fa <span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:107%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span style="font-size:10.0pt"><span style="line-height:107%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Cambria&quot;,serif">Alethic pluralism maintains that truth is realized by different truth-conferring properties in different domains of discourse. A challenge for this view arises from mixed discourse: propositions and inferences that combine content from distinct domains. This paper examines the problem at three levels: mixed atomic propositions, mixed compound propositions, and mixed inferences. Its central claim is that these forms of mixed discourse are not equally problematic. Moderate versions of alethic pluralism, especially Lynch&rsquo;s functionalist account, can explain mixed compounds and mixed inferences by appealing to a higher-order property of truth shared across domains. Mixed atomic propositions, however, remain resistant to such treatment because they involve cross-domain interaction at the most fundamental semantic level. The paper concludes that the ultimate viability of alethic pluralism depends on its ability to provide a convincing account of mixed atomic propositions.</span></span></span></span></span></span><br> &nbsp; Alethic Pluralism, Mixed Discourse, Crispin Wright, Michael Lynch, Mixed Atomic Propositions, Alethic Functionalism 289 304 http://jpt.daneshafarand.org/browse.php?a_code=A-10-240-12&slc_lang=fa&sid=6 H. Alaeinejad 1003194753284600388019 1003194753284600388019 No Department of Logic, Iranian Institute of Philosophy, Tehran, Iran