fa <span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:107%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span style="font-size:10.0pt"><span style="line-height:107%"><span cambria="" style="font-family:">Jacob Nathan argues that the mind&ndash;body problem has historically worn three different faces, and that, in light of its most recent face, the proper task of philosophy of mind in the present era is restricted to investigating how the mind can be empirically studied within the neuroscientific age, thus requiring that ontological investigations be set aside. This paper offers a reconstruction and critical evaluation of Nathan&#39;s position. An instance of the articulation of the proper task of philosophy within contemporary mind studies can be observed in the &#39;critical neuroscience&#39; approach as expounded by David L&aring;g Tomasi. Tomasi conceives of philosophy not as a peripheral discipline, but as a &quot;Philosophy as basic approach toward neuroscience.&quot; On this account, philosophy, in its relation to neuroscience, is charged with analyzing theoretical presuppositions, interpreting empirical data, integrating various levels of explanation, and appraising the existential, ethical, and social consequences of neuroscientific research&mdash;without relinquishing its own ongoing inquiries into its characteristic problems.</span></span></span></span></span></span><br> &nbsp; Philosophy of Mind, Mind–Body Problem, Critical Neuroscience, David Låg Tomasi, Jacob Nathan, Consciousness, Philosophy of Science 341 360 http://jpt.daneshafarand.org/browse.php?a_code=A-10-240-15&slc_lang=fa&sid=6 R. Dargahifar 1003194753284600388031 1003194753284600388031 Yes Department of Cognitive Science, Faculty of Strategic Sciences and Technologies, University of Qom, Qom, Iran