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Volume 4, Issue 2 (2024)
J Clin Care Skill 2024, 4(2): 141-159 |
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History
Received: 2024/01/14 | Accepted: 2024/06/8 | Published: 2024/06/30
Received: 2024/01/14 | Accepted: 2024/06/8 | Published: 2024/06/30
How to cite this article
Arabgoorchooee F, Khazaei Z, Javadi M. Epistemic Responsibility in John Heil Viewpoint. J Clin Care Skill 2024; 4 (2) :141-159
URL: http://jpt.modares.ac.ir/article-6-73405-en.html
URL: http://jpt.modares.ac.ir/article-6-73405-en.html
1- Department of Islamic Studies, Faculty of Law and Theology, Shahid Bahonar University of Kerman, Kerman, Iran
2- Department of Islamic Philosophy and Theology, Faculty of Theology and Islamic Studies, University of Qom, Qom, Iran
3- Department of Philosophy of Ethics, Faculty of Theology and Islamic Studies, University of Qom, Qom, Iran
2- Department of Islamic Philosophy and Theology, Faculty of Theology and Islamic Studies, University of Qom, Qom, Iran
3- Department of Philosophy of Ethics, Faculty of Theology and Islamic Studies, University of Qom, Qom, Iran
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Introduction
The question of whether we are responsible for our beliefs depends on whether we consider our attitudes voluntary. In other words, if someone considers forming, preserving, justifying, and suspending judgments about believing in propositions under the control of the will, it will be meaningful to talk about his responsibility for his beliefs. And on this basis, whether to accept or reject the role of will in beliefs leads to various views. Doxastic voluntarism does not consider an active role for the will in the formation, justification, etc., of beliefs; it is against epistemic responsibility. But Doxastic voluntarists, divided into direct Doxastic voluntarism, indirect Doxastic voluntarism, doxastic compatibilism, and doxastic influence, believe that the processes related to beliefs are voluntary and that the epistemic agent is responsible for their beliefs. Among the indirect doxastic involitionists, Heil believes that forming and adopting beliefs, although not a basic act, can be considered a non-basic act [Heil, 1983: 358], and thus it can enter the realm of our will, and our responsibility towards them becomes meaningful. In this research, we focus on the indirect doxastic voluntarism approach and John Heil's point of view in detail to show how indirect doxastic involuntarism defends epistemic responsibility.
Definition of Indirect Doxastic Voluntarism
If epistemic responsibility is based on indirect belief control, then it is a type of indirect doxastic responsibility. Here, indirect doxastic control often means the ability to create certain beliefs using one or more processes between the time you will this belief and the time you form it [Huss, 2009: 249-271].
Indirect doxastic control is the ability to make yourself form certain beliefs by using one or more processes between the time you will the belief and the time you form the belief.
S has indirect control over p-ing iff
(i) S can intentionally p by performing a series of different actions over a considerable period of time, and
(ii) S can ~p [Peels, 2017].
Types of Indirect Voluntary Control
1. Non-basic immediate voluntary control: It is an ability that causes a person to believe or not believe a certain proposition as a non-basic activity. Basic actions are those performed with a decision and will, unlike non-basic actions, require more than one will to perform them. In other words, it is voluntary control over a non-basic verb, through several basic verbs [Heil, 1983: 358].
2. Long-Range Voluntary Control: It involves discontinuous activities to create belief in a particular proposition, such as selective exposure to evidence, hypnosis, or seeking out and associating with a group that believes a particular proposition or propositions and avoiding those who hold such propositions [Alston, 2005: 71].
According to John Heil, the extent of indirect voluntary control varies between the three perspectives of creating, maintaining, and acquiring beliefs.
John Heil and epistemic responsibility through doxastic indirect voluntarism
Heil considers the procedures for generating and maintaining perceptual beliefs to be voluntary [Heil, 1983: 355-364; Code, 2017: 90]. He confirms methods such as behavioral change [Huss, 2009: 257; Feldman, 2000: 672] and Pascal's conditioning [James, 1915: 7] as voluntary methods of generating perceptual beliefs. The cognitive experiences of people in using such techniques show that we have indirect control over our beliefs [Ammerman, 1973: 57-76], and for this reason, we can acknowledge that we have duties and responsibilities for them. According to Heil, it is reasonable to talk about epistemically responsible agent, cognitive duty, and the like here. According to Heil, the responsible epistemological agent is the one who appropriately collects information [Heil, 1983: 361-362]. But his opinion about the adoption and formation of beliefs varies between voluntary and involuntary [Heil, 1983: 357-358; Heil, 1984: 60-61].
