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Volume 4, Issue 1 (2024)                   Geo Res 2024, 4(1): 71-89 | Back to browse issues page

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Anvari S, Hedayat Afza M. Analyzing the Idea of Verbal Sharing of Existence from the Perspective of Hakim Rajab-Ali Tabrizi and Examining his Conflict with Mulla Sadra on This Issue. Geo Res 2024; 4 (1) :71-89
URL: http://jpt.modares.ac.ir/article-6-73842-en.html
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1- Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Persian Literature and Foreign Languages, Allameh Tabataba’I University, Tehran, Iran
2- Department of Philosophy and Kalam, Theology Faculty, Farabi Campus, University of Tehran, Qom, Iran
* Corresponding Author Address: Department of Philosophy and Kalam, Theology Faculty, Farabi Campus, University of Tehran, University Boulevard, Qom, Iran. Postal Code: 3718117469 (mahmudhedayatafza@yahoo.com)
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Introduction
Islamic philosophers, accepting the conceptual distinction between existence and quiddity, have considered the words existence or existent a spiritual commonality among creatures. Therefore, their conflict has been defined as the verbal sharing of the concept of existence between the creator and the creature. But the main problem in explaining this issue is the difference in the place of discussion (the mind or the object). Should the concept of existence be studied in terms of its examples, or can it be studied regardless of any concrete examples?
Rajab-Ali Tabrizi is among the scholars who discussed the issue of verbal or spiritual sharing of the concept of existence. In his interpretation of this issue, the commonality between the words existence and existent in the essence of a person and creatures has been questioned. This article examines the issue from Hakim Tabrizi's point of view and, by rereading and analyzing his answer to the question at hand, evaluates his criticisms of Mullasadra regarding the concept of existence”.

The historical background of the issue, according to Tabrizi
Tabrizi, in the introduction to his treatise Esbate Vajeb, mentions the sayings of great people such as Plotinus, Farabi, Qounavi, and Indian sages based on verbal sharing of existence in order to indicate that those who believe in the verbal sharing of existence are thinkers with a school of thought. have been Despite Hakim Tabrizi's historical references to people from different intellectual and religious groups, his background in establishing negative theological views is based on two elements of reason and hadith:
- Intellectually, it is based on the rules deduced from the works of peripatetic, especially Avicenna.
- Regarding hadith, it is based on his trust in Shiite hadiths, especially in the books by Kolani and Ibn Babeveyh.

Tabrizi's rational argument on the verbal sharing of existence
Since Tabrizi considered possible objects as a concrete combination of existence and quiddity in the discussions of ontology, naturally, in his opinion, there was no similarity between the specific existence of the essence and the descriptive existence of quiddity. Hakim's rational argument favoring verbal sharing of existence is also based on the same ontological foundations and the distinction between the essentialism of existence and the descriptive and relational meaning.

A reflection on Khatun-Abadi's considerations about Tabrizi's belief in verbal sharing
Mohammad Ismail Khatunabadi is one of the students of Hakim Tabrizi who has written many books. He has also used the works of other philosophical schools of Isfahan. He writes in the book Aqayed al-Usuliyin: Rajab-Ali Tabrizi, because he does not believe in mental concepts; he believes in the verbal sharing of existence between God and other beings.
Since some researchers in the works of Hakim Tabrizi's school have considered Khatunabadi's interpretation of sharing the concept of existence to be correct, it seems necessary to outline some critical points in the analysis of that point of view:
First, Khatun-Abadi has yet to provide any textual evidence regarding the acceptance of the spiritual sharing of existence in the eyes of Avecinna, Tousi, etc.
Secondly, Tabrizi's statements regarding the essence of God show that even if he believed in valid concepts, he did not accept abstracting the self-evident concept of absolute existence from God's essence. In this regard, Tabrizi presents a rule based on which everything found in creation is prohibited in the essence of the creator: Our thoughts in the creation, no existence in the creator”.
Thirdly, according to Khatun-Abadi, none of the philosophers considered the concept of special existence as a spiritual commonality between a necessary being and a contingent being, so Hakim Tabrizi rejected it. Even though Khatunabadi was a scholar, he did not know Tabrizi's main audience in the above issue (Mullasadra and his students).

Analysis of Tabrizi's conflict with Mollasadra in the idea of verbal or spiritual sharing of existence
Mullasadra claimed: Existence in the meaning of the essence and truth of a thing, which requires the rejection of non-existence, is also true for God. Yes, by accepting the spiritual commonality of the concept of existence between the absolute and the possible, one must also acknowledge the achievement of a comprehensive aspect between them. From here, we can understand the concern of Tanzihists in the issue of sharing the concept of existence. These people's criticisms of Mullasadra regarding the spiritual sharing of existence are related to this hindsight. Those criticisms led some late Sadrists to argue, in defense of spiritual sharing of existence, that the meaning of sharing of existence between necessary being and contingent being is only the concept of existence and not its examples.
In this way, the objections of those who believe there is a mistake between the concept of existence and its exemplification will be removed. However, in proving the idea of establishment in existence, they are easily transferred from the concept of existence to its example. Apart from that clear contradiction, one should ask the late Sadraites: What role does the truth of the general concept of existence have on objective facts in philosophical discussions? What is the difference between a philosophical or theological discussion and a literary or logical discussion? Do even the traditional logicians show the use of the concept without reference to the example so that the philosophers can be satisfied with it? Doesn't the realist philosopher seek to know the outside world, rather than using philosophical concepts only as tools to analyze and examine concrete examples?

Conclusion
Hakim Tabrizi, in epistemological discussions, ruled on the close relationship between concepts and their examples, and therefore, in his opinion, considering a concept without considering its example was not related to philosophical and theological issues. Even based on the concept of existence, Tabrizi could strengthen the theory of verbal sharing of existence because, in the opinion of this realist sage, it should be clear from the beginning which external truth the concept of existence is abstracted from. Contrary to the idea of his student Khatunabadi, even if he believed in credit concepts, he still did not include the general and abstract concept of existence in this issue Because Tabrizi's main addressee in this matter is Mulla Sadra, who, after explaining the spiritual sharing of the concept of existence, used it as a preparation for raising serious issues such as the authenticity of existence or doubting the truth of existence.