What does embodied cognition mean from Ibn Sina's perspective? Given Ibn Sina's dualistic view and the fact that he considers the soul to be the primary agent of cognition, how can embodied cognition be explained? Can we say that differences in the bodies of different perceivers lead to differences in their understanding of a single object? Does the body only influence sensory and imaginative perception, which Ibn Sina considers material, or does it also have an effect on intellectual perception? How can this influence be justified?
Based on the research conducted on the history of this issue, no independent studies were found in this regard. An article titled The Role of the Body in the Emergence of Sensory Perception from the Perspective of Ibn Sina and Mulla Sadra was written. Still, its findings differ significantly from the present research. In that article, the embodied nature of sensory perception from Ibn Sina's perspective is interpreted in such a way that the Shaykh al-Ra'is' view cannot refute the theory of physicalism, because, according to both perspectives, sensory perception is the result of independent interactions between the brain and nerves. In another article titled Embodied Cognition, Explaining the Position and Influence of the Body in the Process of Acquiring Cognition from the Perspective of Mulla Sadra, Ibn Sina's views are briefly mentioned, and an interpretation is offered from his perspective that cannot explain the influence of the body on cognition. The duality of soul and body, as well as the conjunctive relationship between them, is seen as an obstacle to explaining embodied cognition from Ibn Sina's perspective, and this conclusion is once again incompatible with the view presented in this article. Before addressing the main issue, a few preliminary points will be mentioned.
Definition of the Soul
Ibn Sina, in a comprehensive view of earthly souls—vegetative, animal, and human—defines the soul as “the perfection of the first for a natural, organic body endowed with potential life” [Ibn Sina, 1975: 22]. Based on this, the soul is a substance that attaches to the body and is perfected through its connection to the body and bodily instruments. Therefore, according to Ibn Sina, not only the human soul but also the vegetative and animal souls are defined concerning their bodies, indicating a close relationship between the soul and the body.
Definition of the Body
In Oyun al-Hikma, Sheikh al-Ra'ees defines the body as “a collection of organs that the soul uses as tools for its actions” [Ibn Sina, 1980: 340]. Given this definition and considering the shared nature of the physical body in the definition of the three types of souls, the body can be regarded as a body that has a soul, such that the distinguishing factor of the body from other bodies is the soul itself. It seems that in the works of Ibn Sina, there is no independent definition for either the soul or the body, and the reliability of the connection between the two leads to their mutual influence.
In the following, we will briefly examine each stage of perception and the role of the body in it, according to Ibn Sina.
Sensory Perception and the Role of the Body in It
Sensation is defined as the perception of something that presents itself to the perceiver in a specific form and with tangible attributes related to location, time, condition, quality, and so forth, in a particular material [Ibn Sina, 1972: 175].
Ibn Sina, in discussing the necessity of the mediation of instruments in sensory perception in the book An-Nafs of Kitab al-Shifa, states that considering the immateriality of the soul, if the soul could perceive the tangible without the use of instruments, then proximity and distance would have no role in perception, and all tangible things would be the same for the soul. Therefore, it becomes necessary that the absence of the tangible does not harm perception, and all tangibles would be perceived by the soul, which is false [Ibn Sina, 1975: 88-89]. From Ibn Sina’s perspective, sensory forms are apprehended by the soul through their imprint on the faculties.
Ibn Sina in Shifa reminds us that sensory forms, after being sensed by the sensory faculties, are transmitted to the common sense; that is, the faculty that concentrates the sensations, and sensory perception is essentially the act of the common sense [Ibn Sina, 1975: 147].
From Ibn Sina's viewpoint, all external faculties—from vision to touch—originate from the pneumatic spirit and nerves stemming from the brain and connect to it, and there is no objection to different perceptions being transmitted to the brain through a single instrument; therefore, all external senses require the body and the instruments contained within the body for their function [Ibn Sina, 1944: 94-95]. He posits that the common sense or Bontasia perceives all forms that are represented in the external senses and is located in the first cavity of the brain [Ibn Sina, 1972: 178].
Imaginative Perception and the Role of the Body in It
Imaginative perception possesses only two conditions: “the presence of attributes and accidents, and the particularity of the known” [Ibn Sina, 1975: 51]. Although Ibn Sina raises the issue of the immateriality of the imagination with doubt and perplexity in some of his works [Ibn Sina, 1953: 127]; considering his philosophical foundations, which regard only the intellect as the apprehender of universals and attribute any form of particular perception to the bodily faculties, he cannot be considered a proponent of the immateriality of the imagination [Ibn Sina, 1945: 350-345]. For this reason, according to Ibn Sina, the body and bodily instruments play a role in imaginative perception.
