Philosophical Thought
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Volume 4, Issue 1 (2024)
Geo Res 2024, 4(1): 33-40 |
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History
Received: 2023/11/27 | Accepted: 2024/05/22 | Published: 2024/06/14
Received: 2023/11/27 | Accepted: 2024/05/22 | Published: 2024/06/14
How to cite this article
Hodjati S. Frege on Sense: More Investigation. Geo Res 2024; 4 (1) :33-40
URL: http://jpt.modares.ac.ir/article-6-72642-en.html
URL: http://jpt.modares.ac.ir/article-6-72642-en.html
Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Humanities, Tarbiat Modares University, Tehran, Iran
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Today, John Stuart Mill’s theory of reference [Mill, 1843] is entitled “Direct Reference”. This theory confronts some problems [Searle, 1969:164-165; Salmon, 2007: 162; Caplan, 2007: 4-6]. The “Indirect Reference” theory, attributed to Frege, seeks to address those problems. According to Frege, a sign (word or sentence) expresses a sense [Frege, 1892] and this sense, in turn, presents a referent. This sense has some characteristics [Frege, 1892; Frege, 1918]:
a) it is an abstract entity, not material or concrete;
b) it is objective and not subjective: is independent of the knower; does not belong to any agent, contrary to an idea;
c) the knower can grasp it by using language;
d) it is absolute and eternal; and
e) Some mode of presentation of the referent is included in the sense.
Frege calls the sense of a declarative sentence “thought”. Now, an important question arises: how does an absolute and eternal sense introduce a concrete referent, an entity that is temporal and spatial? For example, if we consider the sense of the name “Aristotle,” the most famous pupil of Plato, how can this absolute sense present Aristotle, who is not absolute and eternal? We may find the answer by referring to the semantics of indexical words. Frege does not have a definite semantic theory regarding indexical words; however, he has mentioned some issues, especially in his article “The Thought,” which can be used. There, he talks about indexical words such as “I”, “you”, “today”, and “yesterday. In sum, his view is that unless the referent of an indexical word is determined, the expression containing that indexical word does not express a sense (or thought). However, it has linguistic meaning [Dummett, 1973: 367, 383-384]. If Dr Lauben says “I have been wounded,” and his addressee says “You have been wounded,” and a third one says “Lauben has been wounded,” these three speakers are saying the same thought or content since the referents of the two former sentences are the same as Dr Lauben. It means that three sentences are reduced to one sentence: Lauben has been wounded, and it is clear that it expresses only one sense (or thought). Of course, their linguistic meanings are different, but it is not the same as sense in Frege’s view. The same situation is for someone who says, “It is sunny today. If she wants to say the same thing tomorrow, she should say “It was sunny yesterday”. If the indexical words in these two sentences are determined by a fixed date, for example, the first day of Farvardin in 1403 SH at Tehran, they reduce to one sentence “It is sunny on the first of Farvardin in 1403 SH at Tehran” and it expresses only one thought. However, the linguistic meaning of those sentences is different. The same situation is considered for sense in terms of description: all temporal and spatial constraints should be considered to have a complete, absolute, eternal sense. For example, if “Aristotle” expresses the sense as “the most famous pupil of Plato”, the precise sense is the most famous pupil of Plato in the 3rd century BC. at Athens. This sense can introduce Aristotle even many centuries before or after Christ. Hence, we may say “Aristotle is the most famous pupil of Plato in the 3rd century BC. at Athens” and the copulative verb “is” is timeless. Regarding the empty terms, if we accept that they also express sense and that sense is not mock, since they are deprived of having real referents, the index in the sense is determined through the relative context, i.e., the story. For example, suppose the sense of “Holmes” is “the detective with such and such a characteristic in Conan Doyle’s stories”. This last ingredient, i.e., “Canon Doyle’s stories,” should be added or considered so that the sense becomes absolute and eternal. In sum, if we confront a name referring to an ordinary concrete object, the sense it expresses contains some temporal and spatial indices. The referents of those indices should be determined to have a complete absolute eternal sense (or thought). If we confront an empty term in a fictional or mythical context, the context of use plays the same role as indices and should be determined to get the exact sense. By this account, it seems that all names in Frege’s view are, somehow, indexical words since their sense is indexical.
a) it is an abstract entity, not material or concrete;
b) it is objective and not subjective: is independent of the knower; does not belong to any agent, contrary to an idea;
c) the knower can grasp it by using language;
d) it is absolute and eternal; and
e) Some mode of presentation of the referent is included in the sense.
Frege calls the sense of a declarative sentence “thought”. Now, an important question arises: how does an absolute and eternal sense introduce a concrete referent, an entity that is temporal and spatial? For example, if we consider the sense of the name “Aristotle,” the most famous pupil of Plato, how can this absolute sense present Aristotle, who is not absolute and eternal? We may find the answer by referring to the semantics of indexical words. Frege does not have a definite semantic theory regarding indexical words; however, he has mentioned some issues, especially in his article “The Thought,” which can be used. There, he talks about indexical words such as “I”, “you”, “today”, and “yesterday. In sum, his view is that unless the referent of an indexical word is determined, the expression containing that indexical word does not express a sense (or thought). However, it has linguistic meaning [Dummett, 1973: 367, 383-384]. If Dr Lauben says “I have been wounded,” and his addressee says “You have been wounded,” and a third one says “Lauben has been wounded,” these three speakers are saying the same thought or content since the referents of the two former sentences are the same as Dr Lauben. It means that three sentences are reduced to one sentence: Lauben has been wounded, and it is clear that it expresses only one sense (or thought). Of course, their linguistic meanings are different, but it is not the same as sense in Frege’s view. The same situation is for someone who says, “It is sunny today. If she wants to say the same thing tomorrow, she should say “It was sunny yesterday”. If the indexical words in these two sentences are determined by a fixed date, for example, the first day of Farvardin in 1403 SH at Tehran, they reduce to one sentence “It is sunny on the first of Farvardin in 1403 SH at Tehran” and it expresses only one thought. However, the linguistic meaning of those sentences is different. The same situation is considered for sense in terms of description: all temporal and spatial constraints should be considered to have a complete, absolute, eternal sense. For example, if “Aristotle” expresses the sense as “the most famous pupil of Plato”, the precise sense is the most famous pupil of Plato in the 3rd century BC. at Athens. This sense can introduce Aristotle even many centuries before or after Christ. Hence, we may say “Aristotle is the most famous pupil of Plato in the 3rd century BC. at Athens” and the copulative verb “is” is timeless. Regarding the empty terms, if we accept that they also express sense and that sense is not mock, since they are deprived of having real referents, the index in the sense is determined through the relative context, i.e., the story. For example, suppose the sense of “Holmes” is “the detective with such and such a characteristic in Conan Doyle’s stories”. This last ingredient, i.e., “Canon Doyle’s stories,” should be added or considered so that the sense becomes absolute and eternal. In sum, if we confront a name referring to an ordinary concrete object, the sense it expresses contains some temporal and spatial indices. The referents of those indices should be determined to have a complete absolute eternal sense (or thought). If we confront an empty term in a fictional or mythical context, the context of use plays the same role as indices and should be determined to get the exact sense. By this account, it seems that all names in Frege’s view are, somehow, indexical words since their sense is indexical.