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Volume 5, Issue 4 (2025)
3 2025, 5(4): 1001-1023 |
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Received: 2025/11/4 | Accepted: 2025/12/2 | Published: 2025/07/1
Received: 2025/11/4 | Accepted: 2025/12/2 | Published: 2025/07/1
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Sarebannejad M. Phronesis and the Autonomy of the Will: A Comparative Study of the Moral Foundations in the Philosophy of Aristotle and Kant. 3 2025; 5 (4) :1001-1023
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Introduction
This study examines the conceptual foundations of practical reason through a comparative analysis of three major philosophical traditions: Aristotelian phronesis, Kantian autonomy of the will, and Gadamer’s hermeneutical understanding. Each of these traditions articulates a distinctive yet interrelated account of how human beings discern, justify, and enact moral judgment. From Aristotle’s virtue-based ethics, in which practical wisdom emerges from the cultivated moral character of the agent [Aristotle, 2019: 114], to Kant’s transcendental grounding of morality in the autonomy of pure practical reason [Kant, 2015: 27], and finally to Gadamer’s interpretation of practical understanding as a historically situated act of application [Gadamer, 2013: 321], the question of how reason guides action forms a continuous thread across these diverse frameworks. The article argues that these three traditions, despite their methodological and historical differences, converge on a shared concern: The search for a coherent account of the validity, formation, and realization of moral judgment. Aristotle provides the existential and character-based ground for how agents acquire the capacity to judge well [Reeve, 1992: 119], Kant establishes the normative authority of moral law independent of empirical conditions [Beck, 1984: 56], and Gadamer elucidates how moral judgment is actualized within historical, linguistic, and interpretive contexts [Warnke, 1987: 89]. By situating these traditions in dialogue, the study contributes to contemporary ethical theory by offering a multilayered account of practical reason that avoids both reduction to empirical experience and detachment from lived moral contexts. This integrative account is particularly relevant for addressing the complexity of moral action in today’s pluralistic and dynamic world, where agents must navigate between universal principles, entrenched traditions, and evolving social realities [Adamson, 2015: 211; Kietzmann, 2023: 44].
The research adopts a comparative methodology centered on the conceptual analysis of primary philosophical texts from Aristotle, Kant, and Gadamer. The approach consists of three methodological steps. First, the study conducts an internal reconstruction of each philosopher’s account of practical reason within its own conceptual and historical horizon. For Aristotle, this entails explicating the structure of phronesis as a form of experiential, situational, and virtue-dependent rationality [Kristjánsson & Fowers, 2024: 41]. For Kant, the analysis involves unpacking the structure of pure practical reason, autonomy, and the categorical imperative as foundational sources of moral normativity [Louden, 2010: 103]. In the case of Gadamer, the focus is on the hermeneutical parameters of understanding, the fusion of horizons, and the notion of application as the practical core of interpretation [Coltman, 1998: 66]. Second, the study employs a comparative framework that places these three accounts into dialogue, not by forcing conceptual equivalences, but by distinguishing the analytical levels at which each operates: the formative-psychological level in Aristotle, the normative-transcendental level in Kant, and the interpretive-historical level in Gadamer [Celano, 2015: 91]. This layered comparison prevents interpretive distortions such as reading Kantian autonomy as a direct alternative to Aristotelian virtue, or reducing Gadamer’s hermeneutics to a mere continuation of Aristotle’s practical philosophy [DiCenso, 1990: 114]. Third, by synthesizing the insights of these three traditions, the research constructs an integrative model of practical reason that accounts for its multidimensional structure. This model does not seek to collapse the differences among ethical virtue, moral law, and hermeneutical interpretation, but rather to articulate how they complement one another [Miller, 2011: 15; Banham et al., 2015: 72]. The methodology, therefore, enables a comprehensive philosophical understanding that respects both the autonomy of each tradition and its potential contributions to a unified account of moral judgment.
