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Volume 4, Issue 2 (2024)
J Clin Care Skill 2024, 4(2): 161-184 |
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History
Received: 2024/05/12 | Accepted: 2024/08/17 | Published: 2024/09/17
Received: 2024/05/12 | Accepted: 2024/08/17 | Published: 2024/09/17
How to cite this article
Sarkarpour Z. Emotions and their Connection with Ethics; Avicenna's Viewpoint. J Clin Care Skill 2024; 4 (2) :161-184
URL: http://jpt.modares.ac.ir/article-6-75081-en.html
URL: http://jpt.modares.ac.ir/article-6-75081-en.html
Analytical Philosophy Research Center, IPM Institute for Research in Fundamental Sciences, Tehran, Iran
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Avicenna did not present a specific theory titled theory of emotions in his works. However, one can infer his overall perspective from the scattered discussions he has made about instances of emotion in the context of other topics. Based on these scattered writings, I aim to provide a picture of Avicenna's general outlook on emotions. I do not intend to offer a coherent and complete theory on emotions from Avicenna's viewpoint. Still, based on the interpretations and analyses I have derived from the texts, I will refer to a hypothesis that I find more defensible from my perspective. In this article, I will demonstrate that, contrary to what might initially seem apparent, and contrary to the interpretations given of Avicenna's views on emotions, the core of emotions is not motivation but rather a form of evaluative cognition. With this assumption, it can be claimed that Avicenna's perspective falls within evaluative theories of emotions, according to which the essence of all emotions is evaluation [Tappolet, 2023]. Throughout this writing, I will examine the relationship between emotions and other components such as motivation, pleasure, and pain, the body, and ethics.
In his psychology, Avicenna categorizes the types of soul into three: the vegetative soul, the animal soul, and the human soul. Most of Avicenna's discussions on emotions arise in the context of introducing the faculties of the animal soul. He considers the animal soul to have two main faculties: the cognitive faculty and the motivational faculty, each with its subdivisions. Various instances of emotions are introduced under the term Shaugh or inclination, which refers to states arising from the inclining motive faculty, one of the three motivating faculties of the animal soul (the other two are the decisive faculty and the locomotive faculty). The inclining faculty itself comprises two powers: the Concupiscible faculty and the irascible faculty, with various emotions, such as anger, fear, sadness, etc., being attributed to them [Avicenna, 1996].
Avicenna generally describes inclination as states arising from deficiency and power, aimed at alleviating and achieving perfection. The inclination is, in fact, a drive that directs the individual toward the perfection of their faculties, but it does not compel them to act. Voluntary movement requires another process called decision [Avicenna, 1996: 267-268].
Given the focus of discussions on emotions within the context of the inclining faculty, it initially appears that Avicenna views emotions as generally states of inclination—whose core is motivation—and products of the inclining faculty of the animal soul. Some of Avicenna's expressions in introducing inclination reinforce this hypothesis. For instance, he describes desire as a state distinct from perception [Avicenna, 1996: 267-268]: “This inclination is not part of the cognitive faculties, for the function of these faculties is just perception and judgment”.
However, there is substantial evidence indicating that Avicenna considers the core of emotions to be an evaluative cognitive process that can arise from either the animal soul's cognitive faculties or the rational soul's. In other words, he does not view emotions as solely belonging to the faculties of the animal soul, nor does he see their core as merely motivation. Some of this evidence includes:
1. Emphasis on the causal relationship between inclination—whose instances are the same as those of emotions—and evaluation: According to Avicenna, emotions are the result of evaluations. Since causality, from the perspective of Muslim philosophers, is a necessary and inseparable relationship, emotions cannot exist without evaluation. In other words, their relationship with one another seems to be necessary. Thus, in explaining the above quote, it can be said that this statement merely emphasizes that inclination is not purely a cognitive process, but it does not imply that it is separate from them.
2. Emotions with a Non-Motivational Nature: When introducing emotions under the Concupiscible faculty and the irascible faculty, Avicenna refers to “joy” and “sadness”. He also mentions two emotions called sociability and happiness [Avicenna, 1996: 269-270]. In his discussion of human-specific emotions, he notes “wonder” and “embarrassment” [Avicenna, 1996: 282-283]. The important point regarding these emotions is that a conceptual analysis indicates they do not possess motivational or driving qualities. Sadness is not a desire for movement, action, or attainment. Regarding joy, it seems to be a reaction that follows the desire and inclination toward a subject and its attainment (the realization of a goal). Thus, it represents perfection or, at the very least, a consequence of achieving a goal and perfection, rather than a pursuit of acquiring it. For sociability and happiness, if we understand contentment as a feeling of pleasant companionship and friendship with another—distinct from the desire to socialize with a friend, which is an inclination—this state arises from a lack and is not, therefore, a quality that drives one to alleviate that lack. Rather, it is a product, or in other words, a consequence of realizing a prior inclination. Thus, unlike desire, these emotions represent a realized goal, a state of perfection, or a consequence of achieving perfection [Fatigati, 2021].