Heil's defending epistemic responsibility
He explains the epistemic responsibility for the procedures that generate perceptual beliefs in terms of the intelligent and purposeful nature of this activity. However, his defense of epistemic responsibility for the adoption and formation of beliefs proceeds in two ways: the use of reprimanding or commanding phrases about beliefs, and the non-basic nature of the act of forming beliefs.
Assessment
Heil explicitly emphasizes voluntarism in choosing the methods of belief formation and in maintaining beliefs, but he holds a dual position regarding the acceptance and formation of beliefs, and his view on both sides of involuntarism and Voluntarism is variable. This misconception that he clearly considers the scope of will-to-belief to be only related to the procedures of acquiring beliefs, not the formation and acceptance of beliefs, is rooted in Heil's strong emphasis on the belief-generating methods and the existence of ambiguity and There is a lack of transparency of the types of will-believing in his works, which ultimately leads to the wrong perception of his opinion from the negation of direct will-believing in the formation of beliefs, to absolute non-willing-belief in this field. That is, in cases where Heil insists on the involuntary nature of accepting and forming beliefs, it means rejecting its volition directly (not indirectly), and when he speaks about the possibility of a person's choice and voluntary control over acceptance and forming Beliefs, the intention is indirect belief.
The first evidence of this claim is Heil's criticism of the Cartesian notion of doxastic voluntarism and his attempt to refute it by presenting an alternative model. A further explanation is that the famous interpretation of Cartesian doxastic voluntarism is the direct type [Pojman, 2000: 280]. Perhaps because of this reputation, Heil does not see the need to further explain this interpretation and explicitly refer to the types of will-belief.
Another witness is Heil's own words. Heil [1992: 50-51], pointing to the existence of the problem of inconsistency between the reasonableness of forming a belief in a proposition from the epistemological point of view and the non-epistemological consequences of believing it, believes that although understanding this problem on the one hand, in no way It does not force the acceptance of the will to believe, that is, the acceptance of the doctrine that the formation of belief is under the direct volitional control of epistemic agents. But on the other hand, insisting that there can never be situations in which epistemic subjects, at least indirectly, form or remove beliefs at their own will is too extreme.
Conclusion
By emphasizing the indirect role of an epistemic agency and his will in forming, maintaining, justifying, or removing certain beliefs, indirect doxastic voluntarism accepts his responsibility for his beliefs. Heil follows a graded process from the directness of the will's role in the procedure of forming and maintaining belief to the indirect influence of adopting and acquiring belief. In the formation beliefs, he does not accept direct doxastic voluntarism in forming beliefs, which is based on the famous idea of Cartesian; However, by distinguishing between direct and indirect doxastic voluntarism, explaining the concept of basic and non-basic acts and expressing methods and techniques such as behavioral change, he tries to interpret that adoption and formation beliefs are under voluntary control but indirectly.
The question of whether we are responsible for our beliefs depends on whether we consider our attitudes voluntary. In other words, if someone considers forming, preserving, justifying, and suspending judgments about believing in propositions under the control of the will, it will be meaningful to talk about his responsibility for his beliefs. And on this basis, whether to accept or reject the role of will in beliefs leads to various views. Doxastic voluntarism does not consider an active role for the will in the formation, justification, etc., of beliefs; it is against epistemic responsibility. But Doxastic voluntarists, divided into direct Doxastic voluntarism, indirect Doxastic voluntarism, doxastic compatibilism, and doxastic influence, believe that the processes related to beliefs are voluntary and that the epistemic agent is responsible for their beliefs. Among the indirect doxastic involitionists, Heil believes that forming and adopting beliefs, although not a basic act, can be considered a non-basic act [Heil, 1983: 358], and thus it can enter the realm of our will, and our responsibility towards them becomes meaningful. In this research, we focus on the indirect doxastic voluntarism approach and John Heil's point of view in detail to show how indirect doxastic involuntarism defends epistemic responsibility.
Definition of Indirect Doxastic Voluntarism
If epistemic responsibility is based on indirect belief control, then it is a type of indirect doxastic responsibility. Here, indirect doxastic control often means the ability to create certain beliefs using one or more processes between the time you will this belief and the time you form it [Huss, 2009: 249-271].
Indirect doxastic control is the ability to make yourself form certain beliefs by using one or more processes between the time you will the belief and the time you form the belief.
S has indirect control over p-ing iff
(i) S can intentionally p by performing a series of different actions over a considerable period of time, and
(ii) S can ~p [Peels, 2017].
