For many people, constantly trying to find enough evidence for the existence of God, but without being culpable, are unable to find that evidence; the problem of Divine Hiddenness arises. Some contemporary philosophers have had glimpses into this matter from different approaches, but the first one who attempted to examine it in detail was the Canadian philosopher J.L. Schellenberg. He presents his argument in his 2015 book, The Hiddenness Argument, as an argument in favor of Atheism. This argument suggests that if there were a God, there must be sufficient evidence and reasons for His existence, at least for those who are searching for them; however, there is none, thus God is non-existent.
This paper aims not only to critique Schellenberg's Divine Hiddenness argument but also to examine the approach to this problematic by the American philosopher Michael Rea. Rea believes that humans' idealization of God consists of him as a parental figure who is constantly answering his child's needs. Still, because God's answer to our needs is nothing like a parent's answers, it's implied that God doesn't exist. In other words, human needs that are left unanswered by God are one of the ingredients of this argument, which is of great importance. Michael Rea attempts to expose the flawed foundations of human expectations of God and presents the correct way to conceive these foundations. However, by analyzing his point of view, we shall see that despite his success in finding his way, he is able to assert his objections. Still, Schellenberg's argument remains steady against these objections, for Rea's sole purpose is to show follies of Schellenberg's argument and thus, Rea is blinded to Schellenberg's argument's foundation, essence and main elements and this has come to the objections being not that much fruitful at the end of the day.
The problem of Divine Hiddenness is an argument in favor of Atheism and is a member of Intuitive arguments against God's existence. This argument claims that God hasn't shown sufficient evidence and reasons for his existence to humanity. In other words, the truth of God's existence is conceivable, yet no way or method towards this truth is given to humanity from God [Schellenberg, 2006: 4]. This problem also presents an objection to those who firmly believe in God and His attributes, such as His being all-loving, omniscient, and omnipotent. Such a one and only God, with the claimed attributes being in a veil for even those who are sincere and wholly devoted to catch and conceive him, but have no calls from this one and only God, leads the way to the Divine Hiddenness argument. Though sparks of this argument could be found in Hume's and Nietzsche's criticisms of theism, it was hidden to the eyes for centuries, and no debates over it have ever led anywhere, unless a Canadian philosopher, J.L. Schellenberg, through writing his 2015 book, Hiddenness Argument, suggested the matter seriously and challenged theism. He believes that the idea and argumentation of Divine Hiddenness are original, meaning that there was no such concept ever before.
On the other hand, Michael Rea, the American philosopher of religion, believes that Divine Hiddenness occurs due to God's irresponsibility in addressing humans' infinite neediness. Humanity's graves for God are always his, so he would never hold even a bit of pain, but as there is no response as such from God and as human takes all events as evil happenings, humanity comes to the idea that God is hidden. Rea believes that humans' limited understanding of love as an essential attribute of God brings him to the very point of blindness to God's other attributes. In this paper, we aim to assess the functioning and efficiency of Rea's objections and theories regarding Schellenberg's Hiddenness argument.
Schellenberg suggests his Divine Hiddenness argument with two premises:
1. If there is an all-loving God in the world, it would be a god such that he is always open to a personal, two-sided and positive relationship with each and every individual human. From God's perspective, such a relationship encompasses guidance, support, forgiveness, and consolation, while from the human side, it includes hope, obedience, thankfulness, and trust.
2. If God is ever ready for such a personal relationship with his subjects, then no Non-resistant non-believer should ever exist, and each non-resistant person should always be in a situation such that he could be in a personal relationship solely out of his attempt.
But as there are non-resistant non-believers who find no openness from God despite their efforts, which ultimately means God's hiddenness, thus God doesn't exist.
Rea, in response to Schellenberg's given image of this two-sided (love) relation, points to God's transcendence of attributes, and finds the difference between human love and divine love so important that based on it, our expectations of divine love shall be put under scrutiny and recognition. As a result of this recognition, one of the key premises of the Divine Hiddenness argument is weakened.
Rea also believes that the concept of God's being present and different ways of him connecting to his creations – as illustrated in holy books – is always and vastly accessible, more than what is usually validated in the literature around Divine Hiddenness; especially to those who believe in God, go to bible, and take part in religious rituals. However, this argument ignores the worries about divine love towards those who are non-believers, or are incapable of any access to the bible or religious rituals, but it weakens the main motivation for negative examples of divine love – as the love of a fictitious or faraway lover.
Rea finally believes that Schellenberg's problem is God's being hidden, but his argument is not fit to be named as Divine Hiddenness Argument. He argues for this claim as follows: Schellenberg's problem has contents far more extensive than mere non-resistant non-belief, in which additional and other theistic problems follow God's hiddenness.
However, upon analyzing Rea's review and objections to Schellenberg's argumentation, it appears that the argument remains powerful, as despite Rea's success in presenting his objections in a nuanced manner, his attempt is largely focused on exposing Schellenberg's flaws and overlooks his own claim's paradoxes and limitations. On one hand, he believes that the way towards conceiving God and his attributes is unavailable or at least, not easily available to humanity – and this brings us to some Apophatic theology - and on the other hand, he claims that even if a conceiving of divine essential attributes is available, no expectations from God is followed. Humanity could claim no rights from his creator. But Rea has forgotten that having expectations from God based on those essential attributes is a form of deduction itself. Another problem of Rea's objections is that he pays no attention to the special group of people who are intended in Schellenberg's argument (non-resistant non-believers) and through presenting evidences from biblical literature, and experiences of those who take part in religious rituals, has made himself a suspect of Scandal of Particularity. These points show us that Rea's objections consist inner difficulties, and even if we take them as victorious, Divine Hiddenness could be based on other grounds.