Human-specific emotions like wonder and embarrassment cannot be considered inclinations or drives aimed at acquiring perfection or a goal. Therefore, these emotions challenge the assumption that all emotions possess a motivational nature.
3. Emotions Related to the Imaginative Faculty: Avicenna speaks of an inclination or desire—such as a mother's inclination toward her child, the feeling of friendship with a friend, and the longing of prisoners for freedom and liberation from bondage—that, although not stemming from the inclination faculty, arises from the imaginative faculty. However, like lust or anger, these emotions lead to consensus and subsequently to action [Avicenna, 1996: 268-269; Naeji, 2008: 477-478; Avicenna, 1984a: 110]. In other words, these states are not products of the Concupiscible faculty and the irascible faculty of the animal soul, but they have similar functions to those states. This statement negates the assumption that emotions are exclusively tied to the inclining faculty of the animal soul.
4. Love: Avicenna defines love by stating [Avicenna, ND: 374]: Love is essentially nothing but the appreciation [or commendation] of what is good and in harmony with one’s nature. According to this definition, the core of love is the recognition of something good and compatible with one’s nature and praising it. Thus, the essential nature of love, according to this statement, is not inclination or motivation. Although in the absence of the beloved, love is the source of inclination, and when the beloved is present, the source of the :union: between lover and beloved, or perhaps the preservation of the beloved by the lover [Avicenna, 1983: 363; Avicenna, 1984b: 435]. Then the essence of love lies in its evaluative nature, which involves recognizing and commending the good.
It has already been noted that there is a necessary relationship between inclination and evaluation. Thus, this cognitive stage is common to both inclination and love. If we assume that the essence of emotions, or the commonality among them, is evaluation, then emotions can be divided into two categories: motivational and non-motivational. In fact, motivational emotions are states that, in addition to perception and evaluation, include motivation. When an individual's evaluation indicates a lack of goodness and perfection, the element of motivation accompanies the evaluation, forming motivational emotions. However, the common aspect of all emotions and their essence remains an evaluative perception. Then, according to Avicenna, there are primarily evaluative cognitive states that can be classified into motivational and non-motivational categories.
Pleasure and pain are also linked to emotions through cognition and evaluation, which are also essential to them. Avicenna's views on the relationship between emotions and the body are ambiguous, but he leans toward the idea that there is no necessary connection. He also posits a necessary relationship between emotions and virtues, indicating a link between emotions and ethics. It seems Avicenna considers mood a stable, fixed emotion. Since mood is related to virtue, which is related to morality, emotions are related to morality. [Avicenna, 1996: 65; Samadi Amuli, 2015: 416; Avicenna, 2004: 24; Avicenna, 1984a: 109; Avicenna, 1984c: 429].
In his psychology, Avicenna categorizes the types of soul into three: the vegetative soul, the animal soul, and the human soul. Most of Avicenna's discussions on emotions arise in the context of introducing the faculties of the animal soul. He considers the animal soul to have two main faculties: the cognitive faculty and the motivational faculty, each with its subdivisions. Various instances of emotions are introduced under the term Shaugh or inclination, which refers to states arising from the inclining motive faculty, one of the three motivating faculties of the animal soul (the other two are the decisive faculty and the locomotive faculty). The inclining faculty itself comprises two powers: the Concupiscible faculty and the irascible faculty, with various emotions, such as anger, fear, sadness, etc., being attributed to them [Avicenna, 1996].
Avicenna generally describes inclination as states arising from deficiency and power, aimed at alleviating and achieving perfection. The inclination is, in fact, a drive that directs the individual toward the perfection of their faculties, but it does not compel them to act. Voluntary movement requires another process called decision [Avicenna, 1996: 267-268].
Given the focus of discussions on emotions within the context of the inclining faculty, it initially appears that Avicenna views emotions as generally states of inclination—whose core is motivation—and products of the inclining faculty of the animal soul. Some of Avicenna's expressions in introducing inclination reinforce this hypothesis. For instance, he describes desire as a state distinct from perception [Avicenna, 1996: 267-268]: “This inclination is not part of the cognitive faculties, for the function of these faculties is just perception and judgment”.