Types of Indirect Voluntary Control
1. Non-basic immediate voluntary control: It is an ability that causes a person to believe or not believe a certain proposition as a non-basic activity. Basic actions are those performed with a decision and will, unlike non-basic actions, require more than one will to perform them. In other words, it is voluntary control over a non-basic verb, through several basic verbs [Heil, 1983: 358].
2. Long-Range Voluntary Control: It involves discontinuous activities to create belief in a particular proposition, such as selective exposure to evidence, hypnosis, or seeking out and associating with a group that believes a particular proposition or propositions and avoiding those who hold such propositions [Alston, 2005: 71].
According to John Heil, the extent of indirect voluntary control varies between the three perspectives of creating, maintaining, and acquiring beliefs.
John Heil and epistemic responsibility through doxastic indirect voluntarism
Heil considers the procedures for generating and maintaining perceptual beliefs to be voluntary [Heil, 1983: 355-364; Code, 2017: 90]. He confirms methods such as behavioral change [Huss, 2009: 257; Feldman, 2000: 672] and Pascal's conditioning [James, 1915: 7] as voluntary methods of generating perceptual beliefs. The cognitive experiences of people in using such techniques show that we have indirect control over our beliefs [Ammerman, 1973: 57-76], and for this reason, we can acknowledge that we have duties and responsibilities for them. According to Heil, it is reasonable to talk about epistemically responsible agent, cognitive duty, and the like here. According to Heil, the responsible epistemological agent is the one who appropriately collects information [Heil, 1983: 361-362]. But his opinion about the adoption and formation of beliefs varies between voluntary and involuntary [Heil, 1983: 357-358; Heil, 1984: 60-61].
Heil's defending epistemic responsibility
He explains the epistemic responsibility for the procedures that generate perceptual beliefs in terms of the intelligent and purposeful nature of this activity. However, his defense of epistemic responsibility for the adoption and formation of beliefs proceeds in two ways: the use of reprimanding or commanding phrases about beliefs, and the non-basic nature of the act of forming beliefs.
Assessment
Heil explicitly emphasizes voluntarism in choosing the methods of belief formation and in maintaining beliefs, but he holds a dual position regarding the acceptance and formation of beliefs, and his view on both sides of involuntarism and Voluntarism is variable. This misconception that he clearly considers the scope of will-to-belief to be only related to the procedures of acquiring beliefs, not the formation and acceptance of beliefs, is rooted in Heil's strong emphasis on the belief-generating methods and the existence of ambiguity and There is a lack of transparency of the types of will-believing in his works, which ultimately leads to the wrong perception of his opinion from the negation of direct will-believing in the formation of beliefs, to absolute non-willing-belief in this field. That is, in cases where Heil insists on the involuntary nature of accepting and forming beliefs, it means rejecting its volition directly (not indirectly), and when he speaks about the possibility of a person's choice and voluntary control over acceptance and forming Beliefs, the intention is indirect belief.
The first evidence of this claim is Heil's criticism of the Cartesian notion of doxastic voluntarism and his attempt to refute it by presenting an alternative model. A further explanation is that the famous interpretation of Cartesian doxastic voluntarism is the direct type [Pojman, 2000: 280]. Perhaps because of this reputation, Heil does not see the need to further explain this interpretation and explicitly refer to the types of will-belief.
Another witness is Heil's own words. Heil [1992: 50-51], pointing to the existence of the problem of inconsistency between the reasonableness of forming a belief in a proposition from the epistemological point of view and the non-epistemological consequences of believing it, believes that although understanding this problem on the one hand, in no way It does not force the acceptance of the will to believe, that is, the acceptance of the doctrine that the formation of belief is under the direct volitional control of epistemic agents. But on the other hand, insisting that there can never be situations in which epistemic subjects, at least indirectly, form or remove beliefs at their own will is too extreme.
Conclusion
By emphasizing the indirect role of an epistemic agency and his will in forming, maintaining, justifying, or removing certain beliefs, indirect doxastic voluntarism accepts his responsibility for his beliefs. Heil follows a graded process from the directness of the will's role in the procedure of forming and maintaining belief to the indirect influence of adopting and acquiring belief. In the formation beliefs, he does not accept direct doxastic voluntarism in forming beliefs, which is based on the famous idea of Cartesian; However, by distinguishing between direct and indirect doxastic voluntarism, explaining the concept of basic and non-basic acts and expressing methods and techniques such as behavioral change, he tries to interpret that adoption and formation beliefs are under voluntary control but indirectly.