Analysis
The comparative analysis reveals that practical reason is neither a single-layered faculty nor an exclusively rational or empirical capacity, but a multidimensional structure that integrates character, normativity, and interpretation. In Aristotle’s ethical theory, practical wisdom is inseparable from moral character. Phronesis is not a purely intellectual ability; it is the cultivated capacity to discern the appropriate action in the complexities of human life [Karbowski, 2019: 44]. Its foundation lies in habituation and the formation of virtue, which aligns emotional dispositions with rational judgment [Kristjánsson & Fowers, 2024: 58]. The Aristotelian model thus highlights the existential and developmental dimension of moral agency: Judgment is possible only for those whose character has been trained to perceive the morally salient features of situations [Reeve, 1992: 119]. Kant, however, reframes the question of practical reason by detaching moral normativity from psychological or empirical conditions. While Aristotle’s framework explains how agents become capable of judging well, Kant investigates why moral obligations hold universally, regardless of individual character or social context [Dean, 1999: 77]. In his account, the authority of moral judgment arises from the autonomy of the will, through which rational agents legislate universal moral laws for themselves [Kant, 2015: 27]. Practical reason is thus not primarily a skill embedded in life, but a source of unconditional normative authority. This shift clarifies dimensions of morality that Aristotle’s virtue-centered model does not fully capture, such as the possibility of moral critique, resistance to social conventions, and the universal equality of moral agents [Wartenberg, 1992: 236-239]. At the same time, Kant’s formalism risks overlooking the contextual complexities that shape lived moral decisions [Freydberg, 2005: 64]. Gadamer introduces a third level by highlighting the interpretive dimension of moral life. Even if character is formed (as in Aristotle) and universal laws are valid (as in Kant), moral judgment still requires application within concrete historical and linguistic contexts. Understanding is not merely cognitive but practical: it involves interpreting norms, situations, and traditions in ways that make action possible [Warnke, 1987: 89]. Gadamer’s notion of application demonstrates that moral judgment is never purely abstract; it is a historically conditioned event in which meaning emerges from the interaction between tradition and present circumstances [Coltman, 1998: 66]. This perspective responds to a limitation in Kantian ethics: the idea that universal laws can be applied without interpretive mediation. It also extends Aristotelian phronesis by embedding it in a hermeneutical structure marked by language, dialogue, and historical consciousness [DiCenso, 1990: 66]. Through this tripartite comparison, the study shows that the apparent conflict between Aristotelian and Kantian accounts of practical reason stems from their respective approaches to different dimensions of moral agency. Aristotle explains how agents develop the perceptual and deliberative capacities necessary for judgment; Kant explains why their judgments possess universal moral authority; and Gadamer explains how such judgments become actionable within concrete situations [Gadamer, 2013: 321; Celano, 2015: 91]. The integration of these three levels generates a richer understanding of practical reason: the agent must possess a cultivated character, operate under universalizable principles, and interpret those principles within lived contexts. Neglect of any one of these dimensions produces an incomplete account—ranging from relativistic situationalism to rigid formalism or uncritical traditionalism [Kietzmann, 2023: 44; Schneewind, 1992: 140].
Conclusion
The study concludes that a comprehensive account of practical reason requires integrating the Aristotelian, Kantian, and Gadamerian perspectives. Aristotle reveals the formative and character-based dimension of moral judgment, showing that good action depends on the stable dispositions and experiential sensibilities that constitute virtue. Kant establishes the normative dimension by grounding the authority of moral judgment in autonomy and the self-legislation of reason. Gadamer illuminates the interpretive-historical dimension, demonstrating that moral understanding is inseparable from the act of applying meaning within the horizon of tradition and lived experience.