However, there is substantial evidence indicating that Avicenna considers the core of emotions to be an evaluative cognitive process that can arise from either the animal soul's cognitive faculties or the rational soul's. In other words, he does not view emotions as solely belonging to the faculties of the animal soul, nor does he see their core as merely motivation. Some of this evidence includes:
1. Emphasis on the causal relationship between inclination—whose instances are the same as those of emotions—and evaluation: According to Avicenna, emotions are the result of evaluations. Since causality, from the perspective of Muslim philosophers, is a necessary and inseparable relationship, emotions cannot exist without evaluation. In other words, their relationship with one another seems to be necessary. Thus, in explaining the above quote, it can be said that this statement merely emphasizes that inclination is not purely a cognitive process, but it does not imply that it is separate from them.
2. Emotions with a Non-Motivational Nature: When introducing emotions under the Concupiscible faculty and the irascible faculty, Avicenna refers to “joy” and “sadness”. He also mentions two emotions called sociability and happiness [Avicenna, 1996: 269-270]. In his discussion of human-specific emotions, he notes “wonder” and “embarrassment” [Avicenna, 1996: 282-283]. The important point regarding these emotions is that a conceptual analysis indicates they do not possess motivational or driving qualities. Sadness is not a desire for movement, action, or attainment. Regarding joy, it seems to be a reaction that follows the desire and inclination toward a subject and its attainment (the realization of a goal). Thus, it represents perfection or, at the very least, a consequence of achieving a goal and perfection, rather than a pursuit of acquiring it. For sociability and happiness, if we understand contentment as a feeling of pleasant companionship and friendship with another—distinct from the desire to socialize with a friend, which is an inclination—this state arises from a lack and is not, therefore, a quality that drives one to alleviate that lack. Rather, it is a product, or in other words, a consequence of realizing a prior inclination. Thus, unlike desire, these emotions represent a realized goal, a state of perfection, or a consequence of achieving perfection [Fatigati, 2021].
Human-specific emotions like wonder and embarrassment cannot be considered inclinations or drives aimed at acquiring perfection or a goal. Therefore, these emotions challenge the assumption that all emotions possess a motivational nature.
3. Emotions Related to the Imaginative Faculty: Avicenna speaks of an inclination or desire—such as a mother's inclination toward her child, the feeling of friendship with a friend, and the longing of prisoners for freedom and liberation from bondage—that, although not stemming from the inclination faculty, arises from the imaginative faculty. However, like lust or anger, these emotions lead to consensus and subsequently to action [Avicenna, 1996: 268-269; Naeji, 2008: 477-478; Avicenna, 1984a: 110]. In other words, these states are not products of the Concupiscible faculty and the irascible faculty of the animal soul, but they have similar functions to those states. This statement negates the assumption that emotions are exclusively tied to the inclining faculty of the animal soul.
4. Love: Avicenna defines love by stating [Avicenna, ND: 374]: Love is essentially nothing but the appreciation [or commendation] of what is good and in harmony with one’s nature. According to this definition, the core of love is the recognition of something good and compatible with one’s nature and praising it. Thus, the essential nature of love, according to this statement, is not inclination or motivation. Although in the absence of the beloved, love is the source of inclination, and when the beloved is present, the source of the :union: between lover and beloved, or perhaps the preservation of the beloved by the lover [Avicenna, 1983: 363; Avicenna, 1984b: 435]. Then the essence of love lies in its evaluative nature, which involves recognizing and commending the good.
It has already been noted that there is a necessary relationship between inclination and evaluation. Thus, this cognitive stage is common to both inclination and love. If we assume that the essence of emotions, or the commonality among them, is evaluation, then emotions can be divided into two categories: motivational and non-motivational. In fact, motivational emotions are states that, in addition to perception and evaluation, include motivation. When an individual's evaluation indicates a lack of goodness and perfection, the element of motivation accompanies the evaluation, forming motivational emotions. However, the common aspect of all emotions and their essence remains an evaluative perception. Then, according to Avicenna, there are primarily evaluative cognitive states that can be classified into motivational and non-motivational categories.
Pleasure and pain are also linked to emotions through cognition and evaluation, which are also essential to them. Avicenna's views on the relationship between emotions and the body are ambiguous, but he leans toward the idea that there is no necessary connection. He also posits a necessary relationship between emotions and virtues, indicating a link between emotions and ethics. It seems Avicenna considers mood a stable, fixed emotion. Since mood is related to virtue, which is related to morality, emotions are related to morality. [Avicenna, 1996: 65; Samadi Amuli, 2015: 416; Avicenna, 2004: 24; Avicenna, 1984a: 109; Avicenna, 1984c: 429].