Philosophical Thought
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Volume 4, Issue 3 (2024)
J Clin Care Skill 2024, 4(3): 235-251 |
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History
Received: 2024/02/5 | Accepted: 2024/10/26 | Published: 2024/11/2
Received: 2024/02/5 | Accepted: 2024/10/26 | Published: 2024/11/2
How to cite this article
Hamtaii H, Hodjati S. Unity Problems and the Nature of Proposition. J Clin Care Skill 2024; 4 (3) :235-251
URL: http://jpt.modares.ac.ir/article-6-73277-en.html
URL: http://jpt.modares.ac.ir/article-6-73277-en.html
1- Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Human Sciences, Tarbiat Modares University, Tehran, Iran
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“The problem of propositional unity” consists in how a proposition as a compound entity constructed from its ingredients is distinct from them. Russell holds that the part/whole relation between the ingredients of a proposition and itself is different from the relation held between a set and its members or subsets. According to Russell, the explanation of the unity of a proposition is the most important task a modern philosopher can contribute to philosophy. According to Bradley, if the justification of the unity is to be explained by adding a new ingredient to unite the other ingredients into a whole, this leads to infinite regress. Because of this, Russell does not accept that addition, especially if it leads to the acceptance of infinite ingredients for a unique proposition. On the other hand, Gaskin sees no problem in that regress and conversely, supposes that the root of the unity of the proposition is the regress itself. In his later view, Russell presents judgment as a multiple relation. Instead of a proposition, judgment is more essential in his analysis in such a way that in a judgment, the agent and his intuition are the main elements in uniting all other ingredients of the proposition. For example, in “Othello believes that Casio loves Desdemona,” there are three objects, i.e., Othello, Casio, and Desdemona, and two relations, i.e., believing and loving; and Othello’s belief unites those objects and the loving relation into a unified net. What is interesting for Jespersen is “the problem of the list”: the list of ingredients in a proposition cannot result in unity, and they are underdetermined; the unity needs some interconnection between ingredients. Using transparent intensional logic, Jespersen uses some λ-calculus, so that it is not the object, but the procedure that contributes to the unity of a proposition, which itself is a procedure. He rejects the unity problem for the proposition. According to Eklund, the structural ingredients are sufficient for the proposition. Meanwhile, there still exist some other problems related to the unity problem: “the problem of Order”, “the problem of Combinability”, and “the problem of Representation”. Related to “The Problem of Order,” the question is how these two sentences are different, although they have the same ingredients. “John loves Mary” and “Mary loves John”. In “The Problem of Combinability,” the question arises how in the list (John, Mary loves…) we can make a sentence by John, Mary, and loves; but cannot make a sentence by John and Mary? In “The Problem of Representation,” the question is how the collection of (Desdemona, loves, Casio) is meaningful; however, the collection of (loves, Desdemona, Casio) is not meaningful. (at least in English). Of course, the representation problem does not seem to be very serious, because we may find different languages with different grammar, so each collection considered may be meaningful in at least one of those languages. I agree with Scott Soames that there isn’t an essential (internal) characteristic to show the logical roles of ingredients in a sentence. What the predicate and what the subject are depend on the agent’s will. If we find a proposition without determinate ingredients, that can be another reason that the question of the unity of the proposition is not very essential. Imagine a shepherd who shouts “wolf”! He certainly says something meaningful beyond the mere word “wolf”. He may mean “Wolf has come”, “I can see a wolf”, “Wolf is puncturing something”, or generally “Wolf is in relation with something”. Here, we don’t have a way to choose between these propositions, and this is not merely because of our ignorance; the shepherd himself has nothing more than saying “wolf” in that situation. Certainly, there is some proposition in between. We can claim the shepherd is a liar if there weren’t any wolves. It is very amusing if the shepherd defends and says, “I don’t assert a complete sentence so that it can be true or false”. Hence, in this example, we confront a meaningful proposition; however, we cannot discuss its components. So, the above problems, i.e., the Unity, the Order, the Combinability, and the Representation, don’t arise and cannot be answered. However, the problem of truth evaluability is still justified. Therefore, whatever the explanation is given for the nature of the proposition should explain how a mere word like “wolf” isn’t truth-valuable, but as containing a proposition, is truth-valuable, although its ingredients are undetermined. So, I conclude that the problem of Truth-evaluability is the main problem related to the unity and nature of the proposition.