Taken together, these three traditions reveal that practical reason is a multilayered structure rather than a singular faculty. Moral judgment requires:
This study examines the conceptual foundations of practical reason through a comparative analysis of three major philosophical traditions: Aristotelian phronesis, Kantian autonomy of the will, and Gadamer’s hermeneutical understanding. Each of these traditions articulates a distinctive yet interrelated account of how human beings discern, justify, and enact moral judgment. From Aristotle’s virtue-based ethics, in which practical wisdom emerges from the cultivated moral character of the agent [Aristotle, 2019: 114], to Kant’s transcendental grounding of morality in the autonomy of pure practical reason [Kant, 2015: 27], and finally to Gadamer’s interpretation of practical understanding as a historically situated act of application [Gadamer, 2013: 321], the question of how reason guides action forms a continuous thread across these diverse frameworks. The article argues that these three traditions, despite their methodological and historical differences, converge on a shared concern: The search for a coherent account of the validity, formation, and realization of moral judgment. Aristotle provides the existential and character-based ground for how agents acquire the capacity to judge well [Reeve, 1992: 119], Kant establishes the normative authority of moral law independent of empirical conditions [Beck, 1984: 56], and Gadamer elucidates how moral judgment is actualized within historical, linguistic, and interpretive contexts [Warnke, 1987: 89]. By situating these traditions in dialogue, the study contributes to contemporary ethical theory by offering a multilayered account of practical reason that avoids both reduction to empirical experience and detachment from lived moral contexts. This integrative account is particularly relevant for addressing the complexity of moral action in today’s pluralistic and dynamic world, where agents must navigate between universal principles, entrenched traditions, and evolving social realities [Adamson, 2015: 211; Kietzmann, 2023: 44].
The research adopts a comparative methodology centered on the conceptual analysis of primary philosophical texts from Aristotle, Kant, and Gadamer. The approach consists of three methodological steps. First, the study conducts an internal reconstruction of each philosopher’s account of practical reason within its own conceptual and historical horizon. For Aristotle, this entails explicating the structure of phronesis as a form of experiential, situational, and virtue-dependent rationality [Kristjánsson & Fowers, 2024: 41]. For Kant, the analysis involves unpacking the structure of pure practical reason, autonomy, and the categorical imperative as foundational sources of moral normativity [Louden, 2010: 103]. In the case of Gadamer, the focus is on the hermeneutical parameters of understanding, the fusion of horizons, and the notion of application as the practical core of interpretation [Coltman, 1998: 66]. Second, the study employs a comparative framework that places these three accounts into dialogue, not by forcing conceptual equivalences, but by distinguishing the analytical levels at which each operates: the formative-psychological level in Aristotle, the normative-transcendental level in Kant, and the interpretive-historical level in Gadamer [Celano, 2015: 91]. This layered comparison prevents interpretive distortions such as reading Kantian autonomy as a direct alternative to Aristotelian virtue, or reducing Gadamer’s hermeneutics to a mere continuation of Aristotle’s practical philosophy [DiCenso, 1990: 114]. Third, by synthesizing the insights of these three traditions, the research constructs an integrative model of practical reason that accounts for its multidimensional structure. This model does not seek to collapse the differences among ethical virtue, moral law, and hermeneutical interpretation, but rather to articulate how they complement one another [Miller, 2011: 15; Banham et al., 2015: 72]. The methodology, therefore, enables a comprehensive philosophical understanding that respects both the autonomy of each tradition and its potential contributions to a unified account of moral judgment.