Rational Perception and the Role of the Body in It
This stage of perception lacks all three conditions of sensory perception. This is because rational forms are completely immaterial, neither particular nor accompanied by material accidents [Ibn Sina, 1944: 103]. Sheikh al-Ra'ees believes that one cannot comprehend the rational form of something without the mediation of its sensible form. This necessity arises from the soul's need for the mediation of the sensible form in the apprehension of rational forms. Thus, humans acquire all knowledge through their senses [Ibn Sina, 1984: 23]. Sheikh states in his book Isharat that the action of the rational soul, whether from the perspective of theoretical intellect or practical intellect, requires the body. The theoretical intellect, initially, is potential and merely a capacity, and through the acquisition of primary intelligibles— which are all contingent upon the body—it transforms into actual intellect [Ibn Sina, 1945: 372-373]. Based on the discussion, it can be stated that the rational soul is also dependent on the body in the realm of rational perception.
The Relationship Between the Soul and the Body
From Ibn Sina's perspective, each body, with its specific temperament, is conducive and suitable for the influx of a particular soul [Ibn Sina, 1945: 376; Ibn Sina, 1968: 580]. Sheikh believes that the principles of the soul's subsequent perfection are also dependent on the body's primary material, such that the quantity, quality, states, and forms of the body significantly influence the capabilities and future conditions of each soul [Ibn Sina, 1975: 308]. Therefore, with differences in temperament and body, the soul's capability in acquiring perfections and performing actions, of which knowledge is among the most important, will vary.
In Ibn Sina's view, the pneumatic spirit acts as an intermediary in the interaction between the soul and the body; thus, every change in the soul is transmitted to the body through the pneumatic spirit and vice versa. Therefore, based on this influence and interaction, changes in the body's condition will lead to changes in the soul and cognition.
Conclusion
Embodied Cognition from Ibn Sina's perspective, despite his dualistic view, can be described as follows: at all levels of perception, any difference in bodies leads to changes in the soul and differences in their cognition of the same known entity. From Ibn Sina's perspective, each body with its specific temperament is conducive for a particular soul, and the subsequent perfections of the soul are also dependent on the body's primary material. Therefore, with differences in temperament and body, the soul's capability in acquiring perfections and performing actions, especially cognition, will differ.
On the other hand, Ibn Sina, considering the pneumatic spirit as the intermediary in the interaction between the soul and the body, asserts that any bodily occurrence affects the pneumatic spirit, and this effect is transmitted to the soul through the pneumatic spirit.
This paper seeks to investigate the possibility and manner in which the body influences cognition, contrary to the prevailing philosophical trend that views perception as a spiritual phenomenon detached from the body. Among Muslim philosophers, except for Ibn al-Haytham's views on sensory perception, especially vision, Ibn Sina is the first philosopher to explain both the metaphysical and physiological aspects of perception. Therefore, the central question of this paper can be expressed in the following question: What does embodied cognition mean from Ibn Sina's perspective? Given Ibn Sina's dualistic view and the fact that he considers the soul to be the primary agent of cognition, how can embodied cognition be explained? Can we say that differences in the bodies of different perceivers lead to differences in their understanding of a single object? Does the body only influence sensory and imaginative perception, which Ibn Sina considers material, or does it also have an effect on intellectual perception? How can this influence be justified?
Based on the research conducted on the history of this issue, no independent studies were found in this regard. An article titled The Role of the Body in the Emergence of Sensory Perception from the Perspective of Ibn Sina and Mulla Sadra was written. Still, its findings differ significantly from the present research. In that article, the embodied nature of sensory perception from Ibn Sina's perspective is interpreted in such a way that the Shaykh al-Ra'is' view cannot refute the theory of physicalism, because, according to both perspectives, sensory perception is the result of independent interactions between the brain and nerves. In another article titled Embodied Cognition, Explaining the Position and Influence of the Body in the Process of Acquiring Cognition from the Perspective of Mulla Sadra, Ibn Sina's views are briefly mentioned, and an interpretation is offered from his perspective that cannot explain the influence of the body on cognition. The duality of soul and body, as well as the conjunctive relationship between them, is seen as an obstacle to explaining embodied cognition from Ibn Sina's perspective, and this conclusion is once again incompatible with the view presented in this article. Before addressing the main issue, a few preliminary points will be mentioned.
Definition of the Soul
Ibn Sina, in a comprehensive view of earthly souls—vegetative, animal, and human—defines the soul as “the perfection of the first for a natural, organic body endowed with potential life” [Ibn Sina, 1975: 22]. Based on this, the soul is a substance that attaches to the body and is perfected through its connection to the body and bodily instruments. Therefore, according to Ibn Sina, not only the human soul but also the vegetative and animal souls are defined concerning their bodies, indicating a close relationship between the soul and the body.
Definition of the Body
In Oyun al-Hikma, Sheikh al-Ra'ees defines the body as “a collection of organs that the soul uses as tools for its actions” [Ibn Sina, 1980: 340]. Given this definition and considering the shared nature of the physical body in the definition of the three types of souls, the body can be regarded as a body that has a soul, such that the distinguishing factor of the body from other bodies is the soul itself. It seems that in the works of Ibn Sina, there is no independent definition for either the soul or the body, and the reliability of the connection between the two leads to their mutual influence.
In the following, we will briefly examine each stage of perception and the role of the body in it, according to Ibn Sina.
Sensory Perception and the Role of the Body in It
Sensation is defined as the perception of something that presents itself to the perceiver in a specific form and with tangible attributes related to location, time, condition, quality, and so forth, in a particular material [Ibn Sina, 1972: 175].
Ibn Sina, in discussing the necessity of the mediation of instruments in sensory perception in the book An-Nafs of Kitab al-Shifa, states that considering the immateriality of the soul, if the soul could perceive the tangible without the use of instruments, then proximity and distance would have no role in perception, and all tangible things would be the same for the soul. Therefore, it becomes necessary that the absence of the tangible does not harm perception, and all tangibles would be perceived by the soul, which is false [Ibn Sina, 1975: 88-89]. From Ibn Sina’s perspective, sensory forms are apprehended by the soul through their imprint on the faculties.
Ibn Sina in Shifa reminds us that sensory forms, after being sensed by the sensory faculties, are transmitted to the common sense; that is, the faculty that concentrates the sensations, and sensory perception is essentially the act of the common sense [Ibn Sina, 1975: 147].
From Ibn Sina's viewpoint, all external faculties—from vision to touch—originate from the pneumatic spirit and nerves stemming from the brain and connect to it, and there is no objection to different perceptions being transmitted to the brain through a single instrument; therefore, all external senses require the body and the instruments contained within the body for their function [Ibn Sina, 1944: 94-95]. He posits that the common sense or Bontasia perceives all forms that are represented in the external senses and is located in the first cavity of the brain [Ibn Sina, 1972: 178].
Imaginative Perception and the Role of the Body in It
Imaginative perception possesses only two conditions: “the presence of attributes and accidents, and the particularity of the known” [Ibn Sina, 1975: 51]. Although Ibn Sina raises the issue of the immateriality of the imagination with doubt and perplexity in some of his works [Ibn Sina, 1953: 127]; considering his philosophical foundations, which regard only the intellect as the apprehender of universals and attribute any form of particular perception to the bodily faculties, he cannot be considered a proponent of the immateriality of the imagination [Ibn Sina, 1945: 350-345]. For this reason, according to Ibn Sina, the body and bodily instruments play a role in imaginative perception.
Rational Perception and the Role of the Body in It
This stage of perception lacks all three conditions of sensory perception. This is because rational forms are completely immaterial, neither particular nor accompanied by material accidents [Ibn Sina, 1944: 103]. Sheikh al-Ra'ees believes that one cannot comprehend the rational form of something without the mediation of its sensible form. This necessity arises from the soul's need for the mediation of the sensible form in the apprehension of rational forms. Thus, humans acquire all knowledge through their senses [Ibn Sina, 1984: 23]. Sheikh states in his book Isharat that the action of the rational soul, whether from the perspective of theoretical intellect or practical intellect, requires the body. The theoretical intellect, initially, is potential and merely a capacity, and through the acquisition of primary intelligibles— which are all contingent upon the body—it transforms into actual intellect [Ibn Sina, 1945: 372-373]. Based on the discussion, it can be stated that the rational soul is also dependent on the body in the realm of rational perception.
The Relationship Between the Soul and the Body
From Ibn Sina's perspective, each body, with its specific temperament, is conducive and suitable for the influx of a particular soul [Ibn Sina, 1945: 376; Ibn Sina, 1968: 580]. Sheikh believes that the principles of the soul's subsequent perfection are also dependent on the body's primary material, such that the quantity, quality, states, and forms of the body significantly influence the capabilities and future conditions of each soul [Ibn Sina, 1975: 308]. Therefore, with differences in temperament and body, the soul's capability in acquiring perfections and performing actions, of which knowledge is among the most important, will vary.
In Ibn Sina's view, the pneumatic spirit acts as an intermediary in the interaction between the soul and the body; thus, every change in the soul is transmitted to the body through the pneumatic spirit and vice versa. Therefore, based on this influence and interaction, changes in the body's condition will lead to changes in the soul and cognition.
Conclusion
Embodied Cognition from Ibn Sina's perspective, despite his dualistic view, can be described as follows: at all levels of perception, any difference in bodies leads to changes in the soul and differences in their cognition of the same known entity. From Ibn Sina's perspective, each body with its specific temperament is conducive for a particular soul, and the subsequent perfections of the soul are also dependent on the body's primary material. Therefore, with differences in temperament and body, the soul's capability in acquiring perfections and performing actions, especially cognition, will differ.
On the other hand, Ibn Sina, considering the pneumatic spirit as the intermediary in the interaction between the soul and the body, asserts that any bodily occurrence affects the pneumatic spirit, and this effect is transmitted to the soul through the pneumatic spirit.