Analysis
The comparative analysis reveals that practical reason is neither a single-layered faculty nor an exclusively rational or empirical capacity, but a multidimensional structure that integrates character, normativity, and interpretation. In Aristotle’s ethical theory, practical wisdom is inseparable from moral character. Phronesis is not a purely intellectual ability; it is the cultivated capacity to discern the appropriate action in the complexities of human life [Karbowski, 2019: 44]. Its foundation lies in habituation and the formation of virtue, which aligns emotional dispositions with rational judgment [Kristjánsson & Fowers, 2024: 58]. The Aristotelian model thus highlights the existential and developmental dimension of moral agency: Judgment is possible only for those whose character has been trained to perceive the morally salient features of situations [Reeve, 1992: 119]. Kant, however, reframes the question of practical reason by detaching moral normativity from psychological or empirical conditions. While Aristotle’s framework explains how agents become capable of judging well, Kant investigates why moral obligations hold universally, regardless of individual character or social context [Dean, 1999: 77]. In his account, the authority of moral judgment arises from the autonomy of the will, through which rational agents legislate universal moral laws for themselves [Kant, 2015: 27]. Practical reason is thus not primarily a skill embedded in life, but a source of unconditional normative authority. This shift clarifies dimensions of morality that Aristotle’s virtue-centered model does not fully capture, such as the possibility of moral critique, resistance to social conventions, and the universal equality of moral agents [Wartenberg, 1992: 236-239]. At the same time, Kant’s formalism risks overlooking the contextual complexities that shape lived moral decisions [Freydberg, 2005: 64]. Gadamer introduces a third level by highlighting the interpretive dimension of moral life. Even if character is formed (as in Aristotle) and universal laws are valid (as in Kant), moral judgment still requires application within concrete historical and linguistic contexts. Understanding is not merely cognitive but practical: it involves interpreting norms, situations, and traditions in ways that make action possible [Warnke, 1987: 89]. Gadamer’s notion of application demonstrates that moral judgment is never purely abstract; it is a historically conditioned event in which meaning emerges from the interaction between tradition and present circumstances [Coltman, 1998: 66]. This perspective responds to a limitation in Kantian ethics: the idea that universal laws can be applied without interpretive mediation. It also extends Aristotelian phronesis by embedding it in a hermeneutical structure marked by language, dialogue, and historical consciousness [DiCenso, 1990: 66]. Through this tripartite comparison, the study shows that the apparent conflict between Aristotelian and Kantian accounts of practical reason stems from their respective approaches to different dimensions of moral agency. Aristotle explains how agents develop the perceptual and deliberative capacities necessary for judgment; Kant explains why their judgments possess universal moral authority; and Gadamer explains how such judgments become actionable within concrete situations [Gadamer, 2013: 321; Celano, 2015: 91]. The integration of these three levels generates a richer understanding of practical reason: the agent must possess a cultivated character, operate under universalizable principles, and interpret those principles within lived contexts. Neglect of any one of these dimensions produces an incomplete account—ranging from relativistic situationalism to rigid formalism or uncritical traditionalism [Kietzmann, 2023: 44; Schneewind, 1992: 140].
Conclusion
The study concludes that a comprehensive account of practical reason requires integrating the Aristotelian, Kantian, and Gadamerian perspectives. Aristotle reveals the formative and character-based dimension of moral judgment, showing that good action depends on the stable dispositions and experiential sensibilities that constitute virtue. Kant establishes the normative dimension by grounding the authority of moral judgment in autonomy and the self-legislation of reason. Gadamer illuminates the interpretive-historical dimension, demonstrating that moral understanding is inseparable from the act of applying meaning within the horizon of tradition and lived experience.
Taken together, these three traditions reveal that practical reason is a multilayered structure rather than a singular faculty. Moral judgment requires:
- a cultivated ethical character capable of perceiving what matters in concrete situations;
- a universal normative framework that secures the impartiality and rational validity of moral obligations;
- a hermeneutically informed process of interpretation and application through which norms and virtues are actualized in real human contexts.
This integrative framework avoids the pitfalls of reducing morality to habit, abstract law, or historical relativism. It demonstrates that the complexity of contemporary moral life—marked by pluralism, cultural diversity, and evolving social challenges—demands an understanding of practical reason that is at once experiential, principled, and interpretive. By bringing Aristotle, Kant, and Gadamer into philosophical conversation, the study contributes to a robust and dynamic conception of practical reason that better accounts for the full scope of human moral agency.
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